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Abstract 
 
This thesis attempts to elucidate the specificities of contemporary ruins using critical 
theory and cultural studies applied to various sites of analysis ranging from art and film 
to abandoned factories and disaster zones. It is motivated not only by the question of 
whether thinking about the contemporary world through the conceptual paradigm of the 
ruin might offer insight into the crises that afflict our everyday lives, but by the political 
desire to seek, amidst the ruins, an opportunity to re-imagine the possible. The ruinous 
processes of creative destruction, dispossession, commodification, forced obsolescence, 
deindustrialization, and disaster are examined in their relation to the workings of 
capitalism. Capitalism is seen to systematically manufacture ruins, producing physical, 
ecological, and affective geographies of ruination. These ruins are the starting point to 
ask the question: What does it mean for the political imagination to be confronted with 
social reality as a mounting pile of wreckage? I suggest that it has a profound impact 
upon our sense of historical agency, upon our capacity to dream, to imagine, and to act. 
Ruins are bound up with losses of all kinds, and, as such, with larger cultural practices of 
memory and mourning. While ruins in capitalist modernity still embodied a dialectic 
tension between old and new, loss and invention, nostalgia and optimism, ruins in 
postmodernity lack the same productive tension: they seem to signal unqualified loss and 
the foreclosure of all possibilities for the future. I argue that moving beyond this 
depressive melancholy imagination, one of the many 'ruins of modernity', requires that 
we confront and work through these losses in order to be better able to seize upon the 
opportunities for resistance and social change that exist in the present. The representation 
of ruins, specifically the relation of form to content, is considered from the standpoint of 
its ability to restore perceptibility and responsiveness or, inversely, to anaesthetize and 
make us numb. Radical, self-reflexive aesthetic practices concerned with symbolizing 
loss and deepening historical awareness, are presented as a creative and promising 
approach to re-appropriating the ruins.   
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Introduction 
 
 
 
We live, it seems, in a world in ruins.  The daily news is full of headlines and images of 
the latest disasters: countries devastated by war, famine, or foreign intervention; cities 
ravaged by financial ruin or deserted in the wake of deindustrialization; societies mired in 
political strife or struck by economic collapse; environmental catastrophes so devastating 
that they are hardly graspable by the human imagination—and the list goes on.  
Overnight entire countries fall into bankruptcy and cities are wiped off the map.  
Economic restructuring puts thousands out of work and signals the devitalization of 
communities.  The aftermath of an earthquake or hurricane unfolds in a series of related 
disasters that are the direct result of decision-making processes.  While there is 
tremendous variation in the phenomena mentioned above, what is interesting is precisely 
the way in which contemporary catastrophes increasingly blur the distinctions between 
the environmental, the political, and the economic.  Indeed, while ruins have always 
embodied the tension between nature and culture, as theorists like Georg Simmel (1958) 
have pointed out, in the ruinous landscapes of today it is often no longer possible to 
disentangle them.  As such, to be engaged with social and political life is to be faced with 
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the problematic of how to account for this ruinous state of things, to ask whether there 
might be a deeper logic at work behind what on the surface appears to be an unrelated but 
terrifying accumulation of crises and turmoil.  This project emerges out of a concern to 
draw the connections between these sites and scenarios, in order to better understand our 
relationship to the landscapes of devastation which we inhabit.  It is motivated not only 
by the question of whether thinking about the contemporary world through the 
conceptual paradigm of the ruin might offer insight into the crises that afflict our 
everyday lives, but by the political desire to seek, amidst the ruins, an opportunity to re-
imagine the possible.  
 We are so accustomed to thinking of ruins as the ruins of distant times and ancient 
civilizations that we often fail to see the devastated landscapes around us as the ruins of 
our own age.  As a cultural category, ruins can evoke a diverse set of images: the rubble 
of a medieval church in the French countryside, a crumbling temple in the Central 
American jungle, or more famous and well-preserved monuments like the Pyramids of 
Giza or the petrified city of Pompeii.  Though geographically and historically dispersed, 
and the products of very different cultures, what unites these images is their temporal 
discontinuity with the present.  They are safely situated in the distant past—in ancient 
times or the dark ages, remote and immemorial.  While, undeniably, the iconography and 
the discourse of ruins is dominated by the ruins of ancient Greek and Roman times—
those of Classical Antiquity—the concept has been increasingly interrogated by critical 
scholarship and challenged by the disastrous events of recent history, including the 
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aftermath of war, genocide, and atomic power.  As such, it has been made to encompass a 
much broader range of sites and phenomena.  The 'classical' ruin of antiquity, once 
considered the standard model of the ruin, is now one ruin among many, whose self-
evident status and social significance is no longer left unproblematized.  The result has 
been that the conceptual terminology of 'ruins' increasingly occupies an important, even 
contested, place in academic discourse and in popular culture, and is called upon to make 
sense of the state of cultural and social institutions, including the university and the 
museum (Readings 1996; Crimp 1993).   
 The ruin, as it is conceived by the discipline of archaeology, is a self-evident 
thing, a recognizable material artefact.  It is loosely defined as the remains of a human-
made structure that is in a state of decay.  A ruin is an edifice or construct that has lost its 
purpose and functionality, that has fallen out of use, and thus been exposed to the 
vagaries of time and the forces of nature.  Its destiny in the present is seemingly a purely 
passive one: to be photographed, studied, and preserved as a historical remainder, a 
palimpsest of epochs.  Yet, this conceptualization of the ruin has been challenged by 
recent scholarship, which argues that the status and social significance of the ruin is no 
longer self-evident, but rather, something that needs to be problematized and rethought 
by social scientists, cultural theorists, and art historians.  Julia Hell and Andreas Schönle 
(2008), in their ground-breaking edited volume, Ruins of Modernity, point to the fact that 
the ruin is, in fact, an indeterminate, open-ended theoretical construction, one that is 
available to critical re-appropriations.  As such, they call upon us to attend to the 
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essential questions that the ruin raises for theory:  
As an aesthetic and conceptual category, [the ruin] is uniquely ill-
defined. Where does the ruin start, and where does it end? Is a well-
preserved but empty building already a ruin because it has lost its 
practical and social function? And, at the other end of the spectrum, 
does rubble still qualify as a ruin? More broadly, is a ruin an object 
or a process? Does it signal the loss or the endurance of the past? 
Does it matter whether ruination is the work of nature or human 
action? Is authenticity a necessary condition of the ruin, or are 
manufactured ruins just as real? (6) 
This is just the beginning of the theoretical trajectories that take the ruin as their point of 
departure.  We could further ask: What is the relation of the ruin to time?  Indeed, are 
there multiple temporalities of ruination?  Is it necessary that a given structure was once 
complete to be considered a ruin?  What is the relationship of the ruin to capitalism, or  to 
the 'manufactured landscapes', to borrow the title of the 2006 film on photographer 
Edward Burtynsky's work, of heavy industry or resource extraction?  What place does the 
ruin occupy in our cultural imaginary?  How has the ruin been appropriated by visual 
culture?  There are no clear answers to these questions, but the very act of problematizing 
what was previously taken for granted opens up the space for a series of creative and 
critical revaluations.  Thinking through the possible distinctions between the ruins of 
antiquity and those of modernity (and postmodernity), between those of the past and the 
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present (and even the future), necessitates such an approach.  
 The ruin has long been a subject of fascination, particularly in the modern period.  
As Brian Dillon suggests in “A Short History of Decay,” modernity generated an “early 
enthusiasm for ruins: a craze that culminated with the elaboration in the late eighteenth 
century of a Romantic aesthetics of fragmentation, failure and picturesque decline” 
(2011, 11).  In previous, premodern times, ruins were not part of the cultural imaginary in 
the same way.  While, indeed, there were structures and edifices in states of decay—the 
ruins of Classical Antiquity lounged languorously upon the landscape long before 
modernity—they were not conceptualized as a socially significant and meaningful 
category.  There was nothing notable about ruins: people inhabited them, passed through 
them, played amidst them, but never thought to turn them into an object of knowledge, 
art, literature, or poetry.  Ruins first take on an aesthetic force and metaphoric power in 
relation to modernity: “it is not really until the renaissance—that is, until the advent of a 
modernity that conceives itself in relation to the remains of the past—that the ruin 
becomes an essential aesthetic concept” (Dillon, 12).  In other words, it is, according to 
Dillon, modernity's reflexivity and historical positioning that is key when thinking about 
its relationship to ruins.  Modernity is situated in relation to antiquity or the pre-modern; 
one of the features of modernity is a sense of historical discontinuity with the past, of 
rupture with former ways of life.  The conditions of modernity, modernization, and 
urbanization, create an awareness that, in the words of the famous modern artist Piet 
Mondrian, “the destruction of old forms is a condition for the creation of new, higher 
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forms” (cited in Dillon 2011).  The 'modern' is keenly conscious of the loss constituted 
by the insuperable break from the cultural traditions, social structures, and everyday life 
of the ancients, even if these are imaginary and idealized.  It is only in such a context that 
the ruin, as a trace or a fragment, is valued as a cultural container which “encapsulates 
vacuity and loss as underlying constituents of the modern identity. It is the reflexivity of 
a culture that interrogates its own becoming” (Hell and Schönle, 6).  Ruins become one 
of the tropes through which modern subjectivity is organized.    
 Ruins, for the modern imaginary, become a vehicle for registering the passage of 
time, for marking the gap between present and past forms—the gap that is generated by 
the revolutionary process of creative-destruction accompanying modernity.  Modernism 
was understood as producing ruins as its very condition of possibility.  In modernity ruins 
are an organizing trope for thinking through such themes as the revaluation of values, the 
questioning of traditional social roles, the destabilization of social meanings, and the 
dissolution of former modes of being, thought, and behaviour in modern society.  They 
capture the effects wrought upon everyday life by the great upheavals of modernity: the 
transition from rural to urban environments, industrialization, and the imposition of 
capitalist social relations.  Yet loss in modernity, painful as it often was, was ultimately 
understood as productive: of new forms, new values, and advances toward the betterment 
of the human condition through progress.  Ruins were able to embody the tensions 
accompanying loss, to evoke at once the feelings of melancholy for the past and the 
optimism for the future; they were reminders “of what we have lost and are constantly 
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losing in our rush into the future” (Quint 2006, xi-xii).  Huyssen calls this tension 
between loss and the creation of the new the “dialectic of modernity” (2006, 20).  It is 
perhaps this dialectic, which traverses the possible, that has been lost in the 'postmodern' 
moment in which ruins are so often the signifiers of unqualified loss, the products of 
human shortcomings and evil.  While one side of the modern dialectic remains, what 
Harvey (1990) sees as that of the destructive forces of fragmentation, damage, and 
dispersal, the side of hope, of creative projects for the emancipation and the betterment of 
the human condition, has been abandoned.  Indeed, the contemporary concern to chart the 
'ruins of modernity', to cite the title of Hell and Schönle's (2008) influential collection, is 
suggestive of a desire to understand precisely what has been lost in the contemporary era.       
 The twentieth century—which witnessed, notably, two imperial wars, a series of 
violent revolutions, extreme forms of political repression, and the invention of the atomic 
bomb—produced a startling pile of wreckage, and this tendency toward ruination appears 
to be accelerating as we move into the twenty-first century.  The welding of new 
technological capacities to the pursuit of political power is in part responsible for this 
phenomenon, as are the scientific developments that have allowed us to manipulate the 
natural environment on a massive scale without taking into account the long-term or 
unforeseen consequences of such actions.  Yet, in many ways, ruination does not appear 
to be merely the consequence of war-making or the outcome of environmental backlash.  
Ruins can be seen as much more than a side-effect, intentional or unintentional, of man's 
pursuit of power over fellow man or nature.  Indeed, while ruins certainly are bound up 
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with the rise and fall of empires, as well as with the natural processes of decay with 
which they are commonly associated, in recent times, ruin-making is much more 
insidious to the deeper logic and organizing principles of this society—perhaps 
inseparable from the very dynamics of capitalism.  This has led some scholars to reflect 
upon the ruin's relationship to modernity: “Is there a possible elective affinity between 
ruins and modernity? Or is the connection [...] even stronger—is there some intrinsic 
logic of ruin at work in modernity?” (Hell & Schönle, 5).  What is certain is that these 
catastrophic events have instigated a major reconceptualization of ruins in contemporary 
scholarship which has had, as we shall see, an impact upon the cultural imaginary.     
 Indeed, I have only hinted at the complicated and often convoluted ways in which 
the contemporary scholarly discourse on the ruin is bound up with—whether critically or 
uncritically—a larger cultural melancholia.  This melancholia, the inability to work 
through losses and trauma, the failure to mourn, is perhaps, as suggested in the next 
chapter and throughout the dissertation, the outcome of what is perceived as modernity's 
failed project: it signals the incomplete, seemingly impossible, mourning for the utopian 
possibilities that modernity and modernism were felt to harbour.  In the aftermath of the 
horrific events of the past century, our obsession with the ruins of modernity is, perhaps, 
an expression of nostalgia for the ruins of another time—ruins that were the work of 
decay rather than human destruction, of the passing of time rather than capitalist and 
imperialist practices.  This nostalgia, far more than just the longing for an absent past, 
whether real or imagined, is, as Huyssen writes, “also a longing for another place,” 
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another reality, which can mean another future (7).  At its limits, this means that the 
universalization of capitalism does not signify the end of history nor of hope for a better 
world.   
 The first chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to elucidating the social history 
of the ruin in modernity and postmodernity, tracing the socio-historical circumstances 
that have altered our discourse and conceptualization of the ruin.  It approaches the ruin 
as a social concept as much as a material process, which offers insights into our larger 
ways of perceiving and interpreting the world around us.  The starting point is the 
romantic conceptualization of the ruin, which saw it as a picturesque fragment left by the 
struggle between nature and culture, and capable of evoking a melancholy, but 
nevertheless pleasurable, aesthetic enjoyment.  I outline how the devastating material 
realities of the twentieth century gradually extended the concept and category of the ruin 
to include those of human-made disasters.  In the aftermath of the worst horrors of the 
twentieth century, the very notion of aestheticizing ruins was to come under attack, as 
any pleasure derived from the contemplation of catastrophe was problematized.  When 
dealing with ruins, we are dealing with the difficulties of history and its representation; 
we inevitably face questions of historical preservation and erasure; we confront at once 
the deepest human suffering and the most abhorrent human evil.  From this theoretical 
excursus, it becomes clear that ruins are bound up with losses of all kinds, and, as such, 
with larger cultural practices of memory and mourning.  I argue that moving beyond the 
melancholy imagination, one of the many 'ruins of modernity', requires that we confront 
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and work through these losses in order to be better able to seize upon the opportunities 
for rebuilding in the present.  Ruins, with the power they hold over the imaginary, 
become a bridge between a past which is always, to some extent, unknowable, and a 
future which remains uncertain, helping us to relocate ourselves as agents in the historical 
process.  
 In chapter two, I explore the ways in which the manufacture of ruination could be 
argued to be an inextricable feature of the logic of capitalism.  In building upon the 
existing critical theory dealing with the ruin, I create a conceptual framework adequate to 
the task of elucidating the specificity of contemporary ruins: the ruins of capital.  The 
'ruins of capital' is a term used here to refer to landscapes devastated by 
deindustrialization, financial speculation, commodification, and imperial ventures.  
Capitalism, as such, is seen to be bound up with the production of economic, social, and 
political wastelands, including Detroit and New Orleans, to mention just two notable 
cases.  Its logic is that of the relentless pursuit of profit, forced obsolescence, and the 
rapidly outmoded.  Its 'self-revolutionizing' tendency, the outcome of the drive to 
overcome inherent and periodic crises, was first identified by Marx as expressing itself in 
the dynamic of 'creative destruction', and later developed by Harvey (2012), Mandel 
(1976), and others.  Within the field of political economy, such concepts as 'disaster' or 
'crisis' capitalism (Klein 2007; Gunewardena & Schuller 2008) have begun to elucidate 
the contemporary features of the production of and capitalization upon catastrophe.  
These theories allow us to identify catastrophe as the latest frontier, not only of the 
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accumulation of capital, but also of dispossession.  As the production of space—in this 
case of ruins—is simultaneously a fashioning of the self and the senses, it is also 
important to question the ways in which our identities and our capacities, our ability to 
imagine and to act, are informed by the ruinous landscapes that we now inhabit, an issue 
raised by artists such as Edward Burtynsky.              
 The third chapter of this work takes up this issue of the interrelation of 
subjectivity and space by examining two figures of the ruins—the flâneur and the 
glaneur/euse—who serve as lenses through which the processes refashioning the 
landscape in modernity and postmodernity can be grasped.  Urban sociologists, including 
Simmel, Benjamin, and Lefebvre, have long been concerned with the impact of 
modernization and urbanization, with its various disruptions and dislocations, upon the 
sensibility and character of modern men and women.  They have argued that everyday 
life occurs in spaces (and according to temporal rhythms) that have been produced and 
structured in particular ways by forces associated with capitalism, such as fragmentation, 
commodification, and rationalization.  Building on this work, it becomes important not 
only to explore the ways in which ruined spaces are negotiated and inhabited, but also to 
examine our interactions with cultural ruins and debris—those objects destined by forced 
obsolescence to become old-fashioned and outmoded.  Such an analysis speaks to the 
lives and the afterlives of things in our society, a trajectory that all too often leads from 
the commodity form to the trash bin in a seemingly predestined manner.  Nevertheless, 
the circuits of cultural objects beyond the commodity form at times follow creative paths 
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that lead to their re-appropriation.  As residues of a production process organized not 
according to the fulfilment of needs and the cultivation of human capacities, but instead 
toward profit maximization, cultural debris have the potential to spark moments of 
critical insight, akin to what Benjamin terms “profane illumination” (1986, 179).  The 
flâneur and glaneur/euse are thus protagonists that can help untangle both the 
contradictions and overlooked potential of our encounters with the ruins of everyday life.  
 Problematizing the representation of ruins is crucial for thinking about the 
interrelated issues of aesthetics and ethics, in particular, the aestheticization of horror.  In 
the conditions of late modernity, or postmodernity, there has been much discussion of the 
idea of representation itself as a ruin (Horkheimer & Adorno 1986).  Theodor Adorno 
(1983) was perhaps the first to signal the state of crisis in which cultural production 
found itself following the horrors of the Second World War, including the Holocaust and 
the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in his famous declaration 
regarding poetry after Auschwitz.  The dilemma that faces the architect, artist, and even 
historian in the post-war, post-nuclear aftermath of the twentieth century is how to 
represent the wreckage of history: What is the relationship between form and content?  
Does horror resist all attempts at understanding; is it unspeakable?  How does one 
negotiate “the impossibility of remembering and the necessity of forgetting” 
(Merewether, 33)?  The fourth chapter of this dissertation examines these issues in 
relation to our capacity to respond to human suffering, and in light of recent discussions 
around the relationship between aesthetics and anaesthetization (Buck-Morss 1992), or 
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the impairment of our ability to react and act when faced with the 'pain of others', as 
Sontag (2004) puts it.  The ruins produced in this last century demand that we rethink the 
project and the conventions of representation, particularly in a media culture so saturated 
with images, in order to retrace the possibilities and limitations of artistic and aesthetic 
appropriations, for these have had both the power to move us and the unfortunate side-
effect of making us numb. 
 Finally, the fifth chapter of this dissertation, in further developing the relation 
between aesthetics and politics, seeks to define the features of an 'aesthetics of the ruins'.  
Following Flatley (2008), it qualifies melancholy as something that is not necessarily 
depressive in character, but at times stimulative of agency; as an activity or method, to 
melancholize is productive of knowledge of loss, oppression, and various structures that 
are responsible for the affective life and the state of the imaginary of the individual and 
collective (2).  In contrast to the 'aesthetics of disengagement', the enacting of depressive 
states of boredom, social withdrawal, and communicational rupture, which Ross (2006) 
argues characterizes contemporary artist practice, I seek out examples of an alternative 
aesthetic practice which, in these terms, is melancholy, rather than depressive, in 
character.  While preoccupied with irretrievable losses, such an aesthetics seeks, 
nevertheless, to work through them.  It is an engaged practice which is concerned with 
contemporary ruins, including the ruins of occupation, the remains of civil war, and what 
Stoler (2008) calls 'imperial debris'.  Insisting upon the ruins becomes a way of resisting 
dominant ideologies that would erase or aestheticize death in order to promote further 
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cycles of violence, retribution, or sectarian warfare (Seigneurie 2011).  Several 
interesting artistic examples are discussed, in which art is used to recall the past, or to 
create temporal juxtapositions, in such a way that another future, for instance of 
reconciliation or co-habitation, becomes imaginable.  
 There are undoubtedly notable omissions in this work—certain themes not 
addressed, some theorists left aside, numerous artistic and social movements meriting 
attention that were not discussed.  In response, I can say that this dissertation does not 
claim to be fully comprehensive of all of the contemporary theoretical and aesthetic 
excursions that take ruins as their starting point as that would be far beyond the scope of 
this work.  There will be future projects, my own and others, that will pick up where I 
have left off.  The decision to structure the chapters thematically was in the interests of 
raising some thought-provoking questions and stimulating debates that challenge the 
ways in which we are accustomed to thinking about ruins.  I was interested in considering 
ruins from multiple angles, through the lenses of art, history, politics, aesthetics, space, 
and subjectivity.  My own desire to revisit the ruins was born of a personal need, as much 
as of a theoretical interest, to rethink the possible forms of engagement within the 
contemporary social and political landscapes that surround us.  It was inspired by those 
many artists and thinkers who have not remained prostrate before the ruins of their time, 
but who have courageously sought to face them, to grapple with them, even to transform 
them.  As one of my favourite artists, the great English sculptor, Henry Moore once said, 
“To be an artist is the opposite of being in a state of despair.  To be an artist is to believe 
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in life” (120).  Beyond naïve optimism, returning again and again to the ruins can 
generate another kind of hope that is not blind to the sorrows of history: a hope that is 
rooted in human agency, the recognition that we are, and have always been, the agents of 
history.      
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1. 
The Social History of the Ruin 
 
 
I. 
What stands out, as one begins to engage with the vast body of literature that deals with 
ruins, is the way in which ruins have intersected with the human imagination throughout 
modern history.  Ruins have, for many centuries, occupied an important place in the 
cultural imaginary of the Western world.  They have been studied, painted, 
photographed, contemplated, and reproduced.  In certain periods, ruins have generated a 
veritable craze of enthusiasts, among them several important theorists and authors of the 
twentieth century, including Sigmund Freud, Georg Simmel, and Walter Benjamin, just 
to mention a few.  Ruins, far from being the dead relics of the past, are productive: of 
literary and artistic works, poetry, art historical narratives, tales of adventure, myth, and 
legend.  They have a remarkable ability to resonate with the deepest preoccupations and 
cultural projects of certain epochs; invested with social meanings and symbolic 
significance, ruins often serve as a cultural screen upon which are projected the fears, 
anxieties, desires, and hopes which are shared and shaped by society at large, especially 
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in times of radical upheaval and social change.  Taken up by the socio-cultural 
imaginary, ruins become the object of contention and desire, of fantasy and imagination, 
of speculation and struggle; they are interwoven in networks of knowledge and power—
with expert opinions, authorized interpretations, and institutions from the university to 
the museum.  Thus, far from being the exclusive preserve of art historians or 
archaeologists, ruins are a fascinating site of socio-cultural analysis.  While ruins have 
been extensively analyzed through the lens of aesthetic concepts and judgement, in this 
chapter, we will shift the register to the realm of the imaginary, shedding light upon the 
ways in which ruins have served as a key trope through which men and women have 
grappled with the larger forces at work in transforming their everyday lives.  The 
multiple expressions given to ruins in modernity and 'postmodernity', whether in 
literature, poetry, film, or painting, reflect the attempts of ordinary people to engage with 
historical processes in a meaningful manner.  
 While ruins, in some cases, may remain more or less unaltered for centuries, the 
meanings attached to them change substantially over time; that is, despite their evident 
materiality, their status and significance are socially-constructed, historical, and 
contextual.  Much more than mere historical traces, ruins themselves have a history that 
is not only natural, but more importantly, social.  They have been inextricably bound up 
with history, politics, aesthetics, philosophy, and social practices, appropriated towards 
various ends and projects, ranging from the artistic to the political.  Despite what 
Francesco Orlando (2006) terms their “primary non-functionality,” or their retirement 
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from their intended function, as something lived in or used for specific purposes, they 
have been invested with a creative range of secondary functions (10).  Symbolically, they 
are taken up in the present in countless ways to make sense of different aspects of human 
experience related to time, materiality, transience, and in particular, the larger processes 
(re)fashioning the landscape and our everyday lives.  Indeed, as a material feature of the 
physical and social landscapes which we inhabit, we are faced not only with the question 
of how to conceptualize ruins, but what to do with them.  An analysis which looks toward 
the past for insight and inspiration must become a praxis that is turned toward the future, 
and receptive to the moments of possibility in the present.  Praxis is the moment in which 
the imaginary connects with agency in the struggle to insert ourselves, as thinking and 
dreaming beings, into the historical process. 
 This chapter will offer a brief overview of how ruins have been conceived, 
interpreted, and imagined across a period of Western history: from the Romantic era to 
the current age.  It will broadly trace the theoretical excursions that take the ruin as their 
starting point, just as it will chart the vicissitudes and trajectories of the ruin in 
representation, in order to provide the context for a discussion of the ruin in the 
contemporary period, designated by some as that of post-modernity.  For our purposes, 
we are less interested in the debate as to whether 'postmodern' is indeed an accurate or 
appropriate appellation for our age, than with the question of how and if contemporary 
ruins differ from romantic, modern ruins.  For many critical theorists, including Harvey 
(1990), Berman (1988), and Jameson (1991), the cultural and political landscape of the 
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mid- to late-twentieth century does differ from that of what is commonly referred to as 
modernity—even if they do not agree on what to call it.  What each does affirm, 
however, is the persistence of capitalism, which remains in its essentials unchanged in 
the contemporary era, even as certain of its features have evolved.   
 As we shall see, there has been a major reconceptualization of ruins in the 
twentieth century, one that is still ongoing and in which this thesis participates.  Certain 
historical events of the past century have no doubt played a compelling part in 
stimulating this broad cultural debate—events that include, but are not limited to, two 
world wars, the Holocaust, and nuclear disaster.  While ruins before the mid-twentieth 
century were seen as 'fertile', expressive of human hopes and folly, ruins in the 
subsequent period came to be experienced as hostile and inhuman (Yablon 2009).  Far 
from the product of natural cycles, the ruins left by these catastrophes came to be seen by 
theorists, including Adorno and Horkheimer (1986), as the inescapable product of 
Enlightenment thinking and rationality to which the project of modernity was bound.  
“Europe,” they write in Dialectic of Enlightenment, “has two histories: a well-known, 
written history and an underground history.  The latter consists in the fate of the human 
instincts and passions which are displaced and distorted by civilization” (231). Their 
conclusion: “The curse of irresistible progress is irresistible regression” (36).  Departing 
from a vision of history as still rich in redemptive and revolutionary possibilities, 
however broken, this cultural shift presents a more pessimistic perspective which casts 
culture itself as a ruin.  Indeed, the anti-modern sentiment which, according to Harvey 
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(1990), arose from within the folds of modernism itself, in response to the horrors of 
genocide, atomic war, and other forms of systematic murder and oppression—to the 
failures of the 'Enlightenment'—rejected the larger project of modernity as complicit with 
barbarism. It is thus we are to make sense of the affirmation of the postmodern, which 
distances itself from the aims, the means, and the crimes of the modern.    
 This reaction, though appropriate to the scale of devastation witnessed over the 
course of the past century, has had major consequences on the socio-political imaginary 
and the possibilities for meaningful political praxis in our time.  Indeed, while ruins have 
been inextricably bound to the experience of loss in modernity, only now do they signal 
the foreclosure of loss—the inability to work through trauma.  By way of a journey 
through the contemporary critical scholarship on ruins, this chapter will argue that ruins 
in 'postmodernity' are entangled with what I will term the melancholy imagination: a 
socio-cultural imaginary unconsciously preoccupied with loss and unable to perform the 
work of mourning.  Aside from the continuing effects of historical trauma, the reading of 
the 'project of modernity'—which Harvey defines as the project of using the “knowledge 
generated by many individuals working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human 
emancipation and the enrichment of daily life” (1990, 12)—as responsible for the ills of 
the past century, is, at least in part, at the root of this melancholic condition.  While the 
exploitation of nature, instrumental reason, and the development of rationalized methods 
of domination were certainly among the products of this project that merit condemnation, 
this does not mean that the concern for the betterment of the human condition, which 
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animated modernity even if it was distorted, should be replaced by cynicism.  
Furthermore, the cautionary tale afforded by Dialectic of Enlightenment, while no doubt 
a brilliant work of cultural criticism, perhaps under-emphasizes the leading role of 
capitalism and imperialism in many of the traumas of recent times.  The practices 
connected with the logic of capital call for close scrutiny as being productive of many of 
the ruins of our time—a theme explored in greater depth in the next chapter.  Beyond 
indicting the human passions, a rather hopeless task, especially when it becomes, as it 
often does, a question of an unmalleable human nature, such an approach offers an 
effective target for practices of resistance and reinvigorates a sense of agency.       
 Ruins are, for the imaginary, storehouses of loss, archives of collective memory.  
As Francesco Orlando argues in Obsolete Objects in the Literary Imagination, while in 
capitalism we value what is new, useful, and in fashion, those things made “useless, old, 
unusual, decayed, obsolete, or derelict,” like all repressed materials, find a way of 
returning in cultural forms (2006, 6).  Literature, for him, is thus “a photographic 
negative of the positive cultural reality” (5), a place where discarded objects are piled up.  
Similarly, cultural expressions of ruins might also be seen as such reminders: they 
recuperate fragments of the various historical losses and traumas that have accompanied 
the changing material conditions of life in modernity and postmodernity, the 
transformation of social relations by the imperatives of capital, and acts of domination 
and violence.  They are the imperatives to remember rather than to forget, or repress, the 
past.  As Quint writes of the obsolete, one form taken by the ruin, in the preface to the 
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book, “these objects return, depicted in literature whose own cultural function is to 
remind us of what we have lost and are constantly losing in our rush into the future” 
(2006, xi-xii).   
 I would like to argue that, just as the disruptions and dislocations to the social 
fabric in modernity demanded 'working through' in the Freudian sense of confronting 
loss, so too the traumas of our 'postmodern' time require confrontation, elaboration, and 
even interpretation, for as Freud stressed of traumatic events, ““the meaning […] is only 
recognizable later on” (1973e, 118).  Ruins, an intimate register of time and of history, 
are one possible site of this cultural work.  Overcoming the depressive and paralyzing 
features of melancholia which have cast their shadow over politico-historical praxis 
means revisiting the ruins of the past, as well as those of the present and the future.  
Remembering complicated legacies of violence and damage, of lost hopes and ideals, 
reopens history's book.  The social history of the ruin—whether architectural or 
industrial, produced by financial speculation or by war—reveals the tension between loss 
and its foreclosure, between the imperative to remember and the need to forget that are 
part of the vicissitudes of mourning and melancholia.  The proliferation of cultural 
expressions centred upon ruins can, as such, be read as attempts at narration, meaning-
making, and symbolization; and symbolizing losses, be they personal or political, is the 
first step toward working through them.  It is as such that the ruin is a key trope of 
(post)modernity, and bound up with what Michael Rothberg, in his book Traumatic 
Realism: The Demand of Holocaust Representation, terms our “contemporary fascination 
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with trauma, catastrophe, [and] the fragility of memory [...]” (2000, 3). 
 
II. 
The ruins of ancient and medieval times came to be associated with the aesthetic 
experience of the picturesque in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, an 
association that has persisted, to a large extent, in the present.  The picturesque, an 
aesthetic ideal developed during the period of romanticism in the writings of William 
Gilpin, Richard Payne Knight, Uvedale Price, John Ruskin, and others, was 
conceptualized as a quality of the landscape that evokes a certain quality of feeling: in 
occupying a space between the beautiful and the sublime, the picturesque scene was 
understood to give rise to a pleasant, melancholy state of being that is neither the 
expansive, harmonious play of the senses in the contemplation of beauty, as defined by 
Immanuel Kant, nor the terror of a confrontation with sublimity.  Theorists of the 
picturesque attempted to pin its visual qualities to the character of line and texture, the 
contrast of light and dark, and the relationship between foreground and other elements of 
a scene, all discussed by Gilpin (1794) in his essay “On Picturesque Beauty.”  As J. 
Aikin wrote in a letter to his son in 1794: “in ruins, even of the most regular edifices, the 
lines are so softened by decay or interrupted by demolition” (quoted in Hunt 1997, 179).  
Ruskin similarly notes in The Seven Lamps of Architecture, published in 1849, that “there 
is not a cluster of weeds growing in any cranny of ruin which has not a beauty in all 
respects nearly equal, and, in some, immeasurably superior, to that of the most elaborate 
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sculpture of its stones” (2001, 83).  Rough, broken, angular—these defining qualities of 
the picturesque adhered perfectly to the shape and character of ancient ruins or the rubble 
of medieval churches that speckled the European countryside.  Indeed, with their 
crumbling walls, the intricate play of light and shadow upon their varied surfaces, and 
their simultaneous evocation of fragility and endurance, such ruins became the prototype 
of the picturesque in the romantic sensibility.  
 Ruins for the romantics were not only the source of visual appreciation, but were 
expressive of history, time, and materiality—suggestive of larger metaphors that could be 
grasped by the imagination.  As John Dixon Hunt explains in Gardens and the 
Picturesque: Studies in the History of Landscape Architecture, there was, in the 
eighteenth century, “a movement from learned identification of specific classical remains 
to generalized evocation”; that is, rather than being emblematic signifiers of particular 
people or events, ruins came to be viewed as the more generalized “impressionistic 
suggestions of decay and loss” (1997, 181).  Indeed, ruins were central to the picturesque 
because they met both its formal (or aesthetic) and associative (or imaginative) demands 
(180): “Ruins were a prime ingredient of any picturesque view. They satisfied, in the first 
place, a love for broken and rough surfaces” (179).  In the second place, they satisfied the 
mind, for it was “equally essential” that ruins “should have been 'of some grandeur and 
elegance' […] so that the associative faculty could be brought into play. For what attracts 
one to ruins is their incompleteness, their instant declaration of a loss which we can 
complete in our imaginations” (179).  The historical presence in ruins gives them their 
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“noble” character, and contributes to the feeling of melancholy they evoke (Ruskin 
2001).  As Smethurst notes, for Gilpin “[t]he picturesqueness of ruins is guaranteed by 
their 'roughness' and 'irritation' to the eye”; yet he “connects ruins with the English 
affectation of pleasing melancholy: 'But in a ruin the reigning ideas are solitude, neglect, 
and desolation'” (2012, 144).  As such, ruins were a coveted source of philosophical 
contemplation and artistic inspiration, attracting poets, painters, writers, and travellers of 
a romantic persuasion.   
 Ruins evoked a pleasurable reflection upon the passage of time and the transience 
of all things—the life cycles of nature, lost love, the passing of fellow creatures, and, of 
course, the rise and fall of empires symbolically captured in the tangible fragments of the 
past.  They appealed to the sensibility of the early moderns.  The bitter-sweet pleasure 
with which they came to be associated was a highly desired aesthetic experience or affect 
of the time.  According to Michael Roth in Irresistible Decay: Ruins Reclaimed: 
By the eighteenth century, the taste for decay had become a mark of 
aesthetic sensitivity for many aristocratic Europeans. But the kind of 
decay that was to please, the kind that was to call up the pleasurable 
melancholy that writers associated with the contemplation of ruins, 
was a slow process. Each 'survivor' from the past was supposed to 
convey the fragility of the human endeavor over time. There were 
only so many ruins that were well-enough preserved (while retaining 
the proper amounts of picturesque irregularity) to produce the 
26 
 
desired mix of emotions in the beholder (1997, 3-5). 
As Roth indicates, it is the passage of time and the work of nature, in the form of slow 
decay gaining the upper hand over even the greatest cultural accomplishments, that 
constituted the chief appeal of ruins for the Romantic imagination.  The ruin was not just 
any old pile of rubble, but had to contain the right mix of formal elements to offer 
satisfaction to the beholder and meet the picturesque standard.   
 Similarly, Georg Simmel, in his 1911 essay, “The Ruin,” pointed to the pleasure 
of ruins as being a function of their temporary suspension at the edge of obliteration, their 
momentary holding of the “contradictory strivings” of nature and culture, matter and 
idea, form and chaos (1958, 24).  He writes: “Whenever we perceive aesthetically, we 
demand that the contradictory forces of existence be somehow in equilibrium” (23).  The 
charm of the ruin is its ability to hold, just for an instant in historical time, these 
contrasting tendencies in a unified form available to perception: “the past with its 
destinies and transformations has been gathered into this instant of an aesthetically 
perceptible present” (23).  The ruin bridges time, making the lost past—even if only 
mythical and imagined, remote and romanticized—tangible to the senses, and, in doing 
so, throws the present into sharp relief.  Ruins, thus, speak to the perceptibility of 
history—the ways in which it is embedded in things—just as they offer the clues to make 
comprehensible that same history.  Thus, the meanings assigned to ruins—the ways in 
which we fill in the gaps—touch upon our understanding of the past and its significance 
for the present: they reveal something of the imaginary.   
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 It is, therefore, perhaps in their very ambiguity, in the subtle tensions that made of 
them the archetype of the picturesque, that the ruins of antiquity have exercised such 
generative potential and become so culturally charged.  Given their uneasy resolution of 
nature and culture, past and present, persistence and decay, ruins could become the 
symbolic container for the contradictions of everyday existence during the period of 
modernity.  In the noble and picturesque form of ruins, worn away by the passage of time 
but still persisting, loss could find its plaintive and poetic expression.  Thus, in the 
context of the almost unwavering Enlightenment belief in progress, scientific 
development, and Western Europe's colonial project, ruins were, in the cultural sphere, a 
kind of antidote to the unbridled optimism of the era.  Ruins stood for the other side of 
modernity that was deeply felt during the height of Romanticism: the displacements, 
disjunctures, and shocks associated with industrialization, modernization, as well as 
empire- and nation-building.  As Huyssen notes, this quality of negativity, of critique, is 
one that is still important today: “An imaginary of ruins is central for any theory of 
modernity that wants to be more than the triumphalism of progress and democratization 
or longing for a past power of greatness” (2006, 13).  As such, in the realms of 
representation and the cultural imaginary, ruins were thoroughly permeated with the 
melancholia and nostalgic sentimentality of the modern age.  Symbolically invested with 
such poignancy, ruins could speak to the often unconscious and contradictory hopes and 
fears of the time—for instance, the deep-seated belief in the betterment of the human 
condition and the pessimistic sense of the ultimate futility of grandiose projects.   
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 Similarly, in his book “Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy 
of History,” Peter Fritzsche (2004) traces the social history of ruins during the period of 
1780-1850.  He argues that the French revolutionary period witnessed a transformation in 
the way that the past was perceived and experienced.  The ruptures and dislocations of 
revolution and war, as well as industrialization, that characterized that period, gave rise to 
a sense of history as discontinuous.  People began to perceive themselves as cut off from 
the past, yet connected to one another to the extent that they shared the same time: they 
“felt themselves as contemporaries, as occupants of a common time zone with mutually 
recognizable personalities, dramas, and processes such as “revolution” or 
“industrialization”” (10).  History, in other words, became what Fritzsche calls a “mass 
medium” (13).  The events of this tumultuous time, which constituted a “deep rupture in 
remembered experience” and the fabric of everyday life, also denaturalized the 'natural 
order', opening given social and political arrangements onto a field of possibility (16).  
Ruins, while expressive of the “melancholy of history,” nevertheless played an important 
role in reimagining the possibilities of the present (8):  “the ruins of the past were taken 
to be the foundations for an alternative present” (96).  Ruins, the result of human actions 
and endeavours rather than the work of nature, could now speak to human possibility: 
“the fragment also spoke through history in a way that the silence of nature's reclamation 
had not permitted” (105).  Surviving bits of the past—the broken fragments that were to 
become the ruins of the age—served as reminders, not only of that which had been 
irretrievably lost, but of that which might still be achieved, but remained incomplete, in 
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the present.  Thus, there is during this time, as Fritzsche describes, a growing awareness 
among Europeans, “of the ways in which history enhanced the subject and enabled 
action” (128).  Modernity is, in other words, a time of unprecedented loss, but also of 
great historical dramas in which ordinary people are the protagonists.  As Fritzsche 
concludes: 
 What is crucial here are not the ruins themselves, for they did not 
change, but the new historical field in which they were seen and 
apprehended [...] They were rendered visible by the new structures 
of temporality based on disorder and rupture, concealment and half-
life, that emerged with the revolution in France. The power of ruins 
in the nineteenth century was to depict the violence of historical 
movement without imputing necessity to its direction. They 
challenged the absoluteness of the present with the counterfactuals 
of the past (106).  
The new awareness of history had the potential to be progressive in so far as it revealed 
history as having no fixed telos, no necessary linear movement, but rather, whose 
direction was a site interpretation, contestation, and struggle.  
 Orlando locates literature's obsession with obsolete and outmoded objects in this 
same historical epoch.  The French revolution, he argues, which did away with privilege 
on the basis of birth right, was, for the bourgeoisie, a double-edged sword.  While, on the 
one hand, it promised upward mobility in the form of access to various posts and 
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positions of power previously restricted to the nobility, it also brought with it the risk of 
downward mobility, even impoverishment.  In other words, the unhinging of social 
position from the 'natural order of things' did away with any guarantee as to one's life 
chances and outcomes, and was, therefore, a great source of anxiety.  As Quint writes: 
This preoccupation with things that rapidly lose their utility and 
value testifies to the uncertain social and economic bourgeois world 
that has succeeded the continuity of the ancien régime, a world of 
commodities with built-in obsolescence and of decontextualized 
kitsch, a world where the fluctuations of the marketplace constantly 
threaten the self-made man with declassement, rich today, poor 
tomorrow (xii). 
The transformation of social relations and conditions in modernity, which happens 
primarily through the imposition and extension of the logic of capital onto the 
circumstances of material life, but also through technological change, brings with it an 
interest in those forms, objects, and relations with which capitalism does away.  For 
Orlando, this can be explained by the “performance principle” or “functional imperative” 
and its opposite: ruins, relics, and rubbish represent the non-functional, the social 
unconscious, which exercises a power of fascination by falling outside of the logic of 
commodification (7).  In a world in which, according to Marx's (1990) analysis in 
Capital, commodities reign, where everything is reduced to equivalences, the non- or 
anti-commodity becomes, at least in the imaginary, a form which recuperates that which 
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has been lost, threatened, or displaced.  Thus, Orlando, whose interest is in the social 
function of literary texts, takes Marx's famous quote and adds a twist: ‘‘The literature of 
those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself at first 
sight as ‘an immense accumulation of anticommodities’’’ (15).  Ruins, in this sense, are a 
cultural form that embody the tensions and conflicts that accompany changing social 
relations; their representation in literature, art, or poetry reveals the nostalgia for an 
ancien régime, real or imagined, that was, at the very least, stable, predictable, and rooted 
in tradition.  The often unconscious idea that something has been irretrievably lost—a 
sense of certainty about the world or our position within it—as we charge forward into 
the arms of 'progress' explains, at least in part, the romantic appeal of ruins.  Ruins 
became not only a key trope through which cultural anxiety was able to find an 
expression, but also a modality of working through loss in a period of rapid 
transformation and upheaval.  
 Nevertheless, the nostalgia evoked by ruins is not necessarily just a reactionary 
sentiment, symptomatic of the anxieties provoked by the insecurities arising from the 
transformations of capitalist modernity.  As Andrea Huyssen argues in “Nostalgia for 
Ruins,” such a nostalgia often signifies a desire not only for a lost past, but for a different 
future: 
Since the European seventeenth century, with the emergence of a 
new sense of temporality increasingly characterized by the radical 
asymmetries of past, present, and future, nostalgia as a longing for a 
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lost past has developed into the modern disease per se. This 
predominantly negative coding of nostalgia within modernity is 
easily explained: nostalgia counteracts, even undermines linear 
notions of progress, whether they are framed dialectically as 
philosophy of history or sociologically and economically as 
modernization. But nostalgic longing for a past is always also a 
longing for another place. Nostalgia can be a utopia in reverse (7; 
my emphasis). 
Particularly in the contemporary, postwar, post-Holocaust, post-modern moment, where 
neoliberal capitalism reigns supreme, ruins are important to reclaiming a sense of the 
possible, though the task of revisiting them has been no doubt made difficult by the ways 
in which they are both commodified and made to commodify the past.  Nostalgia is a 
critical sentiment because it mourns and pines for the ideals and alternatives of the future 
that were lost along with modernity's imagined project: “We are nostalgic for the ruins of 
modernity because they still seem to hold a promise that has vanished from our own age: 
the promise of an alternative future” (8).  According to Huyssen, the ruin topos, as it was 
taken up in modernity, reflected “a deep understanding of the ravages of time and the 
potential of the future, the destructiveness of domination and the tragic shortcomings of 
the present,” and thus was stimulative of “emphatic forms of critique, commitment, and 
compelling artistic expression” (9).  Returning to such a potent sense of time and of 
history, as connected to the past but not determined by it, is, as we shall see throughout 
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this dissertation, a first step toward imagining the future otherwise.  
 
III. 
Approaching ruins through the framework of aesthetic experience is a practice that 
continues into the present day.  There is a certain pleasure or enjoyment associated with 
the contemplation of ruins—one that was to be problematized in the latter part of the 
twentieth century as the Romantic conceptualization of ruins was blown apart in the 
aftermath of war and terrifying genocide.  Exemplary in this regard, Rose Macaulay 
(1967), an English novelist, in her exuberant celebration of ruins, Pleasure of Ruins, 
takes what she terms a “pleasurist” approach to her study, mapping the various human 
reactions to ruins in the terms of aesthetic enjoyment.  Each chapter of the book traces a 
different aspect of the emotional spectrum evoked in response to ruins, from the romantic 
melancholy stimulated by imagination of former times, to the exaltation aroused by 
fragments of past nobility and greatness.  Interestingly, Macaulay's book, written in 1953 
in the shadow of the atrocities of the Second World War and the London cityscapes 
devastated by the Blitz, makes little mention of what, in a short note at the very end, she 
refers to as the “new ruins.”  Her pleasurist approach, which seems blind to the ruins 
surrounding her, is all the more perplexing when one considers, as Brian Dillon (2006), 
points out, that her own home and library were completely destroyed during the London 
bombings.  For Macaulay, ruins must be safely situated in the distant past to be capable 
of evoking aesthetic pleasure—they must be aestheticized or made beautiful by art.  It is 
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thus that the ruins of her home and city, like so many open wounds, fall outside her 
interpretive framework; she writes: 
Ruin pleasure must be at a remove, softened by art, by Piranesi, 
Salvator Rosa, Poussin, Claude, Monsù Desiderio, Pannini, Guardi, 
Robert, James Pryde, John Piper, the ruin-poets, or centuries of time. 
Ruin must be a fantasy, veiled by the mind’s dark imaginings: in the 
objects that we see before us, we get to agree with St Thomas 
Aquinas, that quae enim diminutae sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt, and to 
feel that, in beauty, wholeness is all (454-455). 
To her nostalgic imagination, ruins belong to a time when things were still 'whole', or at 
least capable of being made whole, by being given an aesthetic form.   
 In her romantic conceptualization, ruins are bound up with nostalgia for the past, 
for a lost and irretrievable age that does not touch upon the traumatic wounds left by the 
violence of the present.  She reveals, however, that her exclusion of the modern ruins of 
war is, in fact, an ambivalence born of trauma, a desire to hold onto a more certain time; 
as she indicates, “such wholesome hankerings are, it seems likely, merely a phase of our 
fearful and fragmented age” (455).  To Macaulay, the debris of war are too close, too 
sharp, too raw to be aestheticized; they resonate, not with the beauty of the picturesque, 
but with the horror of the sublime: “[n]ew ruins have not yet acquired the weathered 
patina of age […] [they] are for a time stark and bare, vegetationless and creatureless; 
blackened and torn, they smell of fire and mortality” (453).  Macaulay would perhaps 
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like to forget the devastation which surrounds her, yet, the timing of her study could be 
seen as symptomatic.  Indeed, the losses associated with these modern war ruins evoke 
the unconscious desire for the imagined simplicity of those of another time: as Munteán 
(2011) suggests, she “renders modern ruins a catalyst of nostalgic longing for those other 
ruins that she explores in her book.”  Remarkably, it is her idealized representation of 
ancient and medieval ruins, in a curious book which resists confronting the horrors that 
surround her, that indicates indirectly the trauma of her own experience as evoked by the 
ruins of her time.   
 These ghastly ruins, 'blackened and torn', of modern warfare were to provoke not 
only the contemporary reconceptualization of the the ruins topos, still ongoing, but a 
rethinking of modernity itself as a ruin.  Michael Roth (1997), in his essay “Irresistible 
Decay: Ruins Reclaimed,” is one of those who intentionally seek to broaden the 
traditional concept of ruins, away from the picturesque ideal, to include the ruins of 
deliberate acts of destruction, such as those of war.  In doing so, he puts a spotlight on the 
twentieth century as one of widespread devastation and unbridled destruction.  According 
to Roth, the scale of ruination left behind in the wake of the Second World War has 
irrevocably altered our perception of ruins, shifting it from one of romantic, pleasurable 
contemplation and aesthetic enjoyment, to a much more sobering confrontation.  As he 
states, 
the total wars of the twentieth century have shaken our framing of 
ruins and shattered the notion that culture can exist as an innocent, 
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floating fragment in a powerful sea of violence. In the wake of 
World War II, culture itself came to be cast as a ruin, as a troubled 
witness to the violence of humanity rather than as a spectator of the 
sublime powers of nature (20).  
He suggests that the central role once accorded to nature in ruins must now be accorded 
to humanity's destructive capacities: “[t]he regular rhythms of nature have been replaced 
in our time by the enormity of our capacity for ruination” (20).  In ruins we are no longer 
faced with the result of processes of decay, but with the debris of history.  History itself 
is no longer conceived as a linear and progressive movement, a continuity that bridges 
past, present, and future, nor as the cyclical movement of nature, but rather, as a startling 
series of ruptures and discontinuities that leave behind only the wreckage of the past.  
This recalls Walter Benjamin's harrowing image of the angel of history, who experiences 
historical progress as the catastrophic and terrifying accumulation of refuse: “Where we 
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage 
and hurls it in front of his feet” (2007b, 257).  Such a conceptualization troubles the 
aesthetic approach to ruins and raises a series of ethical questions.  As ruins come to be 
conceived as the remainders and reminders of historical violence, rather than the great 
accomplishments of civilization, any pleasure derived from them becomes more 
problematic: “It is one thing to aestheticize the gradual decay of monumental buildings, 
another to aestheticize the effects of disaster,” writes Roth (7).  Such a statement touches 
upon the difficult task of the representation of loss, for culture itself is imbricated in the 
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horrors of genocide, war, and nuclear annihilation.   
 This brings us to Adorno's famous proclamation of 1949: “To write poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric” (1983, 34).  Adorno was clearly concerned with some profound 
cultural questions: Can cultural expressions exist unsullied in an environment of turmoil 
and bloodshed?  Do the traditional concepts of aesthetics still apply to the catastrophic 
remains of the twentieth (and twenty-first) century?  What Adorno and Roth both suggest 
is that it is inhuman to take pleasure, even aesthetic pleasure, in those remnants that recall 
the suffering of others; the ruins of catastrophe cannot be said to be evocative of the 
enjoyable experiences associated with the picturesque.  From this perspective, the very 
scale of devastation wrought by war and genocide during the last century has produced a 
qualitative transformation in our understanding of ruins; the sentiments integral to the 
'pleasurist approach'—nostalgia for a lost past, exaltation, bitter-sweet rumination, and 
feelings of grandeur—are entirely inappropriate in response to such horrors.  Yet, if not 
pleasure, what sentiment, if any, should be evoked by the contemplation of such ruins?  
Should horror spark only horror, the reactivation of the wounds of trauma?  Or is it that 
such ruins should not be preserved at all, but rather rapidly effaced by the wrecking ball 
or allowed to disappear by neglect?  Is it that representations of ruins perform a kind of 
violence in aestheticizing the remains of catastrophic occurrences?  At its extreme, such 
an approach treats ruins as a kind of pornography, as elicit material looked upon only 
with perverse enjoyment.  Accordingly, the ruins of the twentieth century must escape 
the very domain of aesthetics, for its horrors resist all form, all intelligibility.  Yet, given 
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ethical demands of cultural memory and mourning in the present, it is insufficient, if not 
disastrous, to foreclose the possible social functions of ruins and their representation, 
even if those have necessarily changed.  Indeed, ruins continue to occupy a complicated 
and contested place in public culture, particularly in the postwar period, on account of 
their being interpreted as the visible and highly charged symbols and reminders of the 
darker side of European modernity.  Perhaps what is needed is less the wholesale 
rejection of culture as a ruin, than a reconsideration of the traditional categories and 
functions of aesthetics in relation to the ruins of our time.   
 Ruins, in the postwar, 'postmodern' context, at least those of war and genocide, 
are called upon to perform the work of memory.  Much differently than the ruins of the 
past, which, for the Romantics, were 'impressionistic' and 'suggestive' of vague 
sentiments and a noble past, the ruins of twentieth century violence are expressive of 
terror and horror.  They are the witnesses to the ravages of violence; they stand against 
the past, as imperatives that it should never happen again.  As such, the ruins of war are 
perhaps best defined as 'negative monuments'.  British art critic Herbert Read, writing in 
the late 1930s, argued that monumental works of art are no longer  
[…] possible in the modern world—at least not in our Western 
European world. We have lived through the greatest war in history, 
but we find it celebrated in thousands of mean, false and essentially 
unheroic monuments […] The only logical monument would be 
some sort of negative monument. A monument to disillusion, to 
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despair, to destruction. . . [the artist] can at best make a monument to 
the vast forces of evil which seek to control our lives: a monument 
of protestation (1947, 317-318).       
He saw Picasso's Guernica, exhibited in London in 1938, as such a monument of 
negativity to the evil of the Spanish Civil War.  Similarly, the ruins of the mid- and latter- 
part of this past century cannot be made to uncritically celebrate the past; they are not 
heroic structures.  Rather they recall devastation and destruction in the manner pointed to 
by Read.  Left in the wake of bombings, civil war, or ethnic cleansing, the architectural 
remains of houses, synagogues, churches, shops, and libraries have been, and continue to 
be, so many unsettling, uncanny spectres upon the landscape.  Macaulay allowed herself 
to ponder one such building in London, capturing precisely this surreal quality: “The 
stairway climbs up and up, undaunted, to the roofless summit where it meets the sky” (3).  
Modern ruins testify to a world turned upside down, a world made unnatural, unliveable, 
and strange; they are suggestive of the damage that we have done to ourselves and to one 
another.     
 While ruins are assigned the work of memory in the contemporary era, this is 
anything but a straightforward task, but one that is, rather, convoluted and political, 
subject to competing demands and differing imperatives.  Michael Meng's (2011) study 
of the vicissitudes of the ruins of Jewish communities following the Second World War, 
Shattered Spaces: Encountering Jewish Ruins in Postwar Germany and Poland, has 
thrown an important light upon the issue of historical erasure and the ethical demands 
40 
 
that ruins pose as remnants of historical violence.  The aesthetic tasks of preservation, 
monumentalization, and reconstruction are interwoven with the cultural work of memory 
and mourning, as with its inverse, forgetting and denial.  In the case of Germany and 
Poland, where the worst atrocities of Hitler's 'Final Solution' were carried out, the few 
surviving fragments of pre-war Jewish life that marked the landscape were almost 
systematically destroyed or treated with neglect.  Meng writes that: “As Poles and 
Germans rebuilt their bombed-out cities, towns, and villages, they expelled the traces of 
the Jewish past. The few Jewish sites that escaped the wrecking ball gradually decayed 
by neglect or were turned into movie theaters, storage houses, swimming pools, libraries, 
and exhibition halls” (5).  As he goes on to explain, Jewish ruins were not merely 
considered unworthy of preservation, but “reflected a deeply discomforting, abject past 
that few Germans and Poles wished to encounter in the early postwar decades” (5).  
Ruins in themselves served as a moral force—a visible reminder of the violence, 
injustice, and atrocities committed, not solely by officers or officials, but often at the 
hands of ordinary Germans and Poles.  As such, they were disconcerting to many non-
Jewish citizens of these countries who wanted to rebuild, to forget the past, and to get 
back to 'ordinary' life, or, particularly in the case of the Poles, millions of whom were 
used for forced labour and murdered in mass, to focus on their own experiences of 
victimhood: “As European societies recovered from the war, the bonding memories of 
ethnic national identity left little space for recalling Jewish suffering and complicity; 
memories of victimization and resistance proved much more popular and comfortable to 
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recall” (Meng, 254).  Jewish sites, provocative of profound anxiety, were covered over or 
refashioned in a way that foreclosed the working through of the 'abject' past.      
 The representation and mediation of the ruins of our collective past is clearly an 
issue that touches upon difficult ethical and political questions.  As such, it is entirely 
inadequate to condemn ruins, or, more particularly, their representations or 
commemorations—for instance, in the form of artworks, museums, restorations, or 
monuments—to the dustbin of history.  The issue requires re-framing: it is not a matter of 
whether to represent ruins, the legacy of this past century, but how to do so in a way that 
is attentive to the representational exigencies of horror and catastrophe, as will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter four.  “The difficult question,” as Sorkin writes, “is 
not whether to make art but how...” (1993, 74).  Indeed, for Meng, the 'how' requires 
consideration of the deeper issues at work in identity, community, and democracy which 
are most often ignored by the very committees or governmental organizations that are 
charged with undertaking such projects of restoration or memorialization:  
Restoring a synagogue or a Jewish cemetery rarely involves thinking 
deeply about the shattered histories that these spaces reflect: their 
destruction during the war and their neglect and erasure after 1945. 
In reconstructing multiethnicity from the ruins of multiethnicity, this 
commemorative cosmopolitanism exhibits comforting, soothing 
flourishes of tolerance and difference for all to see, but deflects 
critical engagement with liberal democracy's collapse in the past and 
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its failures in the present (10). 
Only in confronting these failures and their aftermath, the deadly human toll, can we 
meaningfully engage with the past.  Ruins require some kind of mediation if they are not 
to become mere 'heritage' sites which pay token tribute to loss, whether of a people or its 
cultural achievements.  Perhaps at the most profound level, ruins can function as 
reminders of “the traumatic condition of European modernity and the fragility of human 
empathy,” which were, as Meng argues, “laid bare” by the Holocaust (26-7).  This issue 
of the mediation of catastrophe and horror, of what kind of form is suited to the content, 
is one that has been explored in the postwar period up until the present day.   
 
IV. 
Artists and art historians dealing with such thorny issues as those raised by Roth, Adorno, 
and others, have been creative in their reconceptualization of the possible social functions 
and symbolic meanings of ruins.  Charles Merewether (1997), for instance, in his essay, 
“Traces of Loss,” argues that we need to situate our understanding of the ruin within the 
psychoanalytic paradigm of loss.  For Sigmund Freud, the 'father of psychoanalysis', 
much of our past, both individual and collective, is buried in the unconscious.  It is a ruin 
that requires excavation: the analyst, like the archaeologist, will “start upon the ruins, 
clear away the rubbish, and, beginning from the visible remains, uncover what is buried” 
(1962, 192).  For indeed, buried though it might be, in fragments and pieces, at times 
obscure and seemingly inaccessible, this past is nevertheless productive; as Freud writes: 
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“All of the essentials are preserved, even things that seem completely forgotten are 
present somehow and somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to 
the subject” (1973b, 276).  These deep-seated ruins, which Freud saw as the inevitable 
outcome of repressions that are part of the very processes of becoming a subject, exercise 
an unconscious power over psychic life; they are manifested in seemingly fortuitous 
circumstances and events, in compulsions, and in neurotic behaviours.  Thus, Freud 
(1973a) argued that representing the past is the only way to avoid repeating it in 
behaviour.  Aesthetics, which in the case of psychoanalysis means the symbolic work of 
personal narration, makes the past meaningful and intelligible—re-members it, in other 
words.  Representation will never be, nor should it desire to be, a restoration, but it is a 
creative reconstruction, a retelling—inevitably partial, but nevertheless profound.  The 
work of mourning, of dealing with losses and traumas, whether real or imagined, was for 
Freud a necessary but interminable task: “is there such a thing as a natural end to an 
analysis […]?” he writes in 1937, in the shadow of so many horrific political events 
(1973c, 237). 
 In Freudian psychoanalysis, working through loss means creatively reworking the 
past in representation; it is neither the denial nor foreclosure of loss, nor the obliteration 
of memory.  Rather, remembering is a way of acknowledging the impossibility of 
complete mourning that, while melancholic in character, avoids the 'pathological' 
attachment to the past that preoccupied Freud (2006) in his 1917 essay “Mourning and 
Melancholia.”  For Merewether, ruins are capable of achieving such a reworking in the 
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social and cultural spheres because they “embody a sense of loss” and signal “the 
presence of death in the present” (25).  Ruins, as incomplete and fragmentary remains, 
call attention to what is not there, to what is missing or absent.  They constitute not only 
an archive of disasters which can be safely situated in the past, but a tangible presence 
that marks the ongoing nature of disaster—its after-effects and lived remains.  Yet, they 
also gesture to what is irretrievable in the past, inaccessible to memory.  As records of 
destruction, they symbolically “[mark] the space between the memory of ruins and the 
ruins of memory” (Merewether, 32).  Ruins offer no easy resolution of the past, but 
embody a certain tension at the site of memory, between remembering and forgetting: 
Ruins are a legacy that can neither be fully remembered nor fully 
forgotten; they point to the excessive presentness of disaster, its 
capacity to spill out of the present into our sense of the past and out 
into expectations for the future. Arrested in time and place, the ruins 
of disaster are overwhelmingly defined by time and place, yet they 
are also out of time and out of place (33). 
Past events, seemingly in ruins, have an ongoing legacy; they live on in the present, much 
like the material buried in the unconscious, and have consequences for the future.  
Indeed, ruins “collapse temporalities,” serving as a temporal bridge (25).  As Kolocotroni 
explains: “Freud’s ‘psychomythology’ [of memory] crucially links the past, present, and 
future of mental processes, and uncovers, with a single strike of the spade, the loquacious 
ruins of a personal and collective prehistory” (2010, 161).  Ruins, as a metaphor for “the 
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multi-temporality of human consciousness” (Kolocotroni, 165), are suggestive of the 
ways in which the emotional economies of trauma and loss have their own time which 
differs radically from linear time.  Ruins are not only reminders of personal loss but of 
collective trauma and brutality, and therefore have a larger socio-political significance,  
as suggested by Kolocotroni: “Involving metaphors of archaeological discovery and the 
poignant permanence of ruins, Freud’s writing accounts for the persistence of memory in 
the vanguard of personal and political struggles” (154) 
 This rethinking of the ruins through the paradigm of loss has had an impact on 
architectural and artistic practices that deal with representing the ruins of catastrophe, a 
theme discussed in depth in chapter four.  Merewether cites the work of architect Daniel 
Libeskind on the Berlin Jewish Museum as an example of a response to what has been 
declared 'the ruin of culture' in the wake of the Holocaust.  Libeskind's Jewish Museum is 
structured around a void.  Rather than commemorating the cultural achievements of the 
Jewish people, it recalls the fact that these have been destroyed along with their creators, 
those millions of individuals who were wiped off the face of the earth within the course 
of a few years time; thus, according Merewether, Libeskind, “seek[s] to frame what is 
missing—a voice or the space of loss” (33).  The museum serves as a haunting presence 
at the very limit of representation: it is “an anguished site of cultural patrimony, a site 
that keeps alive a sense of something at the threshold between the impossibility of 
remembering and the necessity of forgetting” (33).  Ruins are 'negative monuments' of 
this kind, not the sites of commemoration as such, but those reminders of loss which 
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trouble the present; they recall but never restore the past.  Embodying that tension 
between presence and absence, visibility and invisibility, they actively resist completion 
or closure, and as such, leave the task of cultural mourning and working through open-
ended, subject to continual revisitation.  As Merewether concludes, “ruins belong to the 
archive: the archive of unending disaster” (37). 
 Leo Mellor's (2011) book, Reading the Ruins: Modernism, Bombsites and British 
Culture, is structured precisely around this idea of the “writing of disaster” which draws 
upon the work of French philosopher Maurice Blanchot.  Mellor's is a study of the impact 
that the bombed-out British cities of the Second World War Blitz had upon the socio-
cultural imaginary of the British people; specifically, he is interested in how the actually 
existing landscapes of devastation left by the London bombings were taken up by the 
literary modernists, as these texts are reflective of how postwar British culture more 
generally negotiated its newly made ruins.  He argues not only that the ruin was a key 
trope of modernity, but that the bombsites were the very “condition of possibility of late 
modernism” (5). The fragments of destruction opened onto multiple temporalities; they 
embodied a sense of time as discordant and even sublime which was expressed in the 
literary late modernist works (6).  As he suggests, 
bombsites contain absolute doubleness. They are inherently both a 
frozen moment of destruction made permanent; as much as they 
capture the absolute singular moment, the repeated cliché of the 
stopped clock exposed, battered by blast but still affixed to a wall in 
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a bombsite: yet they also act as a way of understanding a great 
swathe of linear time previously hidden or buried, offering history 
exposed to the air (6). 
Ruins, in this sense, open up a dialogue with the past and its afterlives, with the 
foreclosed possibilities of the present, and with imagined and apocalyptic futures.  They 
served as the material basis for late modernism's aesthetic veneration of the broken, 
partial, and fragmented, just as they acted as a container for the fears, hopes, and desires 
of Britain's traumatized populace.  For Mellor then, aesthetics is intertwined with the 
materiality of cities and with a larger cultural imaginary—with space as with subjectivity.  
Representing the ruins is a highly charged project, for it requires confronting devastation, 
but doing so with respect and care for those who have suffered as a result.  It means 
“maintaining through the groundwork of memory a constant vigil over the prospect of 
past and present brutality” (Kolocotroni, 154).  Thus, it invariably embodies the tension 
between “mourning and the aestheticisation of suffering” (Mellor, 13).  Ethically 
speaking, one must recognize that representation is always bound to interpretation, to 
privileged narratives that, for instance, either access a potentiality for healing or reify the 
aftermath of violence: as Mellor concludes, “Reading—and writing—the ruins of war 
requires the material spaces cut violently into the city fabric to be acknowledged and 
understood” (203).   
 
V. 
48 
 
We see a major shift in the way that ruins are framed, interpreted, and valued in the 
twentieth century as compared with the Romantic era.  During the earlier period of 
modernity, ruins were bound up with a humanist vision.  Brian Dillon (2006), in his piece 
“Fragments from a History of Ruin,” points out that, during the Renaissance and 
Romanticism, representations of ruins were made meaningful by the insertion of a human 
figure between the beholder and the scene of decay.  The landscapes this figure inhabited 
were still comprehensible to the viewer, still loaded with potential, and therefore, 
humanized.  The figure contemplates these landscapes and is at ease within them.  With 
the catastrophes of the twentieth century, however, a rupture occurs: the human figure 
vanishes, along with realistic and romantic forms of representation, and we see a 
dramatic shift toward surreal, fragmented, and dehumanized forms of representation.  As 
Nick Yablon writes:  
The Great War signalled the beginning of a larger reconfiguration of 
the ruin that has continued to this day.  Aesthetic or sentimental 
responses [...] would be considered ill suited to the severe 
devastation wrought by the total wars of the twentieth century.  The 
ruins left behind by heavy artillery or by the air raids of subsequent 
wars prompted a break with the convention of the seated figure in 
the foreground calmly contemplating the scene and imbibing its 
philosophical meanings […] Instead, they were captured in 
abstracted aerial photographs and in expressionist or surrealist 
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canvases that accentuated the inhumanity of the landscape (2009, 
290). 
The twentieth century witnessed the rapid development of new technologies of warfare 
employed in two world wars, which, when combined with an instrumental rationality 
tuned for domination, made the annihilation of entire cities and entire peoples not only a 
possibility but an accomplished fact.  As Yablon points out, the scale of such devastation 
could not even be beheld by the human eye unaided; rather, it required the aid of 
panoramic or aerial shots taken by mechanical devices which exposed entire 
neighbourhoods, ghettos, and city blocks vanished from the urban topography.  The very 
way in which space was conceptualized was literally blasted apart.  New technological 
and artistic modalities had to be invented to capture and comprehend this new reality, 
which, as a destruction beyond any hope, any meaning, any possibility of redemption, 
was experienced as profoundly inhuman.  Yablon suggests that only those new artistic 
movements of the twentieth century, including surrealism, expressionism, and the literary 
modernism mentioned above, were considered adequate to the task of representation in 
the war and postwar periods.  The experience of horror, once wedded to the ruins, could 
not be captured in realistic and romantic representations; rather it demanded the confused 
and melting landscapes of Dali, the maimed bodies and screaming horses of Picasso.  
 Paul Fussell (1989), in The Great War and Modern Memory, has made an 
analogous claim, arguing that, with the Great War, irony emerges as the only truly 
effective literary device in understanding and recalling the various “satire[s] of 
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circumstance” that constituted everyday life in the trenches.  In the many “little ironic 
vignettes” he documents, both real and fictional, disaster erupts just at the moment when 
everything seems fine (32).  The people or characters in these heart-wrenching situations 
are victims, not only of disaster, but of a disaster that seems to arrive after the fact—
when survival or escape from certain death seem to have been secured.  It is this “ironic 
reversal,” at the height of hope, that captures so much of the experience of modern 
warfare (34).  He labels this gap, between experience and understanding, “the dynamics 
of hope abridged” (14): that devastating “collision between innocence and awareness” in 
which the former is irrevocably dashed (5).  Irony, in those literary works that followed 
the two world wars, of which Heller's Catch-22 is exemplary, captures the structure of 
experience and memory elicited by war: that of traumatic understanding which always 
occurs after the fact, too late to prevent shock.  Thus Fussell locates the temporality of 
traumatic memory in an economy of remembering, repeating, and forgetting that was to 
become generalized among those generations that lived through the wars of the twentieth 
century and those that came after it (5).         
 For Mellor, it is the devastation that came with the Second World War and its 
close that marks a dramatic rupture separating the modern and the postmodern period of 
total dehumanization: “after 1945 any discussion of ruins of the city needs to 
acknowledge the horror of the atomic sublime—and the human cost—from Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki onwards” (203-204).  He suggests that the bomb sites of the Great War 
were “broken yet verdant” (204); that is, they still exercised a generative potential, 
51 
 
offering the possibility of healing and redemption.  The landscapes of the postmodern 
atomic period are, by contrast, bleak, dead, empty—ultimately lacking in aesthetic and 
imaginative potential that could be used for humanist purposes.  He takes the Trinity 
bomb test site in New Mexico as the ultimate symbol of this postmodern sublime: 
The reflective glossy plateau of deadly nullity represents the ultimate 
break into postmodernism, the carcinogenic sublime, the bombsite 
ruin as showing merely surface sheen rather than possessing depth, 
resonance or potential. Layers of history are no longer revealed but 
rather fused into a blur (204). 
For Mellor, ruins in the postmodern are not palimpsests of history, not even rubble that 
can be sifted through.  They are cold, hard, and unrelenting: there is nothing intelligible 
or recognizable, nothing redeemable in the image he offers us.  This postmodern sublime 
recalls Robert Smithson's (1996) bleak description of the ruins of the American suburbs 
of his home town in “A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey,” an essay 
written in 1967.  Smithson describes the surreality of the scene as akin to a photograph of 
a photograph, or “an enormous movie film that showed nothing but a continuous blank” 
(70).  The desert becomes a post-historical, post-apocalyptic landscape, “a map of infinite 
disintegration and forgetfulness” (74).  The monuments of Passaic have no past; rather, 
they are the “memory-traces of an abandoned set of futures”—a portrait of hopelessness 
(72).  Any traces of hope, any movement of criticism and negativity, as embodied by  
'negative monuments' such as Guernica, are seemingly effaced in these dead relics.  A 
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massive car lot, sparkling in the dead summer sun, offers a bland version of infinity as a 
void, an abyss.  Passaic finally reveals itself as “an open grave—a grave that children 
cheerfully play in,” a depressing picture indeed (74).  
 For others, it was the smouldering rubble of the twin towers in the aftermath of 
9/11—another open grave—that heralded, not so much the coming of a new era, as the 
waking from the dream: the sudden realization that the world had become something 
unrecognizable.  Perhaps it was this moment that sparked the proliferation of academic 
scholarship, at least in the English speaking world, around ruins in the last decade.  As 
Hell and Schönle suggest: “The destruction of the world's most famous symbolic icon of 
capitalist modernity on 9/11 brought to a climax the debate about the ways in which 
modernity, broadly conceived, seems to have invented, framed, and produced ruins” 
(2008, 5).  Moreover, it might also be said to have constituted some of the driving energy 
behind the flurry of debate that was sparked when documenta posed the question “Is 
Modernity our Antiquity?” in the lead up to their twelfth annual exhibition of modern and 
contemporary art in Kassel, Germany.  What drives this question, this project to 
conceptualize modernity as a ruin, is an overwhelming sense that we are in a post-
modern age, that we stand amidst the rubble of the utopian project that was harboured 
within modernity, and which for many took the aesthetic form of modernism.  Indeed, as 
Mark Lewis (2006) has pointed out, in response to the question raised by documenta 12, 
there is something elegiac and mournful, even paradoxical, in declaring the passing of 
modernity into history. 
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 Lewis was one of the many art historians to respond to the problematique of our 
relation to modernity and to weigh in on the debate around whether we are still modern.  
He defines modernity as an open-ended process of revolution, transformation, and 
change—a continual state of flux.  The characteristic quality of modernism, the artistic 
movement that sought to adequately express modernity, was that of its presentness: the 
idea that the modern is now.  As such, it was premised upon the rejection of historical 
forms and past traditions in the service of the creation of new ones.  Thus, as Lewis 
notes, ruins were written into the fabric of modernism as the result of its contradictory 
relation to the past: yet, the “need, at one and the same time, to conjure the past, revere it, 
excise it and destroy it—extends to the very heart of modernism and undermines 
modernism from within.”  Nevertheless, the distinction between modernism and 
modernity is crucial, for while the aesthetic forms of the former may belong to what 
Lewis calls “a different time, to a different knowledge, and finally, of course, to a 
different ambition” than those of the contemporary moment, this does not mean that the 
immediate past has become an instant antiquity; rather, it points to something a bit 
different.  Modernism imbibed a utopian impulse, concerned, as it was, with the 
prefiguration of futures to come.  As Lewis writes: 
Modernism tried to make sense of the modern revolution in the 
world; it produced aesthetic objects, images and ideas in relation to 
the fact that modernity was deemed not yet to be complete, nor its 
ideas fully actualised. Modernism was, in other words, the idea that 
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modernity could be figured and interpolated with utopian possibility. 
It is that sense of modernity-in-the-making—the idea that there was something undecided 
about it, where it was headed and what it could mean, and that it was possible to shape 
it—that has passed into history.  Modernity is now fait accompli, a done deal, a sentiment 
which is captured in Lewis's rather frightening closing remark: “there is no longer such a 
theoretical premise or any speculation at the heart of the modern. It's here, it's now and 
it's triumphant.”  Post-modernism, in other words, marks the passing of the openness and 
inventiveness, the creative sense that 'anything is possible', that characterized modernity.   
 I would, however, like to argue that this sentiment—that history is somehow 
completed—is symptomatic of an imaginary that has suffered profound losses and failed 
to recover from them.  It signifies a state of political resignation, a profound melancholia, 
that forecloses all possibilities of a different future.  Postmodernism, in this sense, is 
perhaps a reactionary movement—an acting out—born of trauma.  The ruins of 
modernity need not stand for the end of history.  But the fact that we are so concerned, 
less with the ruins of particular events and tragedies, than with the ruins of modernity, as 
recent scholarship demonstrates, is significant.  Mourning, over the disappointed 
promises of modernity, over our dashed hopes, remains uncompleted.  As such, the 
possibilities for the new remain tightly circumscribed within the confines of given forms.  
Working through these collective losses—remembering rather than repeating them in 
symptomatic behaviours—is essential to making a different future imaginable.  If this 
work is not carried out, as Freud warned, there is the “danger of never finding anything 
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but what is already known” (1973e, 118).  The 'already known' here is the frightening 
reality of neoliberal capitalism which dictates social, political, economic life, and with 
which postmodern forms often seem so complicit.          
 The ruins of modernity as well as those of modernism—ruins that haunt our 
'postmodern age'—are the cultural signifiers of a profound state of loss, as they represent 
the ruins not of the past, not of antiquity or our prehistory, but of the future—an imagined 
future that the unstable and shifting present of modernity anticipated.  As Smithson put it: 
“I am convinced that the future lies somewhere in the dumps of the non-historical past” 
(74).  That loss then leaves us, to borrow Peter Fritzsche's (2004) phrase, also the title of 
his book, 'stranded in the present', in landscapes littered with the remnants of our most 
cherished dreams: “Time turns metaphors into things, and stacks them up in cold rooms, 
or places them in the celestial playgrounds of the suburbs” (Smithson, 74).  Or, 
alternatively, it houses them in museums, the cultural mausoleums of our age, where they 
are revered as relics of a more hopeful time.  The vital creative energy of an age was 
invested in a lost object, modernism, which strove to revolutionize life through art, and 
so continues to exert a power of fascination.  It was also invested in that other, and today, 
much less fashionable, if not taboo, object of desire: socialism.  Much like Macaulay, 
who would have preferred not to be faced with the ruins of her own time, contemporary 
ruins, whether in the form of nuclear disaster zones, abandoned industrial cities, the twin 
towers, or the Soviet Union, have become for us the “catalyst of nostalgic longing for 
those other ruins” (Munteán 2011)—the ruins of a modernity that, while confronting the 
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ravages of loss, was still able to remain hopeful about the future.  It is this “dialectic of 
modernity” that, according to Huyssen, “should be remembered as we try to imagine a 
future beyond the false promises of corporate neoliberalism and the globalized shopping 
mall. The future, not just of nostalgia, is at stake” (20).  Our backward looking gaze sees 
only the wreckage of the future in present forms, and fails to acknowledge the 
possibilities that are immanent in the present, persisting in spite of these recent 
catastrophes.  This is a paralyzing form of melancholia that must be addressed if we are 
indeed to change the world.    
 I would argue that what is triumphant is not modernity, as Lewis suggests, but 
global capitalism.  What is so often conceptualized as a radical break into a postmodern 
world, might be better understood as the universalization of capitalism, as Ellen Meiksins 
Wood (1997) has convincingly argued in her article, “Modernity, Postmodernity or 
Capitalism?”  She writes: 
capitalism, even in so-called advanced capitalist societies, has only 
now truly penetrated every aspect of life, the state, the practices and 
ideologies of ruling and producing classes, and the prevailing culture 
[...] I am speaking here about the universalization (or should I say 
the totalization?) of capitalism itself, its social relations, its laws of 
motion, its contradictions—the logic of commodification, 
accumulation and profit maximization penetrating every aspect of 
our lives (551). 
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Rather than speaking about postmodernity or globalization, Wood prefers to focus on the 
manner in which capitalism transforms social relations, in a way that “subjects human 
beings, their social relations and practices, to the imperatives of capital accumulation” 
(554).  The process is one that has gradually been extended and deepened, until no sphere 
of life or geographical zone remains untouched.  Capitalism has finally reached its 
“maturity,” she tells us: “It may be that we are seeing the first real effects of capitalism as 
a comprehensive system. We are seeing the consequences of capitalism as a system not 
only without effective rivals but also with no real escape routes” (558).  What is passing 
into history is not necessarily modernity, but other systems of production, other 
configurations of social relations, and other ways of life that still existed alongside 
capitalism.  Thus, to lament the failings of the utopian strivings of modernism is perhaps 
a little misguided.  It is possible that what we are really lamenting, as many 
commentators, including Susan Buck-Morss (2000) and Wendy Brown (1999) have 
noted, is the loss of that alternative project, socialism—or at least one version of it—the 
hopes for which were damaged by the failures of Soviet-style state socialism and the lack 
of long-lasting revolutionary change.  Nevertheless, the revolutionary and creative 
energies that modernism and socialism imbibed are not irretrievably lost and can be 
reclaimed and reinvested in visions for a different world, including those that imagine a 
different socialist project.   
 There were, indeed, many modernisms, as Marshall Berman (1988) discusses in 
All That is Solid Melts Into Air, some of which harboured a more revolutionary vision 
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than others.  The most revolutionary were those which were able to grasp the very 
tensions of the age and engage with them in a dialectical manner.  Modernism, if it is not 
purely about aesthetics and style, is precisely about reinserting ourselves as historical 
agents into our social and political worlds, and using cultural expressions to help us do 
so.  Berman argues against postmodern claims as to the closure of the possibilities 
associated with modernity.  “Post-modernists,” he writes, “maintain that the horizon of 
modernity is closed, its energies exhausted—in effect, that modernity is passé”; whereas, 
he suggests, “modern life and art and thought have the capacity for perpetual self-critique 
and self-renewal” which persists in the present (9).  To accept postmodern cynicism, to 
give up hope, is to accept the triumph of capitalism as the end of history.  Modernism, 
according to Berman, was a form of artistic praxis: a dialectical process of being shaped 
by, and in turn seeking to shape, the world.  Essential to that process was understanding, 
insight.  Thus, modernists sought to grasp the creative-destructive forces about them—
which Berman captures with Marx's famous maxim “all that is solid melts into air”—
forces which reduced to rubble all former traditions and ways of life and thought.  While 
we can conceive of modernity, in broad strokes, as a period of rapid transformation and 
flux, of the doing away with tradition and ushering in of the new, we must also 
understand the specific transformations wrought by capitalism, in particular, capitalism's 
way of producing ruins, a theme explored in depth in the following chapter.  The reviving 
of a cultural and artistic movement with a vitality equal to that of modernism requires 
precisely that we strive to understand and engage with the forces of capitalism which 
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have reached their maturity and are radically refashioning the social, political, economic, 
and physical landscapes which we inhabit.  Doing so demands that we overcome our 'left 
melancholy', to borrow Benjamin's term; it involves confronting an “unaccountable loss, 
some unavowably crushed ideal, contemporarily signified by the terms left, socialism, 
Marx, or movement” (Brown, 22), in order to rethink social movements in the aftermath 
of the ruins of a particular genre of socialism.   
 Symptomatic of the melancholy imagination is the wholesale rejection or 
disavowal of the former concerns with social and economic justice issues, with the 'grand 
narrative' interest in the betterment of the human condition or even human emancipation.  
Honest stock needs to be taken not merely of the failings of the movements that fell 
under the banner of socialism, but of what is still salvageable therein.  Praxis means 
engaging socially, historically, and politically with those forces shaping everyday life, 
and these are the forces of ruination which shut down factories, lock out workers, wage 
wars, and create the conditions of disaster.  The 'postmodern turn' in cultural studies 
tends to shift our concern away from these questions and concerns and towards other 
interests, related to the body, to difference, to (non)identity.  While this undoubtedly 
opens up new and interesting fields of inquiry, this is not necessarily a solution to the 
problem posed by the lack of alternatives to capitalism in the wake of the failings of 
'actually existing socialism' or an effective strategy of countering the above-mentioned 
forces that are making ruinous landscapes of our everyday life.  Postmodernism is not an 
answer to capitalism, as Ellen Meiksins Wood writes: “The antithesis to that [capitalism], 
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of course, is not postmodernism but socialism” (559).   
 
VI. 
As a final note, as I have been hinting at above, there has been a recent 'postmodern turn' 
in the literature on contemporary ruins, which emphasizes the bodily, the experiential, 
and the affective in the lived experience of ruins, in contrast to the more philosophical 
concerns to which ruins often give rise.  Such approaches aim to explore and describe the 
embodied and sensual experience of being in or passing through a ruin.  They are less 
concerned with traditional aesthetic categories, such as the beautiful, the picturesque, and 
the sublime, or with the aesthetic states associated with such judgements.  Indeed, these 
contemporary theoretical approaches are distinct in that they move away from a 
preoccupation with representation in general.  While art theory and critics of the past 
were interested in how a scene, for instance of an ancient ruin, might be represented in a 
painting, a poem, or a literary work, the approaches to which I am referring are interested 
instead in the lived experience of the landscape or architectural form in itself.  They seek 
to describe the various sensations and responses stimulated by the interaction of the 
human sensorium with the materiality of a particular space and the objects, animate and 
inanimate, that occupy or traverse that space.  As such, these approaches to the study of 
aesthetics might be said to fall under the category of spatial or situational aesthetics, 
tendencies which began to emerge in the 1960s in the discipline of art history to theorize 
the significance of spatial and social contexts to the practice of art.  Encouraging a shift 
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away from thinking of art as a collection of objects that can be housed in a museum or 
gallery, such contemporary aesthetic theories focus instead upon the aesthetic dimensions 
of everyday life—with spatial aesthetics paying particular attention to the ways in which 
the senses and sensibility are shaped by the built environment, and situational or 
relational aesthetics highlighting how social interactions are conditioned by and 
structured around the allocation of spatial props.  To approach aesthetics in this manner is 
to conceptualize the everyday as the terrain of artistic practice and aesthetic experience, 
and as such, as a site that is inherently invested with power.  It is to explore, negotiate, 
and even contest, the boundaries between art and life, between aesthetics and politics.  It 
is another genre of 'new ruins' that are at the centre of this discussion: industrial ruins.  
While these ruins will be discussed in the next chapter, here I would like to point to the 
ways in which these ruins are, in fact, also bound up with larger questions of loss, with 
the possibilities of a different future.   
 Tim Edensor's (2005) study of the decaying industrial landscapes of Great Britain, 
Industrial Ruins: Space, Aesthetics and Materiality, is exemplary in its emphasis on the 
embodied and experiential aspects of ruins.  Each chapter delights in a different aspect of 
the wondrous world of sights, textures, smells, colours, and sounds that ruins offer to the 
intrepid explorer.  He envisions the industrial ruin as a specie of unregulated theme park 
which offers free reign for sensorial engagement, veritably, an immense cabinet of 
curiosities.  Within the ruin, individuals can experience alternative ways of being in their 
bodies and in the built environment.  They can explore their capacities for action, and, in 
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particular, for destruction, in activities not normally sanctioned by society, including 
breaking, smashing, lifting, throwing, and screaming.  Outside of the panopticon of 
institutionalized social life, which subjects social performance to surveillance and 
policing, the ruin is a space of spontaneous encounters, underground activities, under-
aged parties, or romantic liaisons: alternative aesthetic experiences which Edensor 
conceptualizes in terms of the carnivalesque, the transgressive, the illicit, or the uncanny.  
Creatively appropriated, the industrial ruin is rich in perceptual, sensual, and imaginative 
potential: it can stimulate flights of fancy or awaken memories, conjure up associations 
or allow perceptual exploration.  Above all, it generates new experiences which offer an 
alternative to those more restrictive forms made available under the dominant regimes of 
power and knowledge.  As Edensor states:  
For me, however mundane they may seem, ruins still contain this 
promise of the unexpected. Since the original uses of ruined 
buildings has passed, there are limitless possibilities for encounters 
with the weird, with inscrutable legends inscribed on notice boards 
and signs, and with peculiar things and curious spaces which allow 
wide scope for imaginative interpretation, unencumbered by the 
assumptions which weigh heavily on highly encoded, regulated 
space. Bereft of these codings of the normative—the arrangements 
of things in place, the performance of regulated actions, the display 
of goods lined up as commodities or for show—ruined space is ripe 
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with transgressive and transcendent possibilities. Ruins offer spaces 
in which the interpretation and practice of the city becomes liberated 
from the everyday constraints which determine what should be done 
and where [...] (4). 
As the above statement makes clear, Edensor celebrates that which escapes, exceeds, 
transgresses: he views alterity as a positive force in and of itself.  As such, the industrial 
ruin, which he understands as falling outside the spatialization of regulatory regimes, is a 
site rife with emancipatory possibility. 
  As Edensor suggests, it is not just manual labour that subjects the body and the 
senses to strict regimentation, that conditions them through repetitive tasks and habitual 
movements.  The spaces of city life are produced in a way that is intentional, 
bureaucratic, and ultimately commodified—each is assigned a particular social purpose 
or function, usually one that facilitates the flow of capital, the movement of people and 
goods, and the processes of accumulation.  The disciplinary mechanisms of capitalism 
have penetrated the very fabric of everyday life: the “production of urban space is 
coterminous with regulation, surveillance, aesthetic monitoring and the prevalence of 
regimes which determine where and how things, activities and people should be placed” 
(54).  Such arrangements constitute performative constellations; that is, they give rise to 
prescribed activities, “the 'preferential' or 'appropriate' practices organised around 
production, consumption and internalisation of norms” (33).  Even leisure is oriented 
toward the passive consumption of commodities or spectacles.  The range of possible 
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social experiences and interactions, strictly delineated by “commercial and bureaucratic 
regimes,” is nevertheless challenged in the ruin:  
These orderings are violated in the ruin which, once an exemplary 
space of regulation, has become deliciously disordered. Ruins 
confound the normative spacings of things, practices and people. 
They open up possibilities for regulated urban bodies to escape their 
shackles in expressive pursuits and sensual experience, foreground 
alternative aesthetics about where and how things should be situated, 
and transgress boundaries between outside and inside, and between 
human and non-human spaces. (17-18) 
 The strength of this approach, which takes its cue from the critique of everyday 
life (Lefebvre, 1991), is that it calls upon us to take seriously the arranging and deranging 
of the senses under the capitalist system.  The production of needs, desires, and tastes is 
social and historical.  This constitution of sensibility, of structures of feeling, is at the 
core of what it is to be a subject, and, crucially, a social and political being.  As social 
activity and practice are increasingly structured around the consumption of spectacles 
which overstimulates the senses, Edensor and others are concerned with the consequent 
desensitizing or anaesthetizing effects, with the consolidation of unreflexive “patterns of 
identity” (81), the production of socio-political subjects who lack the capacity to 
formulate and articulate revolutionary desires.  Edensor's approach, which values 
“immanent immersion” (91), affective and synaesthetic intensities, and jouissance as 
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potential political forces, is inspired by the Situationist movement, which foregrounded 
the place of the body and of desire in struggle.  It was, indeed, May '68 which drove 
home the message that any alternative socio-political project, for instance, socialism, 
requires the re-education of the senses along with the recovering of our capacities—
creative, destructive, and productive.  Any revolution must certainly involve the 
transformation of everyday life alongside the seizure of political power; that is, it must 
include a deep institutional, spatial, and social transformation.  
 There are, however, some important limitations to the way in which Edensor 
locates the transformative potential of the industrial ruin in the individual's experience.  
The focus on the body as the primary site of the application of power and the 
reproduction of social norms, as well as their point of resistance, insightful as it is, shifts 
attention away from other levels of analysis, particularly of the socio-political and 
productive spheres.  Indeed, while making visible the micro-operations of corporeal and 
sensorial management, it obscures the more essential social relations of production and 
consumption, the ways in which bodies are inscribed in larger structures of capital 
accumulation.  The momentary transgression of boundaries, liberatory as it may feel, 
does not constitute a meaningful institutional challenge, does not address the structural 
and disciplinary mechanisms of capital.  Fetishizing the moment of destabilization as the 
practice of politics is a dangerous move, in that it devalues longer-term, organized 
political movements, the day-to-day activity of which is not glamorous or exciting, but 
laborious.  The question of subjectivity is, no doubt, one of the most pressing issues 
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facing the political Left in developed countries; yet, in recent decades, the formulation of 
the problematic in terms of class consciousness has been superseded by its formulation in 
terms of revolutionary desire, often shifting the focus away from the collective toward 
the individual.  Celebrating the radical potentiality of alternative forms of experience is 
symptomatic of this tendency, and fails to address substantial social issues that revolve 
around basic human needs, like employment, housing, daycare, and so forth, whose 
redress requires a more meaningful confrontation with political power.   
 Furthermore, conceptualizing the industrial ruin as a site which falls outside the 
bureaucratic and regulatory regimes of society ignores the ways in which it is inherently 
and inextricably bound to the deeper logic of capitalism—both in how it has been 
produced and how it continues to be policed.  Edensor is not entirely complicit in this 
regard.  He opens his book by recognizing that ruins are manufactured by the uneven 
development of capitalism: “The production of spaces of ruination and dereliction are an 
inevitable result of capitalist development and the relentless search for profit” (4).  
However, he does not seek to problematize the logic of forced obsolescence, but rather, 
takes it for granted.  While he affirms the value of ruins as sites of alternative forms of 
public life, “leisure, adventure, cultivation, acquisition, shelter and creativity” (21), he 
does not see in them any remaining economic viability—the activities that he imagines 
are on the margins of the political-economic system.  Industrial ruins are not empty and 
void of function, he argues, but rich in positive material and aesthetic properties that 
encourage alternative socialities (9).  Yet, at the socio-economic level, do not industrial 
67 
 
ruins actually represent wastelands?  They are, ultimately, the material signifiers of loss: 
the loss of jobs, community sustenance, economic vitality, and frequently, government 
subsidies.  As empty, often asset-stripped, shells of former economic activity, they serve 
as the visual remainder and reminder of a forced expulsion that was the product of 
hierarchical decision-making, of the lack of control that workers have over the means of 
their labour, of a system of production that fails to account for real social needs, but is, 
rather, dictated by the market and the bottom-line of maximizing profits.  Fenced off, 
boarded up, policed—and therefore far from accessible to the general public—they stand 
over and against the community.  As such, industrial ruins are symbols of dispossession 
rather than liberation.  
 One meaningful way to transform the loss that industrial ruins embody is to 
actually recuperate those spaces back into the socio-political, economic, or cultural life of 
the community.  Industrial ruins, including factories and plants, can and have been 
recuperated collectively.  As Sam Gindin (1998) points out, in his article “Socialism 
'With Sober Senses': Developing Workers' Capacities,” there is a forceful historical 
precedent for this practice: during the Second World War North American factories were 
rapidly converted to war-time production; the manufacture of consumer goods was 
quickly shifted to the manufacture of weapons and air planes for the war effort.  Gindin 
alerts us to the fact that it is possible to convert factories to other uses that are socially-
dictated, instead of determined by market imperative.  In Argentina, for instance, on the 
heels of the economic crisis of 2001, we have seen workers recuperating factories for 
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collectivized production after being shut out by the owners, as Naomi Klein and Avi 
Lewis's film, The Take (2006), documents in depth.  Other such social uses include 
community or childcare centres, cooperative housing, and spaces for the arts and culture.  
Reclaiming privatized spaces as social spaces in this way resists the capitalist social logic 
of dispossession, privatization, and profit maximization which makes ruins of our 
personal lives and the vitality of our communities.   
 Ruins, if we think creatively and collectively, offer us the possibility of imagining 
and even enacting another future, of exploring different social relations in concrete 
spaces.  Cities across the world, from Buenos Aires to Detroit, are becoming the fertile 
terrain for such experiments which bring together political, economic, and artistic 
concerns.  Beyond the melancholy imagination, the possibilities for action are endless.  
The losses of the past present new opportunities in the present which, once recognized, 
can be realized through collective action.  Ruins must be viewed as the ground upon 
which we can rebuild our lives and communities in more vital, just, and creative ways.  
While they are certainly the signifiers of loss, they are also the prompts that encourage us 
to remember and revitalize our dashed hopes.  The 'dialectic of modernity' discussed in 
this chapter, means “maintaining through the groundwork of memory a constant vigil 
over the prospect of past and present brutality” and forms of domination, while not 
allowing the crimes and disappointments of the past to shatter our dreams for the future 
(Kolotroni, 154). 
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2. 
Manufacturing Ruins 
 
 
I. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the manufacture of ruins: as capitalism is involved in the 
production of space, it is also and equally engaged in the production of ruins.  This 
double aspect of capitalism can be traced to the processes of “creative destruction,” a 
term coined by Schumpeter (2008), but used here to refer to the crisis-ridden character of 
capitalism first discussed by Karl Marx, and developed by Mandel (1976), Harvey 
(2004), and other Marxist thinkers.  As we shall see, Marx and Engels (1972) identified 
the logic of capital as a “revolutionizing” one, in the sense that its internal contradictions 
lead it to constantly transform itself through violent means, creating a situation in which 
the inverse of the accumulation of capital becomes its forced and necessary destruction.  
In this context, the ruins created by the devalorization of capital and its increasing 
rationalization eventually lay down the conditions for the rate of profit to rise once more, 
as damages caused to landscapes, buildings, and output production by the crisis open up 
new areas for the expansion of the market.  The latter coalesces, as Mandel has 
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explained, in “the recovery of the rate of profit to restimulate entrepreneurial 
investments, and hence to launch an upswing in production” (1976, 439). Thus, 
capitalism can be read as a system of catastrophe-making, akin to Walter Benjamin's 
(2007) image of history as a mounting pile of debris.  Although much of this chapter’s 
argument relates to political economy, the goal of its exploration of the internal 
contradictions of capitalism is to bring into relief the spatial and structural formations left 
behind them—the complexity and totality of which are formulated by David Harvey 
(2001), with his concept of the 'geography of capital accumulation', and Edward 
Burtynsky (2006), with his visual body of work entitled 'manufactured landscapes'.  
Debates about crisis theories and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall will only be 
discussed in passing, for what is interesting for our purposes here is that ruination is 
written into these landscapes: devaluation and devastation strike, inescapably, at the heart 
of capitalism's built environments.  Thus, it is not only theorists but also artists who are 
drawing our attention to the fact that the spaces of advanced capitalist societies are 
littered with ruins—abandoned plants, mine pits and tailings ponds, or cities such as 
Detroit and New Orleans, devastated by deindustrialization or by the aftermath of 
disasters like Hurricane Katrina—that question the very distinction between the natural 
and human-made.  Meanwhile, the profiteering that goes on in the wake of such 
catastrophes has led some, including Naomi Klein (2007) and Mark Schuller (2008), to 
herald the rise of a 'disaster capitalism' that seizes opportunistically upon the rubble to 
'reconstruct' social and spatial orders in service of a neoliberal agenda.  What is clear is 
71 
 
that processes inextricably environmental, political, and economic are remaking the 
geography of our cities in ways that are bound up with capital.  While this chapter will 
explore the spatial side of this geography, it will also emphasize the strange temporalities 
of these ruins of capital, what Nick Yablon (2009) terms their 'untimely' aspect.  Modern 
ruins defy the 'natural' processes of decay in multiple ways—for instance, in buildings, 
often the victims of private-public ventures, that fall into disrepair before ever being 
completed, or in objects that are (pre)destined to ruin by their planned obsolescence.  
Concepts like Robert Smithson's (1996) 'ruins in reverse', as well as the 'day-old' or 
'temporary' ruins discussed by Yablon, capture this idea.  Finally, we must consider the 
ways in which the production of ruins is connected with the human imaginary—with our 
ability to grasp the forces shaping the social and physical landscapes which we presently 
inhabit and to imagine different possibilities for the future. 
 
II. 
In Capital, Volume 3, Marx addresses a key component of his theory of capital: the 
general tendency toward a falling rate of profit.  According to his formula, the 
development of the “social productivity of labour” results in a situation in which “the 
growing use of machinery and fixed capital generally enables more raw and ancillary 
materials to be transformed into products in the same time by the same number of 
workers, i.e with less labour” (1991, 318).  As the means of production progressively 
advance, products can be made with less living labour or 'variable' capital relative to total 
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or 'constant' capital than previously.  The increasing efficiency of production results in a 
situation in which 'dead labour'—the productive forces crystallized in capital—rules over 
'living labour'.  This means that products contain less value or congealed labour time, as 
“[e]ach individual product, taken by itself, contains a smaller sum of labour than at a 
lower stage of development of production” (1991, 318).  Thus, we see a cheapening of 
the products of labour, translating into a decline in the rate of surplus value.  As Marx 
writes: 
Since the mass of living labour applied continuously declines in 
relation to the mass of objectified labour that it sets in motion, i.e. 
the productively consumed means of production, the part of this 
living labour that is unpaid and objectified in surplus-value must 
also stand in an ever-decreasing ratio to the value of the total capital 
applied. But the ratio between the mass of surplus-value and the total 
capital applied in fact constitutes the rate of profit, which must 
therefore steadily fall (1991, 319). 
This is, according to Marx, the “peculiar” characteristic of capitalism.  The increasing 
efficiency of production, or what he calls its “higher organic composition,” which could 
actually be socially useful if translated into the realm of freedom (the shorter work day) 
under the economic relations of socialist society, becomes a central contradiction under 
the social-property relations particular to the capitalist mode of production, one which 
must be constantly addressed through restructuring or necessary destruction in order to 
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ensure the survival of capitalism.   
 As such, in The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels point to the crisis-ridden 
character of capitalism.  As they see it, the history of “modern bourgeois society” is one 
of tensions and strife caused by the friction between the progressive development of 
productive forces and the existing social-property relations, which are, for them, 
outmoded.  Of the “commercial crises,” one of the main outcomes of this contradiction, 
witnessed in their time as much as in our own, they write “their periodical return puts the 
existence of the entire bourgeois society on its trial, each time more threateningly” (1972, 
340).  It is worth quoting at length as they draw out the consequences:   
In these crises, a great part not only of the existing products, but also 
of the previously created productive forces, are periodically 
destroyed. In these crises, there breaks out an epidemic that, in all 
earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity—the epidemic of 
over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state 
of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of 
devastation, had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; 
industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because 
there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too 
much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the 
disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the 
conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become 
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too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so 
soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the 
whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois 
property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to 
comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie 
get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a 
mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new 
markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That 
is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive 
crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented 
(1972, 340; my emphasis). 
Under the social relations of capitalism, the development of the productive forces 
becomes a drag on the very processes of accumulation.  The contradiction inherent in the 
system is that while competition spells the constant revolutionizing of the means of 
production, increasing mechanization, and the development of a massive architecture of 
fixed capital, at the same time, the very value of the products of this infrastructural 
capacity is undermined by their overproduction, which is an attempt to maintain profits in 
the face of their tendency to continuously decline.  The results are absurd: the products of 
this 'civilized' system are systematically destroyed, creating scarcity where there has been 
abundance, and the imperial machine, with its violent measures, is set in motion to secure 
fleeting respite in new markets.  Instead of advancing in the direction of freedom and 
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security for all, capitalism undermines these, forcing workers into the conditions of 
exploitation and uncertainty.  The dream of progress becomes, from a literary point of 
view, a farce—but a terrifying nightmare for all those who live it.  
 Thus, in the Grundrisse, Marx once again addresses this fundamental 
“incompatibility,” between the productive powers of labour and the constricting form of 
capital by which they are “fettered,” as one which inevitably gives way to crises.  While 
attempts are made to assuage this tension, they fail to address the deeper contradictions 
inherent in the system, and therefore, to provide any lasting solution.  The only real 
resolution is, according to Marx, a corresponding transformation of the social relations of 
production—a revolutionary demand:  
The growing incompatibility between the productive development of 
society and its hitherto existing relations of production expresses 
itself in bitter contradictions, crises, spasms. The violent destruction 
of capital not by relations external to it, but rather as a condition of 
its self-preservation, is the most striking form in which advice is 
given it to be gone and to give room to a higher state of social 
production (1973, 749-750). 
As we can see, Marx identifies capitalism as a system of crisis, a point which David 
Harvey and others critical theorists will pick up on.  Interestingly, the tendency toward 
the falling rate of profit leads to the forcible destruction of capital—through devaluation, 
destruction, and imperial war, among other methods—as the precondition for its renewed 
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accumulation.  Thus capitalism depends not only upon the building up of environments 
(and the putting into place of fixed capital) to facilitate the stockpiling of commodities, 
but also their intentional razing; it is absolutely bound up with the destruction of built 
environments and manufactured goods as a condition of its survival.  This is the process 
that has come to be known as 'creative destruction', and is, I argue, at the heart of the 
manufacture of ruins—the other side of the production of space. 
 Revolutionary Marxist theorist Ernest Mandel attempted to apply Marx’s analysis 
of these dynamic contradictions to post-Second World War capitalism by looking at 'long 
waves' of capitalist development while also formulating an analysis of what he 
considered to be a long-drawn-out recession of global capitalism since the 1970s.  For 
him, economic crises under capitalism are inevitable as commodities (exchange values) 
are overproduced, in sharp contrast with pre-capitalist economic crises, “which are 
essentially”, as he explains, “crises of underproduction of use-values” (2003).  It is 
exceptional in human history that, under economic development according to capitalist 
imperatives, accumulation reaches such levels that interruptions of economic growth 
occur no longer “because too few commodities have been produced but, on the contrary, 
because a mountain of produced commodities finds no buyers” (2003).  What follows are 
successions of corporate bankruptcies, higher rates of unemployment, and diminished 
amounts of goods and services sold, including raw materials and machinery. As 
production and earnings are reduced, new ruins are created, for outputs are wasted, 
buildings are abandoned, and machines lay idle.  Outside the confines of industrial 
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production, residential houses are emptied of their inhabitants as banks evict families 
unable to pay their debts. 
 Mandel observes that “[a]t the end of the declining spiral […] production can pick 
up again; and as the crisis has both increased the rate of surplus-value (through a decline 
of wages and a more ‘rational’ labour organisation) and decreased the value of capital, 
the average rate of profit increases” (2003).  According to him, this process generally 
allows for investment to be stimulated: “Employment increases, value production and 
national income expand, and we enter a new cycle of economic revival, prosperity, 
overheating and the next crisis” (2003).  Crisis and recovery cycles might, however, be 
more complex than what this schematic exposition suggests.  David McNally (2011), for 
instance, in his book Global Slump, has convincingly made the case that the recovery of 
corporate profitability is far from translating automatically into new jobs, incomes, or 
social services (24).  As he suggests, the end of the exceptional economic boom of the 
post–World War II era should not be understood, as is generally the case among Leftist 
scholars, as a protracted ‘crisis’ of capitalism, but rather as “a pure and simple program 
for restoring corporate profits” (25-26).  In his view, the neoliberal period “did boost 
corporate profitability after the recessions of 1974–75 and 1980–82 […] substantially 
enough to move the global economy out of crisis for a quarter-century” (49).  Moving out 
of crisis, however, is no synonym of prosperity for all, quite the contrary, for capitalism 
begets ruins and devastation in ‘good’ times as in ‘bad’.  As such, it is a mistake to 
associate the creation of industrial ruins with a specific ‘moment’ within capitalist 
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cycles—the downward turn—for there is no discrepancy between capitalist growth and 
the profound industrial restructuring that transforms infrastructural landscapes in ways 
that rarely suit the requirements of sustainable development or respect workers’ ability to 
take care of the physical environment in which they live.  The most local of matters thus 
comes to appear as much out of reach of social power as the broader governance of the 
international political economy.  
 Critical Marxist geographer David Harvey was one of the first to explicitly 
highlight the complex geographical dimensions of this process.  As is evident in his essay 
“The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession,” the problem of 
overaccumulation creates a rather strange scenario in which the surpluses of capital must 
be either destroyed or absorbed to allow the processes of accumulation to be rejuvenated 
and expanded.  As he writes: 
[there is] a pervasive tendency of capitalism, understood 
theoretically by way of Marx’s theory of the falling rate of profit, to 
produce crises of overaccumulation [...] If system-wide devaluations 
(and even destruction) of capital and of labour power are not to 
follow, then ways must be found to absorb these surpluses. 
Geographical expansion and spatial reorganization provide one such 
option. But this cannot be divorced from temporal fixes either, since 
geographical expansion often entails investment in long-lived 
physical and social infrastructures (in transport and communications 
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networks and education and research, for example) that take many 
years to return their value to circulation through the productive 
activity they support (2004, 63).  
Harvey is pointing toward the resiliency of capitalism, perhaps underestimated by Marx, 
which finds multiple strategies to avoid or escape the crises internal to it—strategies with 
spatial and temporal dimensions and consequences.  He identifies two important routes 
that have been taken historically to extend the life of the system beyond its 
contradictions: “temporal deferment and geographical expansion” or “spatio-temporal 
fixes” (2004, 65)—traditionally thought of as imperialism and long-term infrastructural 
development—both of which radically refashion the landscape and allow capital to be, at 
least temporarily, absorbed.  “Accumulation by dispossession,” the defining feature of 
what he calls “the new imperialism,” is another strategy of pursuing the expanded 
reproduction of capital by extending and intensifying exploitation (and thereby increasing 
profits) by means of the processes of commodification and privatization, in which credit 
and financial systems have come to play a major role.  Thus, capitalism, fleeing crisis, 
produces its social and physical geographies, which have reached a global scale:  
The production of space, the organization of wholly new territorial 
divisions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper resource 
complexes, of new dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the 
penetration of pre-existing social formations by capitalist social 
relations and institutional arrangements (such as rules of contract 
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and private property arrangements) provide multiple ways to absorb 
existing capital and labour surpluses (2004, 65-66). 
Yet, sophisticated as they are, these strategies can and do fail, and the outcome is, as we 
shall see, a further devastation that touches both the geographical and social landscapes.      
 Influenced by the work of Henri Lefebvre on the production of space, Harvey's 
ingenuity is to introduce the geographical dimension into the theorization of the 
processes of capital.  Social and productive relations are spatialized, which means that we 
need to take account of built environments in our social and political analyses, as they are 
potentially revealing of the deeper logic at work in the capitalist system.  His analysis of 
the creative-destructive process of capitalism's territorialization and expansion gestures 
toward the ways in which the manufacture of ruins could be read as part and parcel of 
capital's production of space:  
capital necessarily creates a physical landscape in its own image at 
one point in time only to have to destroy it at some later point in 
time as it pursues geographical expansions and temporal 
displacements as solutions to the crises of overaccumulation to 
which it is regularly prone. Thus is the history of creative 
destruction (with all manner of deleterious social and environmental 
consequences) written into the evolution of the physical and social 
landscape of capitalism (Harvey 2004, 66; my emphasis). 
Seen in this light, the history of capitalism becomes a history of ruin-making—the 
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creation and re-creation of the built environment through continual destruction.  The 
architectural and spatial assemblage of productive forces and social organization is 
constantly undergoing decimation and re-configuration.  Much like Walter Benjamin 
(2007), whose image of the angelus novus recounts history not as progress but as a 
mounting pile of debris, the history of capitalism is one in which productive capacities 
are built up only later to be destroyed, and with devastating human consequences.  When 
the crises of overproduction are resolved through devaluation, destruction, de-
industrialization, or war, it is the most marginal groups and persons in society who suffer 
the greater harm.  The loss of lives or of livelihoods, of homes or hopes for the future, are 
just some of the many outcomes.  As capitalism produces landscapes of ruin, those who 
inhabit those landscapes are inevitably affected—shut out of factories, dispossessed of 
their houses, and barred access to a future of real possibility in terms of the development 
of their human capacities and the realm of freedom.   
 Baran and Sweezy (1968), in their book Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the 
American Economic and Social Order, argue for a reading of contemporary capitalism in 
the core capitalist countries as the phase of monopoly capital, in which the rules that 
govern competitive capitalism, particularly those of price competition, no longer apply 
(though whether free competition ever truly existed is another question).  Yet, while the 
dominance of large corporate conglomerates in the international market alters the playing 
field, leading to other forms of competition such as the sales effort, the essential thrust of 
their argument is in tune with both Marx and Harvey.  The development of the forces of 
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production remains fettered by the organization of socio-economic relations: there is a 
“contradiction between the increasing rationality of society's methods of production and 
the organizations which embody them on the one hand and the undiminished elementality 
and irrationality in the functioning and perception of the whole” (341).  While we have 
developed the capacity to produce enormous quantities of goods, as evidenced by the 
growing surplus, capitalists must find ways to absorb this surplus (of capacity and 
products) in order to maintain profitability; the “pervasive problem” of this society 
becomes that of “too much” (110).  They thus seek out ways of “maintaining scarcity in 
the midst of potential plenty,” creating a completely irrational situation of poverty and 
want even in the heart of the world's most rich and powerful country, the US (337).  Thus 
the strange, once inconceivable, fact “that idle men and idle machines coexist with 
deprivation at home and starvation abroad, that poverty grows in step with affluence, that 
enormous amounts of resources are wasted in frivolous and often harmful ways” (1).  
The features of this system of monopolization are the underutilization of productive 
capacity, chronic unemployment, and waste (a form of destruction).  Indeed, Baran and 
Sweezy emphasize that planned obsolescence, the repackaging of the same products to 
create new demand, and advertising are just some of the many ways that large amounts of 
capital are necessarily redirected along channels that are not socially useful; in fact, 
planning for social needs in such a system is impossible.  Contemporary capitalism is a 
“wasteland,” both literally and figuratively—a ruined landscape littered with broken 
things (141).  
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 If capitalism has always restructured in ways that lead to ruination, what is 
specific about the current moment?  We have seen that the ways in which contemporary 
capitalist societies produce waste at home is one feature, while the 'new imperialism' 
abroad is another.  To answer this question in a different way, we need to consider the 
distinction that is often made between modernity and postmodernity.  As we shall see in 
more detail below, ruin-making has been intricately bound with capitalist modernity.  
The logic of creative destruction is the dynamism that drives the constant revolutionizing 
of the system.  The so-called “postmodern moment” does not differ in this fundamental 
sense.  Indeed, theorists of postmodernity insist that in this so-called postmodern phase or 
condition of capitalism, “the basic rules of a capitalist mode of production continue to 
operate as invariant shaping forces in historical-geographical development” (Harvey 
1990, 121). What is different about the contemporary era is what Harvey calls, in The 
Condition of Postmodernity, “the regime of accumulation and its associated mode of 
social and political regulation” (121).  Essentially what this means is that the ways in 
which labour is composed, society organized, and capital invested have changed.  Harvey 
makes a useful distinction between the contemporary configuration of production and 
reproduction and that of the Fordist-Keynesian era (1945-1973).  The latter was a regime 
of mass production and consumption, accompanied by “a new kind of rationalized, 
modernist, and populist democratic society,” which supported a golden era of capitalist 
development, a long boom that lasted until the crises of the 1970s (126).  The 
restructuring of capital, again through processes of creative destruction, was the outcome 
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of that wave of crises.  To briefly summarize Harvey's argument, industrial capital 
suffered whereas financial capital gained ground, “achiev[ing] a degree of autonomy 
from real production unprecedented in capitalism's history” (194).  This process, still 
ongoing to some degree, has ushered in what Harvey describes as a regime of “flexible” 
accumulation, characterized by space-time compression, structural unemployment, 
austerity, deregulation, monopolization, and neoliberal governance.   
 For the core capitalist countries, once centres of industrial activity of an enormous 
scale, this transition has refashioned the social and physical landscape.  The restructuring 
of capital has led to a new global organization of production and consumption, 
commencing a decades long process of deindustrialization in much of North America and 
Western Europe.  The ruins of capitalist industry—contemporary ruins—litter the cities 
of these continents.  The social consequences, in the form of unemployment and the 
devitalization of communities, just to name a few, have also been ruinous.  But there are 
other ruins too, less recognizable as such: those that have resulted from decades of poor, 
disorderly city planning and development according to neoliberal imperatives.  Such 
processes have left communities vulnerable to disasters that are no longer 
straightforwardly 'natural'.  Ruin-making has become not just the necessary, if 
unintended, side-effect of capitalism's driving force of creative destruction, but the latest 
frontier for profit maximization.  Disasters are another aspect of life that have been 
commodified in the interests of extending and prolonging accumulation.  I would like to 
turn now to a closer examination of these forces that are making and remaking the social 
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and physical terrain of North America to illuminate the social consequences of ruin-
making in greater depth. 
 
III. 
As gestured to above, two forces in particular are fashioning and re-fashioning the urban 
environments of North America in the contemporary context: deindustrialization and 
disaster.  On the one hand, we are witnessing the effects of the shift from the 'Fordist' to 
the 'post-Fordist' or 'flexible' regime of capital accumulation, which has resulted in the 
restructuring of the economy and the decline of the manufacturing sector.  As capital 
attempts to deal with crisis—seen most recently in the wave financial meltdowns and the 
near-global recession—new markets, not only for products but also for labour, are 
increasingly being sought abroad in the global South.  In the last few decades, this 
tendency has caused a marked shift in Western capitalist countries to a service sector 
economy, which, when combined with neoliberalism and austerity measures, has resulted 
in the creation of precarious labour conditions, part-time employment, and the loss of 
unionized factory work, particularly in the automotive sector.  Mobility, in contrast to 
territorialization, is the strategy behind the transnationalization of capital, which has seen 
factories move overseas where labour is cheaper and regulations virtually non-existent.  
Outsourcing, contract-work, and other just-in-time production methods have replaced the 
traditional factory line geared toward mass production which was popularized by Henry 
Ford.  Rapid deindustrialization, particularly of the heavily industrialized north-eastern 
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and mid-western United States and Canada, as well as in Western Europe, has been the 
outcome of these changes, and has left behind ruins of a scope far greater than those of 
classical Antiquity—massive factories, industrial zones, decaying city centres, and vast 
urban prairies.   
 On the other hand, we have seen a recent wave of disasters whose causal factors, 
blending as they do ecological crisis with political decision-making and bad city 
planning, are, at first glance, rather difficult to pinpoint.  The scale of devastation 
wrought by these is almost incomprehensible.  What has become evident, however, is 
that, in the contemporary epoch, crisis and catastrophe zones have become fertile ground 
for capital accumulation, through corporate reconstruction efforts, as well as the 
privatization of social goods and the commons.  This suggests that capitalism, in the 
'postmodern' era, is increasing taking advantage of the very ruinous landscapes it 
systematically produces by reincorporating them back into the cycles of accumulation as 
a terrain for unbridled profiteering.  Creative destruction—a basic logic of capitalism—is 
evident as the driving principle behind both deindustrialization and disaster, but it has 
reached new scales and swept away old taboos and pretences.  Ruin-making is, in other 
words, the new frontier of accumulation, the newest scene of mass dispossession, rather 
than just a by-product of restructuring.  Capitalism's crises, and the responses to these 
crises that lead its elite in search of new frontiers of accumulation, take us back to the 
ruins as the latest source of profitability in an ongoing struggle to deepen and expand the 
production of surplus value. 
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 Let us address the first process mentioned above, deindustrialization, taking the 
city of Detroit, Michigan, as an obvious and powerful example of the havoc wreaked as a 
result.  Harvey (2004) ties the processes of deindustrialization back to the ways in which 
surpluses of capital are absorbed by embedding them in the built environment, or the 
infrastructures of production and consumption—which, in the case of Detroit, are 
primarily those of the automotive industry.  Investment in such massive industrial 
infrastructure, requires, as Harvey points out, the backing of 'fictitious' capital, or credit, 
which must later be realized, or returned in real terms.  Yet, these strategies to “fix” 
capital through territorialization end up serving as an impediment to the expanded 
reproduction of capital, which must eventually move onto new ground: “Vast quantities 
of capital fixed in place act as a drag upon the search for a spatial fix elsewhere” (2004, 
66).  As Harvey points out, this inbuilt drive toward “geographical expansions, 
reorganizations and reconstructions often threaten, however, the values fixed in place but 
not yet realized” (2004, 66).  In such a situation, there are few possible outcomes—
massive devaluation, fiscal crisis, and/or capital flight—each devastating to the given 
spatial and social order.  Harvey describes this conundrum, in which overcoming crisis 
necessarily requires some form of destruction of fixed capital: 
If capital does move out, it leaves behind a trail of devastation (the 
de-industrialization experienced in the 1970s and 1980s in the 
heartlands of capitalism, like Pittsburgh and Sheffield, as well as in 
many other parts of the world, such as Bombay illustrates the point). 
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If overaccumulated capital does not or cannot move, on the other 
hand, then it stands to be devalued directly (2004, 66). 
Deindustrialized landscapes have come to characterize much of North America and 
Western Europe.  In an era of transnational and mobile capital, factories have been 
increasingly re-located to low-wage regions, most of which are to be found in the global 
South.  The labour market, as well as weak regulations and cheap raw materials, in these 
relatively undeveloped areas facilitate the search for increased profits.  However, this 
process too has limits, as these zones become increasingly subjected to the logic of 
capital; capitalism's expansionary tendencies are checked as it becomes a global system 
with virtually no geographical regions left untouched.  In Canada and the US, the 
resultant collapse of the manufacturing sector in the wake of this geographical expansion 
and reorganization of capital has left entire cities, particularly those economically non-
diversified and reliant upon heavy industry, in a state of disrepair.  Detroit, as we shall 
see, serves as a highly visible and symbolic example of this process, one which has 
captured the imagination of numerous critics, film-makers, and artists.  
 Much has been written, filmed, and photographed of America's 'Motor City', once 
known affectionately in the past as the 'Paris of the Midwest'—a centre of high art and 
architecture.  Detroit long served as a symbol of American prosperity and power in the 
interwar and even post-war period until its decline.  Over the last several decades, it has 
also been a highly visible site of racial conflict and segregation, urban poverty and decay.  
It was in Detroit that Henry Ford first introduced his motorcar, and later, the Fordist 
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model of mass production based on the assembly line, which transformed existing 
production methods and accumulation strategies.  It was here that the American dream, 
of comfortable consumerism and a home in the suburbs, was perhaps the most nearly 
achieved, at least by some, if only for a short while.  Manufacturing became a bastion of 
unionized labour—the stable, well-paying employment behind the mass-purchasing 
power that would help fuel two decades of postwar economic growth.  The automobile 
industry, as has been well-documented, provided the both the vehicles that permitted so-
called 'white flight' from the downtown core to the surrounding suburban 
neighbourhoods, as well as the wages that allowed factory workers to purchase their own 
model (Darden et al. 1987; Farley et al. 2000; Rucker & Upton 2007).  Thus, it has been 
remarked with a certain irony that the automotive industry sowed the seeds of its own 
decline, as it played a key role in defining the new socio-spatial relations that were to be 
consolidated in postwar period in America: suburbanization, the spatialization of 
inequality, and profound regional variations of development (Darden et al. 1987; Surgue 
2005).  The fate of Detroit, as a city that now stands in ruins, must be understood in the 
full light of these factors.  Ruin-making in contemporary capitalism broadly, but here, in 
the case of Detroit specifically, can be traced back to historical patterns of geographical 
development and (sub)urbanization—with undeniable racial and class dimensions—as 
strategies that responded to the economic conditions of the interwar and immediate 
postwar period, including recession and unemployment, but ultimately provided only 
short-term relief to the deeper crises of capital discussed above. 
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 As critical theorists have pointed out, Detroit's spatial logic has been defined by 
an uneven development, the result of a “spatial trajectory of investment and divestment, 
economic growth and decline,” which has unfolded very much upon racial lines (Darden 
et al. 1987, 11).  In Detroit, Race and Uneven Development, Darden et al. trace this 
pattern of development back to the 1940s, when policies of suburbanization, fuelled by 
transportation and housing subsidies, were actively pursued at the federal and local 
levels, encouraging urban dispersal and industrial relocation.  This process fragmented 
Detroit, creating a duality between the decaying downtown core with its satellite 
working-class neighbourhoods, and prospering suburban municipalities, such as 
Dearborn and Troy, which are today the still relatively prosperous seat of administrative 
and service activities.  As they write: “Auto decentralization, then the reorganization of 
commercial capital from downtown to regional shopping centers gave birth to two 
Detroits” (1987, 11).  In other words, the geographical logic of capitalism produced not 
only particular physical environments through the mapping of circuits and infrastructure 
of production and consumption onto the landscape, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, social geographies of division and inequality.  That is why, today, Detroit is 
not uniformly desolate and decayed, even if the city itself is bankrupt; rather certain 
sectors and areas—for the most part gated communities safely set away from the 
downtown core—continue to receive investment while others are left to the processes of 
ruin: “economic reorganization in response to the industrial crisis is bringing with it a 
spatial redistribution of capital that continues to advantage selected suburbs” (Darden 
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1987, 12). 
 Thomas Sugrue (1996) explains the racial dimension of this process of uneven 
development in The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit.  
He describes how as African Americans moved north in the early half of the twentieth 
century in search of better jobs in America's 'Rust Belt', they were met by racist attitudes 
and discriminatory practices, both in the areas of work and residence.  Detroit's 
geography developed in a racialized fashion, with the white and black areas of town 
segregated, the former situated outside the downtown core and subsidized in various 
ways, and the later ghettoized and impoverished.  Detroit developed not as one city but as 
many, characterized by markedly different socio-economic realities: black 
neighbourhoods were spatially isolated from their white counterparts, encouraging 
patterns of investment and divestment that benefited the privileged communities.  Sugrue 
thus identifies the decline of  Detroit—in which over a million people have left the city in 
a mass exodus and hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost—as, at root, an “urban 
crisis” fuelled by racialized poverty and uneven development:   
Detroit's postwar urban crisis emerged as the consequence of two of 
the most important, interrelated, and unresolved problems in 
American history: that capitalism generates economic inequality and 
that African Americans have disproportionately borne the impact of 
that inequality (1996, 5). 
Uneven development, coupled with neoliberal urban policies, exacerbated social 
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inequalities, leading to social struggle and racial conflict.  Thus, David Harvey, in words 
that echo those of Surgue, writes:   
the urbanization process was as geographically uneven as were the 
income streams that flowed to different segments of the working 
class. While the suburbs flourished, the inner cities stagnated and 
declined. While the white working class flourished, in relative terms 
the impacted inner city minorities—African-American in 
particular—did not. The result was a whole sequence of inner-city 
uprisings—Detroit, Watts, culminating in spontaneous uprisings in 
some forty cities across the United States in the wake of the 
assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968 (2012, 16). 
Creative destruction is a highly uneven spatial process—one with racial and class 
dimensions and consequences.  Inequality is a spatial practice, as much as a social one.  
Darden et al. and Surgue, much like Harvey, identify the spatial logic of capitalism as a 
key factor in facilitating or hindering its processes of accumulation.  As George 
Steinmetz remarks in his piece, “Detroit: A Tale of Two Cities,” the “nonsimultaneity of 
the urban and automotive crises” suggests that they are non-identical—separate but 
interrelated problems (2009, 765).  The spectacular fall of Detroit is not due merely to 
bad management or lack of competitiveness of the auto-industry on the global market, or 
to the crisis of overproduction faced by manufacturing sector in general, but to the very 
ways in which space is occupied, invested, and organized—in this case along class and 
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racial lines.   
 The process of uneven investment, divestment, and reorganization of capital—of 
creative destruction, which is manifestly more destructive than creative in Detroit—
continues until today.  Photographic images of the city, which abound in books and on 
the internet, reveal huge expanses of grassland where houses and factories once stood: 
“You have to see 189 acres of vacant land in the middle of a big city to understand the 
term urban prairie,” writes John Gallagher in his book Reimagining Detroit (2010, 26). 
This so-called urban prairie poses developmental questions of a kind not hitherto faced 
by urban environments habitually struggling with the problems of expansion, rather than 
those of contraction: “Nobody trains to deal with emptiness other than by filling it with 
traditional development—housing, retail space, industrial parks—but that kind of 
development is inadequate to deal with the scope of Detroit's prairies” (Gallagher 2010, 
23).  As the recent film Detropia (2012) demonstrates in its filming of a public town-hall 
meeting, strategies proposed by the mayor and his team of consultants to “consolidate” or 
“down-size” the city have been met with hostility among its impoverished residents who 
feel that once again they are being made the victims of uneven development, forced to 
give up their homes and move elsewhere.  Nevertheless, the local inhabitants are 
reimagining these spaces, through, for instance, the implementation of urban parks and 
community gardens, but the long-term health and vitality of the community certainly 
cannot be separated from deeper attempts to revitalize the economy and address the 
legacy of uneven development and creative destruction that has so radically and rapidly  
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transformed the city's landscape.  
 There are, in other words, two broad tendencies at work in Detroit's ruination: an 
economic and an urban crisis, which are, however, inseparable.  Both must be traced 
back to the drive to revolutionize the processes of accumulation, pursued through 
territorialization, geographical expansion, (de)industrialization, investment and 
divestment, and the reorganization of capital, which results in profound unevenness of 
development, even at the level of the metropolis itself.  While the strategies producing 
unevenness can create opportunities for exploitation, it is also a highly volatile process 
which can backfire.  As Robert Brenner argues in The Economics of Global Turbulence, 
“capitalism tends to develop the productive forces to an unprecedented degree, and [it] 
tends to do so in a destructive, because unplanned and competitive, manner” (2006, 25).  
The uneven development of the means of production, though stimulating competition 
among sectors or manufacturers, also creates tendencies toward over-production and 
over-competition.  Fixed capital, according to Brenner, is particularly “vulnerable to new 
productions with more advanced techniques operating at lower costs” (2006, 32).  While 
certain sectors or regions of the economy surge ahead, taking advantage of new 
technologies and cost-cutting measures, others are left behind, unable to recuperate the 
investments sunk into masses of territorialized capital.  In the case of Detroit, this spatial 
logic divided and developed the city such that, when crisis befell the automobile industry, 
vast stretches of the urban metropolis had already been made vulnerable to decay.  Ruins 
were built into the process of development from the outset, through the systematic 
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manufacturing of divestment, underfunding, and poverty.   
 
 
IV. 
 
I would like now to take a look at that other force mentioned above that is refashioning 
the physical and social geographies of the global South, and increasingly, the core 
capitalist countries of the global North: disaster.  An entire field of contemporary study 
has emerged to theorize the rise of so-called 'disaster capitalism'.  As Mark Schuller 
(2008) explains, researchers are beginning to understand natural catastrophes—such as 
floods, earthquakes, or hurricanes—as merely the “triggering events” to what should be 
conceptualized as much broader political and economic disasters (17).  Social policy, 
uneven development, economic decisions, and political factors are among the factors at 
work in what he terms “the disaster after the disaster”—the secondary catastrophe that 
disproportionately affects the most marginal groups and regions in our society (18).  He 
points to neoliberal capitalism as manufacturing the states of 'vulnerability' and 'hazard' 
which are then exacerbated following 'natural' crises such as Hurricane Katrina—a 
relatively new phenomenon.  Development, an uneven and unplanned process—
particularly in the era of flexible accumulation and neoliberal governance—as we have 
seen above, leaves certain physical and social landscapes which are more vulnerable to 
damage than others.  The creative destructive process often results in poorly planned 
metropolitan regions.  The “'technical' decisions about land use and development,” 
Schuller suggests, which are in existence long before a disaster strikes, help to explain 
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the scale and the pattern of devastation that emerges in its wake (17).  Thus, institutional 
practices and policies are pervaded by structural forms of inequality which organize 
spatial and social relations in hierarchical ways.  Indeed, as Alexander De Waal notes in 
his introduction to the book, Capitalizing on Catastrophe, disasters reveal the socio-
political fault lines of a society, exposing class and race divisions, as well as 
institutionalized power arrangements: “disasters […] strike disproportionately in 
locations with poor infrastructure and where people are poor and politically marginal.  
Entirely man-made disasters such as wars display even greater spatial and political bias” 
(2008, ix).  Disasters are not wholly natural events; rather, they are unleashed within the 
channels opened up by capitalism's geography of accumulation and dispossession—
channels which have increased and widened over the last few decades.  Moreover, the 
crisis-ridden character of capitalism has led it into the domain of disaster 'reconstruction' 
as the newest frontier of its expanded reproduction.  Zones of disaster promise 
tremendous profits, as well as an exceptional opportunity for economic restructuring and 
socio-spatial engineering according to the principles of neoliberalism.  Thus, Schuller 
defines disaster capitalism as the “instrumental use of catastrophe (both so-called natural 
and human-mediated disasters, including postconflict situations) to promote and 
empower a range of private, neoliberal capitalist interests” (2008, 20).   
 While private sector-led reconstruction efforts abroad—corporate contracts in 
post-invasion Iraq being a prime target in this regard—have long attracted critical 
attention, it is only recently that scholars have begun to take note of the similar processes 
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happening in North America.  Both Schuller and De Waal identify Hurricane Katrina as a 
textbook example of disaster capitalism in a 'developed' capitalist country.  Several 
decisions about the region's development, made in the interests of the private sector in the 
first place, left it vulnerable: among those, “the destruction of wetlands, offshore oil 
production, construction of levees, and other infrastructure projects destroyed the natural 
ecosystem, amplifying the storm's destructive effects” (Schuller 2008, 17).  Capitalist 
processes were, in other words, systematically at work in the production of the ruins of 
New Orleans; in devastating the region's natural habitat and in creating social 
marginalization mapped onto the city's topography, it manufactured a landscape that was 
easily decimated.  The calamity that followed then allowed worker's rights to be 
weakened and no-bid contracts to flourish in the reconstruction period, creating major 
profits for big business (18).  While fishing and other small-scale industries were reduced 
to ruin, oil companies and casinos stood to gain (18).  Furthermore, the immediate 
aftermath of the event was seen as a “window of opportunity” for a series of troubling 
structural changes in the interests of the capitalist class (22).  The hurricane was, in other 
words, a pretext for the political and economic interventions which constituted the 
“secondary calamity”; as De Waal writes, “the storm itself was only the harbinger of a 
greater disaster, the wholesale transformation of the region in the interests of real estate 
developers and the tourism industry” (2008, xii).  This involved the privatization and 
gentrification of New Orleans, particularly the waterfront, as well as the underhanded 
introduction of a privatized, for-profit educational system, following neoliberal 
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ideological lines, referred to by teachers as an “educational land grab” (Klein 2007, 6).  
While the disaster itself impacted the landscape, producing ruins to be sure, it was these 
changes that followed in its wake that truly remade the spatial and social geographies of 
the city, in ways that suggest that creative destruction is now actively being pursued as a 
strategy of accumulation and social engineering.   
 Naomi Klein, in her book The Shock Doctrine, further clarifies the intricacies and 
complexities of disaster capitalism, particularly the discourse of exceptionalism that 
surrounds disaster response scenarios.  She highlights that the “orchestrated raids on the 
public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events,” such as those mentioned above, are 
facilitated by the state of shock into which the public has been ushered (2007, 6).  Crisis, 
capitalists have learned, creates opportunity: the state of emergency and exception to 
which it gives way does away with all constraints that curtail the unbridled pursuit of 
privatization and social restructuring in 'normal' times.  She describes this as a “powerful 
move [...] to break the taboos protecting “the core” from privatization” (288).  The 
administering of social, political and economic “shock treatment” is what follows (7).  
Indeed, the commodification of certain elements of our everyday life—of the commons 
or social goods such as education or health care—does not come easily.  A public 
accustomed to certain services is not willing to readily cede these assets; thus, such 
transformation becomes, as Klein remarks, a “possibility available only in times of 
cataclysmic change—when people, with their stubborn habits and insistent demands, are 
blasted out of the way” (20-21).  She aptly compares the mechanism of disaster 
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capitalism with that of torture, which breaks down subjects' resistance through “deep 
disorientation and shock in order to force them to make concessions against their will” 
(16).  The violent nature of the system is, thus, revealed: in “contemporary capitalism,” 
she writes, “fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward” (9).  The 
systematic production of ruins creates the conditions for radical restructuring by 
producing states of vulnerability and shock that weaken the possibilities of collective 
organization and resistance.  
 Schuller, De Waal, and Klein encourage us to conceptualize disaster as something 
not at all exceptional, but rather, integral to contemporary capitalism.  Catastrophes are 
not avoided but rather 'managed' so as to create opportunities for profit and to pursue 
neoliberal agendas; as De Waal argues, we are witnessing a regime of “disaster 
management whereby calamities are not, in fact, prepared for, prevented, relieved, or 
recovered from, but are handled in such a way that they pose the minimum political 
threat to governments” (xi).  Out of disaster zones emerge 'exciting investment 
opportunities' and contracts with better terms and conditions than in times of normality, 
extending the possibilities of accumulation (and thereby providing a solution to the 
falling rate of profit).   
 Similarly ruins must be seen as not merely the by-products of the passage of time 
and the 'natural' forces of decay—in other words, as incidental to the processes of 
production and accumulation—but instead, as products being manufactured by 
contemporary capitalism.  Ruin-making in its many forms is increasingly an actual 
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strategy of capital accumulation.  When viewed in the light, it could be conceived as the 
latest frontier for the new forms of “accumulation by dispossession” discussed by Harvey 
(2004), a notion which he likens to Marx's concept of primitive accumulation, but 
identifies as an ongoing capitalist process.  While his emphasis is on structural 
adjustment programs, which pave the way for corporations to enter new markets, he 
recognizes “that the US may not be immune” to the kinds of crisis that lead to rounds of 
devaluations and restructuring (2004, 79).  In this case, disaster becomes an opportunity 
to seize public goods or services in order to privatize them, and to impose neoliberal 
policies that facilitate the process, ultimately concentrating wealth into the hands of the 
elite while dispossessing the majority of access to these resources.  
 The manufacture of ruins, becomes, as Klein points out, a perfect pretext for 
wiping the slate clean: disaster zones are seen by developers as “clean sheets” for 
radically refashioning the landscape (2007, 8).  Catastrophe is now “the preferred method 
of advancing corporate goals: using moments of collective trauma to engage in radical 
social and economic engineering” (8).  Spatial remapping, along class and racial lines, 
and economic restructuring, based on accumulation by dispossession, are forces that 
remake the social geography of our cities.  The principle of erasure is in line with the 
logic of creative destruction, and is one which creates a profound sense of dislocation and 
uprootedness for the human communities who experience it.  As Klein argues: “Most 
people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to 
salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to 
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reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them” (8).   
 The temporality of contemporary ruins is one in which they rapidly appear, and 
are just as quickly made over, or turned over—reincorporated into the capitalist process 
of accumulation.  The pace of these changes, jarring and sudden, is one that is difficult to 
grasp by the human imaginary; it is, as Klein hints at, somehow out of synch with the 
human need for historical continuity and connection.  Yet, while the specifics of disaster 
capitalism, as an aspect of the contemporary visage of ruins, may be new, the processes 
of creative destruction have, as suggested above, been integral to the history of capitalist 
urbanization and modernization.  Thus, erasure, dislocation, and discontinuity have been 
part of the experience of urban modernity more broadly, even if these are exacerbated in 
present conditions.  The effacement of the past is written into the logic of creative 
destruction as a condition for the invention of the new, with implications for our sense of 
historical agency: “modernity can have no respect even for its own past, let alone that of 
any premodern social order. The transitoriness of things makes it difficult to preserve any 
sense of historical continuity” (Harvey 1990, 11).  In the next section, I would like to 
discuss the temporality of modern ruins—the ruins of capitalism and market 
imperatives—to highlight how this temporality is different from the ruins of a past, 
premodern, precapitalist society, as well as to give an indication of how the cultural 
imaginary has responded.   
 
V. 
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Marshall Berman (1988), in his renowned book All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The 
Experience of Modernity, describes with vividness the chaotic upheavals, the 
geographical transformations, and the temporal disjunctures that characterized modernity.  
For him, the modern period was ripe with dialectical tensions and contradictions—forces 
with which modernism, as a cultural, intellectual, literary, and artistic movement, 
attempted to grapple.  Berman situates Karl Marx in this context—as one of the great 
modernists, alongside Goethe, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky.  Marx, according to Berman, 
reveals the pace and experience of modern life as fast and fleeting, ephemeral; the quote 
from which Berman takes his title—“all that is solid melts into air”—captures the 
essential quality of this experience.  The forces of upheaval which dominate bourgeois 
society are revealed by Marx to be inherent to the system: “All the anarchic, measureless, 
explosive drives that a later generation will baptize by the name of “nihilism” […] are 
located by Marx in the seemingly banal everyday working of the market economy,” 
writes Berman (100).    
 Modernity is, in other words, an experience which cannot be separated from the 
workings of capitalism, and Marx sees both the potentialities and the limitations of this 
capitalist modernity, among these, the productive possibilities it inaugurates but leaves 
shackled by the organization of social relations.  The break with tradition, the unequalled 
creativity, and the sheer effervescence of new forms and ideas made possible by the 
bourgeois revolution are accompanied by unparalleled destruction—the obliteration of 
existing values and social practices.  Thus, for Marx, the bourgeoisie “are the most 
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violently destructive ruling class in history” (Berman, 100).  Furthermore, they have no 
power over the forces which they have unleashed; capitalism is akin to a volatile 
monster, “demonic and terrifying, swinging wildly out of control, menacing and 
destroying blindly as it moves” (101).  To quote the original statement of Marx and 
Engels in the Communist Manifesto:  
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of 
all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation 
distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-
frozen relations […] are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all 
that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with 
sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his 
kind (1972, 338). 
 Lack of duration becomes the defining temporal quality of bourgeois 
'monuments'.  Under capitalism, all things become provisional, disposable, ruled by the 
logic of forced and premature obsolescence.  Even when built of the most durable 
materials, the architectural accomplishments of this society are not meant to grow old.  
As Berman notes: 
The pathos of all bourgeois monuments is that their material strength 
and solidity actually count for nothing and carry no weight at all, 
that they are blown away like frail reeds by the very forces of 
104 
 
capitalist development that they celebrate. Even the most beautiful 
and impressive bourgeois buildings and public works are disposable, 
capitalized for fast depreciation and planned to be obsolete (99). 
Durability no longer has anything to do with materiality; longevity becomes impossible 
when it is not located within the material properties of an object or structure, but bound 
to the wildly fluctuating movements of the market.  In such conditions, no matter how 
developed our technology and building techniques become, the world that they construct 
is strangely ephemeral.  Under capitalism, the ground must be cleared to create new 
spaces and opportunities for accumulation, putting the very notion of progress—as 
enduring achievement—into question.  Thus, Berman reiterates that “everything that 
bourgeois society builds is built to be torn down” (99).  As he goes on to write: 
“All that is solid”—from the clothes on our backs to the looms and 
mills that weave them, to the men and women who work the 
machines, to the houses and neighborhoods the workers live in, to 
the firms and corporations that exploit the workers, to the towns and 
cities and whole regions and even nations that embrace them all—all 
these are made to be broken tomorrow, smashed or shredded or 
pulverized or dissolved, so they can be recycled or replaced next 
week, and the whole process can go on again and again, hopefully 
forever, in ever more profitable forms (99). 
The monuments of the bourgeoisie are not destined to become ruins in the same way as 
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the monuments of antiquity.  They do not last long enough to register the passing of time 
in the manner of Greek and Roman ruins.  The temporality of modern ruins is thus 
markedly different from that of medieval or classical ruins; it is strange, uneven, non-
linear, even multi-directional. 
 The ruins of classical antiquity and medieval Europe belong to the premodern 
world, to a different set of material conditions and social relations.  The temporality of 
these ruins is and was rather straightforward.  They were built, inhabited, abandoned, 
and, over the course of centuries, they were left to decay by exposure.  The ruin was, in 
this case, a process, an indefinite point somewhere in a long trajectory between a 
monument and a pile of rubble.  Ruination in precapitalist societies is the work of both 
time and the forces of nature—rain and snow, sun and wind, erosion and gravity—which 
gradually reclaim human structures.  One cannot speak of the manufacture of ruins in this 
sense, as a ruin's becoming occurred quite apart from the activities of the market or the 
forces that govern production.  Capitalism, by contrast, imposes its own temporality upon 
structures; it manufactures ruins—a process which seems particularly exacerbated in the 
present era.  Capitalism erases or compresses time; speeding up production practices and 
financial transactions is, undoubtedly, in the interests of accumulation.  In this regard, we 
would do well here to consider Hamlet's remark: “Time is out of joint” (Shakespeare 
1993, 69).  Time, under capitalism, is unhinged—that is, wrested from the cyclical 
patterns that dominated premodern societies, and forced into the service of the new 
rhythms of production.  This has profound consequences for the ways in which we 
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register the passing of time, as well as for our understanding of history and the past.  
Capitalism, in remaking the world in its image, imposes upon it a second nature; this is 
reflected, spatially and temporally, in the formation of its ruins.  The ruins of capitalist 
modernity do exist—are, in fact, pervasive.  It is the ways in which they unfold—
emerging seemingly at random, in chaotic and unplanned fashion, and disappearing just 
as quickly—that is different from ruins of the past, and alters the romantic 
conceptualization of ruin-making as a process of nature.  
 Yet, before going on to discuss the illustrative example of American ruins, it is 
worth briefly noting the role that modernism played in relation to the ephemerality of life 
in capitalist modernity.  Modernism was, at least according to theorists like Berman and 
Harvey, the cultural and aesthetic attempt to grapple with the upheaval of capitalist urban 
experience, which is characterized by transience and rupture, without losing all sense of 
control and design.  Certain modernisms were successful in this regard.  As Harvey 
points out:  
Modernists found a way to control and contain an explosive 
capitalist condition. They were effective for example, in the 
organization of urban life and the capacity to build space in such a 
way as to contain the intersecting processes that have made for a 
rapid urban change in twentieth-century capitalism (1990, 115).   
Modernism negotiated the two poles of order and disorder, the contingent and the 
contrived—that is, it still attempted to find purpose and truth, even if “that meaning has 
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to be discovered and defined from within the maelstrom of change” (11).  
Postmodernism, on the other hand, having lost this subtle tension, is one-sided, marked 
by “its total acceptance of the ephemerality, fragmentation, discontinuity, and the 
chaotic”—its virtual affirmation of ruination (44).  According to Harvey, postmodernism, 
which he defines as an anti-modernist, reactionary movement that sprung up in the 
1960s, is misguided in targeting modernism, rather than capitalism—or better yet, the 
way in which the two were wedded together in the postwar era in the support of 
economic stabilization and corporate interests—as the source of many of the ills of urban 
and social life (38).  For it was part of the spirit of modernism, however flawed, in 
struggling with the forces of creative destruction, to seek out solutions to social problems 
in architecture, urban design, and everyday life—even if they failed.  The danger is that 
postmodernism, in rejecting any project aimed at progress, emancipation, or justice, is, at 
best, depoliticized.  At worst, it champions—and often in the name of such celebrated 
postmodern principles as the sublime, as Lyotard (2011) noted—a stark and frightening 
world ruled by wild market forces that undo any stability and plunge lives and 
livelihoods into detrimental chaos.  In looking at the ruinous landscapes of today, we 
might ask whether there are signs of new cultural attempts to grapple, in more complex 
terms, with the ethical and political dimensions of the manufacture of ruins, an issue 
which will be raised in the final section of this chapter, and taken up again in other 
chapters.  First, I would like to take a detour into an exploration of American ruins to 
further highlight the  strange temporalities that they evoke and consider the impact on the 
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imaginary.       
         
VI. 
American ruins—the ruins of a nascent capitalist nation—have always been modern, in 
the sense described above.  Nick Yablon's (2009) discussion of the history of American 
ruins in the 19th century, in his book Untimely Ruins: An Archaeology of Urban 
Modernity, 1819-1919, traces the ways in which writers' and artists' encounters with the 
ruins of the American landscape, particularly those of early capitalist urbanization, 
challenged the dominant aesthetics and poetics of ruins, profoundly shaping the cultural 
imaginary.  As he discusses, many were reluctant to recognize the existence of ruins on 
American soil, not merely because they did not fit with the classical model of a ruin, but 
also because to do so would be to go against the deep-seated national ideology of an 
“Adamic” and “forward-looking” empire, which was “immune to [the] melancholic 
meanings” and vision of history (as inevitable decline) embodied by ruins in the 
dominant discourses of the day (5).  Yet ruins—of both Aboriginal peoples, which were 
mostly overlooked, and early settlers, as well as those of cities—did, of course, exist: 
“Far from being absent or marginal, ruins were in fact ubiquitous across diverse cultures 
and landscapes of the United States during the nineteenth century” (5).  The reason why 
these ruins were invisible or meaningless to local inhabitants and visitors alike was that, 
for the most part, they escaped dominant conventions and received notions about what 
constituted a ruin.  “In stark contrast to the grandiose neoclassical piles conjured by its 
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antebellum landscape painters and poets,” Yablon writes, “the actual ruins found in the 
urbanizing landscapes of nineteenth-century America tended to be prosaic, even tawdry 
structures” (7).  Among their ranks were to be found “abandoned log cabins and defunct 
canal bridges,” “half-demolished churches and cemeteries,” and the “first dismantled 
skyscrapers” (7-8).  Such apparently banal structures could not be recognized at a time 
when the aesthetics of ruins was dominated by those picturesque and romantic ruins of 
classical antiquity and Medieval Europe.  As such, even acknowledging American ruins 
as ruins posed a challenge to the whole discursive enterprise, which was to undergo a 
profound “destabilization of its meanings” as a result (7). 
 What was it that made American ruins modern?  As discussed above, their quality 
of otherness, which made them “unassimilable to the grand historical narratives 
concretized by the classical and Gothic ruins of Europe,” was a key characteristic in this 
regard (Yablon, 8).  In specifying this otherness, Yablon points to their deformity, their 
illegibility, and, especially, their untimeliness.  They were considered to be deformed 
because they failed to age in the appropriate manner.  The materials with which they 
were constructed did not register the passing of time in the same way as those of classical 
ruins: “Houses built of cheap materials such as wood [...] did not offer sufficient 
resistance to decay, fire, or vegetative growth […] Conversely, the newer industrial 
materials of steel, iron, glass, and concrete were too durable—liable only to rust, shatter, 
or crack” (8).  As well, theorists argued of American ruins that they were ambiguous and 
unintelligible—they revealed little of the nature, achievements, or significant events of 
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the civilization which gave rise to them.  This “resistance to interpretation” had to do 
with the limitations of the existing metaphors and tropes for reading ruins (9).  Yet, 
above all, the feature that distinguished these modern ruins from classical or medieval 
ruins was their temporal aspect: “The most glaring anomalies of America’s ruins, 
however, were their temporal properties, or what I call their untimeliness” (10).  The 
strange temporalities of these modern ruins upset the given notions of time and history—
as natural cycles of growth, maturation, and decay—which informed the romantic 
conceptualization of ruins.  This quality of untimeliness—the outcome of capitalism's 
revolutionizing of space and time as discussed above—has given rise to new concepts 
with which to grasp it.  As Yablon argues: 
To some extent, all ruins exhibit a degree of nonsynchronicity [...] 
But the anachronism and incongruity of American ruins—the way in 
which they erupted out of time and out of place—generated a 
particularly complex sense of temporality as multilayered and 
multidirectional. It was to convey their disruption of traditional 
conceptions of time that nineteenth-century witnesses coined such 
oxymoronic terms as day-old ruins, temporary ruins, or simply 
modern ruins (12). 
 Modern American ruins were 'immature', 'premature', or 'instantaneous', and these 
qualities spoke to the new forces at work in fashioning the landscape, forces that blurred 
the distinction between the natural and 'man-made'.  The ruins of early speculative 
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property development or “the equally swift and destructive swings of the capitalist 
economy, were all instantaneous and largely unanticipated, and thus radically different 
from those formed over time” (10).  Yablon locates, to a large extent, the untimeliness of 
modern ruins in the processes of uneven development which characterized the growth 
and urbanization of America.  This is the force of creative destruction, discussed above, 
in which capital develops its geography in a volatile and uneven manner—one in which, 
as Marx and Engels grasped, “all that is solid melts into air” (1972, 338).  As Yablon 
notes:  
given the rapid and seemingly relentless process of capitalist 
urbanization in the United States, its ruins typically proved 
ephemeral. Despite some efforts to preserve them for future 
generations, the ruins of fires, earthquakes, or bankruptcies tended to 
disappear almost as quickly as they had materialized, recycled for 
their precious building materials, deployed as landfill, or simply 
erased to clear the way for new rounds of capital investment (11). 
Unlike classical ruins which lasted for centuries in a state of gradual decay, modern ruins 
appeared and disappeared overnight.  Cities sprung up and were rebuilt, ravaged, or 
abandoned.  Much of this, as Yablon points out, was related to the investment and 
divestment of capital—property speculation, financial crisis, redevelopment.  In the 
urban geography of North American cities, strange disjunctures were produced between 
the old and the new: 
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holdovers from earlier periods [...] testified to the unevenness of 
capitalist urbanization: the way in which one plot of land was 
developed while an abutting one was left barren, one neighborhood 
was “improved” while an adjacent one deteriorated, or the way in 
which one city (such as Chicago) could blossom into a metropolis 
while others in the region lagged or collapsed (as with St. Louis and 
Cairo, Illinois, respectively) (12).   
  While 'day-old ruins' first described “the remains of a settlement that was hastily 
built, hastily abandoned, and almost as hastily reclaimed by nature” (20), this term came 
to be applied to major cities like New York, whose development was largely unplanned, 
following the uncharted paths dictated by the flows and irregularities of financial capital 
(264).  Yablon discusses the example of New York which, particularly during the period 
of 1893 to 1919, was undergoing rapid demolition and (re)development.  The changing 
landscape represented the economic geography of capital investment and financial 
speculation, as well as a growing population.  He describes Manhattan as “a metropolis 
[...] becoming notorious for mercilessly devouring its own architectural landmarks” 
(244).  The momentum and power of the wave of creative destruction, in which buildings 
sprung up only to be knocked down, and various monuments were bulldozed to clear the 
way for new developments, eventually included the rapid demolition of some of the city's 
first skyscrapers.  As Yablon points out, new buildings and architectural developments 
came to feel temporary, provisional: only “the merest of stop-gaps,” he quotes writer 
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Henry James (244).  Even those built with the most durable of materials were not 
expected to survive long enough to become old: “the notion of modern skyscrapers as 
antiquated ruins was belied by the economic geography of Manhattan” (244).  All of this 
led many perceptive thinkers of the time to question the very possibility of ruins on 
American soil: “How could buildings become antique if their life spans were constrained 
by economic laws demanding the perpetual turnover of capital, and thus perpetual cycles 
of demolition and construction?” (244).  Yet this very notion of an absence of ruins, 
when considered from the perspective of individual monuments, becomes a permanent 
state of ruin when looked at from the whole; while ruins may not survive into their own 
antiquity, they are perpetually being spit out and devoured again by the same system.     
 The ruin, rather than being a structure that reveals itself gradually with the 
passage of time, thus rises overnight, ““erupt[ing] out of time and out of place” (Yablon, 
12).  This is the concept that Robert Smithson referred to as “ruins in reverse”: “buildings 
don't fall into ruin after they are built,” he suggests, “but rather rise into ruin before they 
are built” (1996, 72).  This designation aptly applies to many such contemporary 
structures—for instance, the Îlot Voyageur, a failed private-public venture of the 
Université du Québec à Montréal and real-estate conglomerate Busac, which sits rotting 
in downtown Montreal—made the victims of capital divestment that has left them to ruin 
before they were ever even completed.  We come across this concept in Smithson's 
influential 1967 essay, “A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, New Jersey,” in which he 
introduces the idea of the monument to the suburbs.  We tend to think of the suburbs as 
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banal and non-historical, but Smithson, like an archaeologist delving into the monuments 
of an unknown civilization, photographs them, turns them into metaphors, and ultimately 
reads them as ruins.  Pipes spewing become dirty water become “The Fountain 
Monument,” a bridge that crosses a river is named the “Monument of Dislocated 
Direction,” and a sandbox is labelled, quite simply, “The Desert” (70-71).   
 Abandoned construction sites, public works, parking lots glittering in the sun, and 
suburban strip malls are all ruins, but whether of the past or the future remains unclear.  
Smithson plays with the elements of ambiguity in these structures.  What are they?  What 
do they tell us about the civilization that constructed them?  Are they new or old? 
Along the Passaic River banks were many minor monuments such as 
concrete abutments that supported the shoulders of a new highway in 
the process of being built. River Drive was in part bulldozed and in 
part intact. It was hard to tell the new highway from the old road; 
they were both confounded into a unitary chaos. Since it was 
Saturday, many machines were not working, and this caused them to 
resemble prehistoric creatures trapped in the mud, or, better, extinct 
machines—mechanical dinosaurs stripped of their skin. On the edge 
of this prehistoric Machine Age were pre- and post-World War II 
suburban houses (70-71). 
Through the lens of his representation, the machines of industrial capitalism become 
prehistoric creatures.  Works that are still in progress, not yet even finished, take on the 
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quality of being already faded, blurred and aged, like a tattered old photograph.  Indeed, 
Smithson describes the whole scene as eerily similar to an “over-exposed picture. 
Photographing it with my Instamatic 400 was like photographing a photograph” (70).  
His use of such imagery to describe Passaic, a suburban landscape like so many others, 
estranges us from the everyday, habitual patterns of seeing and understanding the world 
around us, and, in doing so, allows us see how strange, even uncanny, these spaces really 
are.  The landscapes of contemporary capitalism are revealed as ruins, and reading them 
as such, as something already past, disrupts the oppressiveness of the now, opening up 
the trajectory of history to other possibilities.  His vision is thus sobering, if melancholic: 
“a kind of self-destroying postcard world of failed immortality and oppressive grandeur” 
(72).  
 Smithson's essay on his journey to Passaic puts into question the notion of history 
as progress and the future as possibility when both are dictated by the capitalist logic of 
obsolescence and the outmoded: “If the future is “out of date” and “old fashioned,” then I 
had been in the future,” he writes (73-74).  Yet these ruins, lifeless as they appear to him, 
still contain the residues of human hopes, a distorted version of utopia, which can 
perhaps be recovered, or at least uncovered, amidst the wreckage:  
This anti-romantic mise-en-scene suggests the discredited idea of 
time and many other “out of date” things. But the suburbs exist 
without a rational past and without the “big events” of history. Oh, 
maybe there are a few statues, a legend, and a couple of curios, but 
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no past—just what passes for a future. A Utopia minus a bottom, a 
place where the machines are idle […] Passaic seems full of “holes” 
compared to New York City, which seems tightly packed and solid, 
and those holes in a sense are the monumental vacancies that define, 
without trying, the memory-traces of an abandoned set of futures 
(72). 
Ruined landscapes are “full of holes”: these are the erasures—the buildings and 
communities wiped off the map by capitalist machines without a second thought.  
Smithson alerts us to the idea that it is not necessarily just what fills the landscape, but, 
perhaps more importantly, what is absent from it, that requires consideration.  One might 
think of the landscapes of capitalism as geographies of forgetfulness.  The past is 
consumed in the constant manufacture of profit, and with it our hopes for a better future.  
Yet, if we think of these “vacancies” as “monumental” perhaps we can begin to grasp the 
very absurdity of a world predestined for its own destruction, and even become angry 
about it.   
 We have seen that the dislocations of urban modernity have destabilized received 
categories for thinking about time and history, antiquity, and the present.  The concepts 
of modern, day-old, and reverse ruins capture the instability of capitalist urbanization, 
particularly the processes of creative destruction that have resulted in the temporal 
ruptures that characterize everyday life.  They are the concepts with which the men and 
women inhabiting these landscapes, including the intellectuals and writers discussed 
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above, have tried to make sense of the contradictory forces refashioning them.  As 
Yablon points out, in imagining “urban modernity [...] as the classical antiquity of the 
future” (3) we are striving to grasp the chaotic processes at work in remaking the world 
around us and our own lives.  Identifying the ruins of the past, present, and future is the 
first step toward reinserting ourselves into the historical process and reclaiming our 
capacity as historical agents.  Flights of the imagination, into a distant time when the 
present can be viewed from a futuristic perspective, have, as Yablon argues and Smithson 
demonstrates, been one such creative response to the ruins, both real and imaginary.  
Modernism, as Berman tells us, was another response.  I would like to turn now to a 
consideration of a contemporary artist and intellectual whose work deals with this 
problematic of the relation of the human imaginary to the “manufactured landscapes” that 
surround us.  Edward Burtynsky's work struggles with the contradictions of 
contemporary capitalism, particularly as they are manifested in geographical formations, 
in order to represent them to us in a new light.  In a similar way to the the great 
modernists, according to Berman's definition, Burtynsky's work, in the 'postmodern' 
context, is deeply invested by the concern that “even in the midst of a wretched present, 
[we might] imagine an open future” (27). 
 
 
VII. 
What is the impact of these ruinous geographies that have been discussed in this chapter 
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upon the human imaginary?  Photographer Edward Burtynsky thinks that there is a 
certain evocative potential in viewing what he terms the “manufactured landscapes” that 
characterize contemporary life.  In his presentation for the acceptance of the 2005 TED 
Prize, he discusses our alienation from industrial environments and other wastelands of 
capitalist modernization and restructuring as highly problematic.  We are disconnected 
from the ways in which our human activities are transforming the world around us.  His 
photographs, of mine tailings, quarries, garbage dumps, and tire pits, attempt to re-
establish this connection between how we live—our dependency upon oil, the mass 
production and consumption of commodities, the lack of environmental sustainability—
and the geographies that are the direct result.  We are, perhaps wilfully, unconscious or 
inattentive to the consequences of industrial processes on the environment.  It could be 
argued that this is, at least in part, because capitalism alienates us from the processes of 
production more generally, leading to a state in which we do not know, except in an 
abstract way, where things—be they food, clothing, electronics—come from, or where 
they go to when we are done with them.  This is especially the case in the Western world, 
where decades of deindustrialization have further removed us from this reality, and 
where our waste is exported overseas to be dealt with by poor and marginalized workers 
in countries like China and India.  We think of nature as 'natural', and not as something 
produced like other commodities, as a type of built environment.  The landscapes that 
Burtynksy illuminates are those visibly touched—better tormented—by human 
endeavour, in which nature and culture are inextricably interwoven.  We are forced to 
119 
 
rethink the very category of 'landscape' to fully grasp the scope of humanity's imprint, far 
from benign, upon the globe.  
 As Edward Burtynsky shows, the 'nature' that surrounds us is a manufactured one, 
and one that is, according to my reading, increasingly in a state of ruin.  Burtynsky's 
work brings home what is hidden from everyday view: the massive mark that we are 
leaving on the face of the earth.  His photographs reveal the “scale […] of what we call 
'progress',” and it is astonishing, or some might say, sublime (TED 2005).  Yet, rather 
than being overwhelmed, his hope is that the viewer will “be challenged by the image”—
encouraged, that is, by the tension he builds between attraction and repulsion, to “enter 
the image” instead of turning away (TED 2005).  Thus, the pictures are beautiful even if 
their content is troubling.  The beauty and complexity of the scenes draw us in: he makes 
photographs in which we will look and linger, images that will ultimately haunt us.  
While Burtynsky focuses on the productive powers that we have built up, linking his 
work, as he writes in the artist statement on his website, to the “ages of man; from stone, 
to minerals, oil, transportation, silicon, and so on,” the other side of his images reveal the 
simultaneous manufacture of ruin.  He understands that the processes in which we are 
engaged have a catastrophic aspect, in that they are not only shaping, but also 
devastating, the world in which we live.  Like Marx, who saw dead labour, crystallized in 
the forces of production, as weighing upon the living, or Benjamin, for whom the 
multiple events that comprise human history could be read as “one single catastrophe” 
(2007; 257), Burtynsky's vision of the landscape problematizes the notion of history as 
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progress.  There is an ambiguity at work in our very relation to these manufactured 
geographies, for while providing us with the 'stuff' needed for a life of comfort, this life 
itself is a dreamworld, one sustained by denying its lack of sustainability and its 
destructive impact, which his images force us to confront.  To look upon ruin, upon the 
debris, raises questions which he recognizes as ethical and aesthetic.  The premise is that 
contemplation can lead to some kind of action, self-reflexivity, and social change.  This 
is, for Burtynsky, the power of art, a theme to which I will return in greater depth in the 
next chapters. 
 For now, I want to stay with the question of the link between ruins and the 
imaginary, by returning to this notion of the disconnect, or Marx's concept of alienation. 
As mentioned above, Burtynsky alerts us to the fact that we are disconnected from the 
manufacture of landscapes, as we are alienated from production processes more 
generally, and, perhaps most importantly, from the making of history as a human activity. 
I would like to add that these landscapes which we are producing are deepening and 
entrenching the experience of alienation.  The social and physical geographies of 
contemporary capitalism are those of exclusion, dispossession, and loss. As Henri 
Lefebvre alerted us to, lived human realities—our everyday life—unfold within these 
spaces, and are thus structured and disciplined by them.  What is our relation then to the 
ruins?  Contemporary ruins are increasingly a visible aspect of the landscape.  They serve 
not only as the outcome, but also as the symbols or metaphors of this state of 
dispossession.  Boarded up houses remind us of the recent wave of mortgage 
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foreclosures, unfinished urban structures signal the troubled history of private-public 
investment ventures, closed down factories re-invoke the painful loss of thousands of 
jobs, and even the death of a community.  In each of these cases, it is poor and 
marginalized communities who bear the burden.  Banks are bailed out, companies are 
restructured, CEOs walk away unscathed, but ordinary people suffer profound losses.  
Ruins, as we saw above, are the product of changing regimes of capitalist accumulation 
and crisis.  But they also have a power to connect with our imaginary—as the remainders 
and reminders of the processes from which we are forcibly excluded.  Ruins populate the 
landscape and they haunt our imaginary.  They are a source of fascination, in part, 
because they reveal something about the spatial and temporal configurations of everyday 
life, and also because in touching the profound depths of human experience—loss and 
longing, memory and projection, the past and the future—they serve as structures of 
possibility. 
 Interestingly, it was Burtynsky's familiarity with industrial ruins in St. Catherines, 
Ontario, that stimulated his critical thinking about the creative-destructive capitalist 
processes of industrialization, deindustrialization, and restructuring that are making and 
remaking our world; as mentioned in his online biography: “He links his early exposure 
to the sites and images of the General Motors plant in his hometown to the development 
of his photographic work.”  Viewing ruins, at least in a certain light, can encourage us to 
reflect on the larger processes that are at work in this refashioning of the landscape.  If 
we can get past the sense of inevitably that surrounds historical events, we can better 
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understand the real factors, including the political decision-making, state intervention, 
and neoliberal policies, that are fuelling deindustrialization and economic restructuring.  
Seeing ruins as part of an historical process-in-the-making, of which we are a part, can 
help us move from a sense of disempowerment toward the reclaiming of political agency.  
Ruins are the site of ambiguity and tension, structures from which we have been 
excluded—and which are frequently boarded up, closed off, guarded, fenced in—but also 
structures manufactured by human productive activities.  For the melancholic imaginary, 
they are the symbols of a past of which we have been dispossessed and of a future of 
possibilities barred off.  Nevertheless, as the reminders of the development of our 
productive capacities as a society, they also invite us to imagine their culmination 
otherwise, in inclusive geographies supportive of human realization.  As such, they are an 
invocation of struggle: the struggle to reclaim our rights, our dignity, our hope, and to 
manufacture landscapes according to another principle—one more in line with the needs 
of human communities and the environment.  
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3. 
 
Figures of the Ruins 
 
 
I. 
In this chapter, I would like to contrast two very different figures of the ruin: the flâneur 
(sometimes the flâneuse) and the glaneur/euse.  Both figures are rich in cultural imagery 
and significance.  The former is the protagonist of much of modern literature and poetry.  
He appears in Balzac and Baudelaire as a modern hero and a literary device: he is both 
the gentleman stroller who surveys, and even dabbles in, the crowd without surrendering 
his individuality, as well as the lens through which the revolutionary processes of 
industrialization and urbanization radically reshaping the physical and social landscapes 
of the time are registered and deciphered.  He is for Walter Benjamin “the dreaming 
idler” (1999, 417) of commodity culture—an ambiguous formation of the subject whose 
distracted perceptual habits tell us something about the metropolis as a “phantasmagoria” 
(2008).  The latter figure, the glaneur/euse, is also a character that haunts modern 
Western culture, appearing famously, for instance, in Jean-François Millet's canvas, Les 
glaneuses, as a romantic feature of the picturesque countryside—the peasant woman 
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gathering grain.  S/he is the ragpicker of Baudelaire and Benjamin—a metaphor for the 
poet and historian who collects the debris of history or the discarded bits of everyday life 
and reworks them into literary or historical montage.  The contemporary gleaner, as she 
appears in Agnes Varda's documentary film-essay, The Gleaners and I (Les glaneurs et 
la glaneuse), forages in open-air city markets and transforms discarded objects into 
works of art.   
 I would like to suggest that both flanerie and glanage, when taken as modalities 
of activity, become metaphors for a type of engagement with the materiality of the world, 
especially its ruins, which holds out potential moments of demystification.  While the 
perceptual habits embodied by the flâneur and the salvaging activities undertaken by the 
gleaner are, no doubt, conditioned or enforced by capitalism, and thus should not be 
romanticized, they nevertheless proffer the possibility of experiences that, in 
denaturalizing capitalism through the encounter with its detritus, reveal history as a 
human activity.  Gleaning, in particular, demonstrates that even under the conditions of 
barebones survival in late capitalism, within a severely restricted framework of 
possibility, human agency and reflection—in the most basic form of refashioning the self 
and the world—are still plausible.    
 
II. 
One of the key concerns of modern thinkers, particularly at the turn of the 19th century, 
was the impact of modern life on the individual.  Sociologists, psychologists, and literary 
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figures alike sought answers in different domains the following questions: in their 
encounters with the conditions of high density living—crowds, noise, traffic, pollution, 
poverty, and disease—how was the sensibility of men and women transformed?  What 
are the effects of sensory over-stimulation on the personality traits and moral character of 
modern man or woman?  These preoccupations reflected the sense of displacement 
brought about by the economic, political, and technological changes wrought by 
industrialization, modernization, and urbanization.  Modernity, a time of great transition, 
was lived by individuals in a very tangible way, most notably in the transition from rural 
to urban forms of life and the rise of capitalism, with its commodification of labour and 
introduction of consumer culture.  Collective life took on new forms and adapted itself to 
new spaces and architectural arrangements, as much as to a new rhythm of time.  The 
crowd, the commodity, the prostitute, and the ruin (as fragment or trace, as the discarded 
or outmoded) were, among others, phenomena that attracted and repelled the writers of 
the late 19th century.  In these conditions, the flâneur and the glaneur/euse emerge as the 
paradigms of modern urban protagonists: the former, a figure that surveys and savours, 
but also decodes and deciphers, the city and its ruins; the latter, a ragpicker who collects 
the broken bits of everyday life, discarded objects, and the recently outmoded to 
transform them.  
 Georg Simmel was one of these early theorists to explore the relation between 
urban spaces and psychic life.  In his 1903 essay, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” 
working from the idea that there is an “inner meaning of specifically modern life”—in 
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other words, that the material reality of social forces and their organization in space have 
corresponding subjective forms—he proposes that there is a specifically “metropolitan 
type of individual” (1950, 409).  He operates on the historical materialist and Marxist 
preposition that subjectivity has “sensory foundations” which are structured and 
conditioned by social relations and the environment (410).  As such, Simmel reads, in the 
transition from the rural to urban environment, the transformation of the sensual 
conditions of life, and a resultant deepening of the experience of alienation.  The tempo, 
rhythm, and nature of sensory stimuli in the metropolis—rapid, jarring, and uneven—
differs greatly from the slow and continuous flow of impressions that characterizes rural 
existence.  This “intensification of nervous stimulation,” a veritable sensory 
bombardment, requires efforts on the part of the person to shield herself, and her inner 
life, from attack, to buffer the shocks of modern existence (410).  These mechanisms of 
defence—intellectualism, abstraction, increasing sophistication—gradually become 
rooted in character types, in “the personality [which] accommodates itself in the 
adjustments to external forces” (409).  Thus Simmel writes:  
the metropolitan type of man which, of course, exists in a thousand 
individual variants develops an organ protecting him against the 
threatening currents and discrepancies of his external environment 
which would uproot him. He reacts with his head instead of his heart 
(410). 
Crowds and commodities are the milieu in which the modern man must struggle to 
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“preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence” (409).  Modern life is, for 
Simmel, a highly mediated one—money, in particular, determines social interactions, 
reduces all quality to a question of quantity and commensurability, and encourages the 
singular pursuit of gain, whether it be the accumulation of profit or the pleasure of 
consumption.  Such conditions fundamentally impact upon one's capacity for response, 
resulting in a blasé attitude of indifference, in which one is lost in the stream of 
meaningless and non-differentiated phenomena: “A life in boundless pursuit of pleasure 
makes one blasé because it agitates the nerves to their strongest reactivity for such a long 
time that they finally cease to react at all” (414). 
 In his concern over the devastating impacts of money, Simmel is pointing toward 
what Karl Marx called in Capital Volume I the “fetishism of commodities”—a symptom 
of the alienation of modern life (1990).  “Money,” Simmel writes, in words that closely 
echo those of Marx, “with all its colorlessness and indifference, becomes the common 
denominator of all values; irreparably it hollows out the core of things, their 
individuality, their specific value, and their incomparability” (1950, 414).  Essential to 
capitalist modernity, as we shall see, is the condition in which social relations between 
people become mediated by things.  This is to say that commodities, the products of 
social labour, appear independent of that labour; their exchange value seems to be of an 
intrinsic, rather than social, character.  Commodities organize and regulate human 
interactions through the mediation of the market.  As Marx writes in Capital Volume I, 
“the commodity-form [...] is nothing but the definite social relation between men 
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themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between 
things” (1990, 165).  Thus the outer form of the commodity obscures the reality of 
production and social organization that lies behind it, leading to a position in which we 
are alienated from a deeper understanding of social, historical, and economic conditions.  
 Capitalist modernity is characterized by a contradictory condition in which the 
products of social labour come to act independently of social relations and have a power 
over us.  Theorists like Marx and Benjamin are concerned with the impact of this 
situation, in which everyday life is saturated with ideological objects, upon our 
consciousness.  As David Harvey explains: 
The fetish [...] has a real basis; it is not merely imagined. We 
establish social relationships with one another by way of the objects 
and things we produce and circulate […]  By the same token the 
objects and things are redolent with social meanings because they 
are embodiments of social labor and purposive human action [...] 
The task of the analyst, Marx therefore held, was to go beyond the 
fetish, to get beneath the surface appearance in order to provide a 
deeper understanding of the occult forces that govern the evolution 
of our social relations and our material prospects (2003, 53). 
The commodity is, therefore, a form that deceives: its outer surface obscures the reality 
of the social relations that produced it.  It is both empty and imaginary—a social fiction, 
but also a material fact, invested as it is with the objective qualities to govern our lives.  
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Fetishism describes a contradictory lived experience, at once real and mystified—the 
outcome of a collective social fiction intrinsic to the system of production itself.  This is 
the collective “slumber” described by Benjamin (1999, 106): a form of private 
consciousness in which the experiences of alienation—of our labour, of our senses, as 
well as from one another—are misunderstood, and the forces that regulate them are 
obscured.  Thus, Benjamin's notion of the phantasmagoria of consumer urban culture 
evolves directly out of Marx's description of the “enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy 
world” of capitalism (1991, 969).  
 Thus, it is this strange world of commodities, with their “phantom-like 
objectivity” (Marx 1990, 128), that some of the great theorists of the last century have to 
tried to make sense of, using the figure of the flâneur as their investigative tool.  But 
while Simmel was rather pessimistic about the effects of capitalist modernity on 
subjectivity, other theorists have had more mixed reactions.  The transformations of 
industrialism and consumerism, including their impact upon perceptual and sensory 
modalities, are read with ambivalence.  In particular, in the writings of Walter Benjamin, 
whose work will be of central importance to this study, the dialectical or contradictory 
nature of both material and subjective life under capitalism is emphasized.  What is 
interesting for Benjamin, and for historical materialists in general, is the way in which 
everyday life provides not only experiences of alienation, but also moments of revelation.  
In proffering that which Benjamin will call “dialectical images” (2008, 106), or wish 
formations of the collective, capitalist modernity opens up possibilities for transformation 
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in unexpected encounters—often with the objects of its own fashioning.  It is, as we shall 
see, ruins that are particularly well-positioned to play the part of stimulating the 
dialectical imagination.   
 
III. 
As David Harvey notes in Paris, Capital of Modernity, it was French novelist Honoré de 
Balzac who first “placed the myths of modernity under the microscope and used the 
figure of the flâneur to do it” (2003, 24).  He argues that the changes remaking Paris at 
that time—both revolutionary and ruinous—rendered the city illegible: “The rapid and 
seemingly chaotic growth of Paris in the early nineteenth century rendered city life 
difficult to decipher, decode, and represent” (24).  The writers of the time, including 
Balzac, Flaubert, and Baudelaire, took upon themselves the task of interpreting the social 
forces and forms at work in this process of transformative or 'creative destruction'.  They 
developed a literary language and imagery to describe the city so as to make it intelligible 
to the popular imagination.  According to Harvey, they not only presented the urban 
landscape as it was, but also as it could be: “They explored different ways to represent 
that world and helped shape the popular imagination as to what the city was and might 
become” (24).  These novelists and poets were the inventors of what he terms 
“psychogeography” (84), which can be understood as a mapping of psychology onto the 
urban terrain: the study of the implications of the built environment on human 
subjectivity, the distribution of social practices in space, and the ways in which spaces 
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are invested with meaning.  Interestingly, at the same time as they were reading and 
writing Paris, they were also engaged in a process of fashioning their own identities and 
ways of knowing, through envisioning themselves in the role of flâneur. 
 Despite being a key figure in the works of many writers of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, one cannot ascribe a uniform character to the flâneur or his literary 
embodiments.  He is, rather, a complex and ambiguous figure, providing, at times, a 
symptomatic reflection of the society in which he moves, and, at others, moments of 
critical insight that demystify social relations.  While possessing, for instance, something 
of the utopian in Balzac, he represents the experience of alienation in Flaubert: “The 
flaneur in Flaubert’s world stands for anomie and alienation rather than for discovery. 
Frédéric in Sentimental Education is a flaneur who wanders the city without ever clearly 
knowing where he is or registering the significance of what he is doing” (Harvey 2003, 
84).  One explanation for this is that the flâneur's relation to the phenomena that he 
witnesses, at least as it is interpreted and described by these writers, is, above all, 
ambivalent.  He seeks the sensory intoxication of the crowd, while nonetheless standing 
apart from it: as Benjamin writes: “there was the pedestrian who wedged himself into the 
crowd but also the flâneur who demanded elbow room” (2006, 84).  He enters into the 
life of the masses, while nonetheless retaining his individuality.  He studies with an acute 
eye the features and characteristics of the persons he encounters, but often fails to 
emphasize with them or their experiences.  Thus, he embodies the tensions and 
contradictions of the time, associated with urban existence in capitalist modernity.    
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 Ambiguous and shifting is also the flâneur's positioning on the aesthetic and the 
ethical registers: on the one hand, he could be charged with being an aesthete insofar as 
he is absorbed in the life of the senses—devouring, as he does the streets with their scents 
and sights, with their commodities and women.  Withdrawn and detached, he 
nevertheless turns all he sees into the objects of knowledge and takes pleasure in 
possessing them with his gaze.  And yet, on another level, when faced with the myriad of 
displays designed to seduce the passer-by to become purchaser, he abstains: 
An intoxication comes over the man who walks long and aimlessly 
through the streets. With each step, the walk takes on greater 
momentum; ever weaker grow the temptations of shops, of bistros, 
of smiling women, ever more irresistible the magnetism of the next 
street comer, of a distant mass of foliage, of a street name. Then 
comes hunger. Our man wants nothing to do with the myriad 
possibilities offered to sate his appetite. Like an ascetic animal, he 
flits through unknown districts—until, utterly exhausted, he 
stumbles into his room, which receives him coldly and wears a 
strange air (Benjamin 1999, 417). 
The intoxication which he experiences must be distinguished from that of the instant 
gratification of consumerism and the simple satisfaction of desire.  Indeed, the flâneur is 
read by social theorists like Harvey and Benjamin as more complex and purposive than a 
mere aesthete: the “flaneur is more than an aesthete, a wandering observer, he is also 
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purposive, seeking to unravel the mysteries of social relations and of the city, seeking to 
penetrate the fetish” (Harvey 2003, 54).  There is something mysterious in his multiple 
encounters with the city, through which he carries out an important work, perhaps 
unconsciously: the work which Harvey describes as 'penetrating the fetish' and Benjamin 
as 'dispelling the phantasmagoria'.  Thus the flâneur is positioned as a potentially 
revolutionary, or at least critical figure, in the work of Walter Benjamin, to whose work 
we shall now turn, and one who, as we shall see, can tell us something about the social 
and historical power of ruins.  
 
IV. 
Walter Benjamin was inspired by the work of the French poets and novelists to undertake 
his own social archaeology of Paris, a project which brings together Marxist theory, 
Freudian psychoanalysis, the critical theory of the Frankfurt school, cultural studies, and 
aesthetics.  It is the ruins of Paris, the crumbling arcades of the nineteenth century, that 
attract Benjamin, particularly in The Arcades Project.  The streets are for him an open-air 
museum of cultural artefacts, remnants of the past that he studies in order to understand 
the present and its possibilities.  Benjamin's encounters with the obsolete and outmoded 
become the sources of critical insight, for, as we shall see, these object traces tell us 
something not only about history as it was, but as it might have been—they alert us to the 
utopian kernel of the collective imaginary contained in each product fashioned by the 
human hand.  The form taken by cultural products contains the transposition of both 
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ideology and wish.  It is as such that they have the capacity to serve as 'dialectical 
images' that critique the very society that produced them by proffering its counter-image: 
the vision of what it could be or could have been.  Benjamin sets out to interpret, much 
like the psychoanalyst, these dream-formations of the collective.  In doing so, his work 
takes us to the heart of fetishism as structure of subjectivity, but also to the revolutionary 
potential of the human imaginary when it is unleashed from its slumber.  It is through the 
figure of the flâneur that Benjamin reveals the “profane illumination” (1986, 179) of 
everyday encounters with what theorist Naomi Stead calls the “melancholy traces” of 
history (2000, 11).  
 The flâneur is an enigmatic and ambivalent figure in Benjamin's work.  On the 
one hand, he is the perfect embodiment of alienated subjectivity: “the flâneur 
empathiz[es] with the soul of the commodity,” Benjamin writes (1999, 369); or again, 
“The flâneur is someone abandoned in the crowd. He is thus in the same situation as the 
commodity” (2006; 31).  The flâneur is immersed in the world of commodity fetishism—
in the “phantasmagoria,” a term which Benjamin sometimes uses to describe the totality 
of superstructural forms in capitalist modernity—which fashions his senses and lived 
experiences.  Benjamin writes of this correspondence between Paris and the modern 
'type' of the flâneur: 
Paris created the type of the flâneur […] Landscape—that is, in fact, 
what Paris becomes for the flâneur. Or, more precisely: the city 
splits for him into its dialectica1 poles. It opens up to him as a 
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landscape, even as it closes around him as a room (1999, 417).   
This confusion of interior and exterior is symptomatic of the collapsing of the subjective 
and objective conditions that, according to Margaret Cohen's reading, is the result of the 
“ideological transposition” that characterizes Paris as “phantasmagoria” in Benjamin's 
writings (1995, 229).  The flâneur reveals the “phantasmagorical transformations worked 
by the commodity structure” (Cohen, 235), transformations which ultimately raise the 
issue of that which Marx termed “false consciousness” and which Benjamin likened to a 
collective slumber from which we need to be awakened.  Both theorists question the 
possibility of knowledge about social reality when the form it takes is one obscured by 
commodity fetishism.  Each addresses the problem of the visibility, and thus 
perceptibility, of the real social relations of production and of our actual relationship to 
material reality.  The dimension of subjectivity—the unleashing of the human imaginary 
from its reified slumber—becomes crucial for grasping the historical-material conditions 
of the present in order to realize its full potential.  
 The flâneur's immersion in the cultural products and forms of his milieu should 
not be interpreted straightforwardly as a sort of structural confinement; rather, there are 
inherent possibilities associated with this position.  Indeed, Cohen suggests that for 
Benjamin there is no privileged 'outsider' position which might, for instance, be occupied 
by the educated cultural critic:  
With all experience saturated by the phantasmagorical power of the 
commodity, even the cultural critic cannot achieve the distanced and 
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multidimensional relation to his/her object necessary for rational 
thought […] Rational demystification can hence no longer be the 
critic's task. Rather, the critic must seek some form of activity using 
his/her immersion in the very objects of study to productive end 
(251).   
Like the rest of us, the flâneur's experiences are based on everyday encounters, those 
through which the self and the senses are fashioned, in a world which is mediated by 
things, commodities.  Yet, it is also in those encounters that the very contradictions 
embodied in things—their dialectical tension—which is the result of the “fetishistic 
inversion” discussed by Marx, is revealed.  The social and historical forces that produce 
the phantasmagoria are also those that offer clues which can be used to interpret what 
Benjamin calls its “wish images” or “dialectical images” (2008).  As Cohen argues, it is 
not so much a matter of an abstracted critical position, so much as “a question of seizing 
the forces destroying the distinction between subject and object to recuperative/disruptive 
end” (1995, 252).  In grasping the dialectical image at the moment of its apparition, the 
flâneur becomes Benjamin's model of the historical materialist or interpretor of capitalist 
modernity.  
 Benjamin, as we know, is interested precisely in these cultural forms and artefacts 
that circulate within the spaces of bourgeois society.  Yet, as Margaret Cohen suggests in 
Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist Revolution, he finds 
the base-superstructure model posited by traditional Marxism to be inadequate to 
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describing the relation between the economic mode of production and the manifestations 
of collective life, which include aesthetic objects and practices.  In working through a 
model of expression to describe this relationship, which develops out of Freud's notion of 
how repressed material comes to take its mysterious form within dreams, Cohen argues 
that Benjamin's work problematizes the causality at the heart of Marxist theory which 
conceptualizes the base-superstructure dynamic as one of reflection.  In his 1900 study, 
The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud (1991) describes how the latent material of the 
dream, connected with an unconscious wish, is subjected to the “primary processes” of 
the “dream-work”—distortion, displacement, condensation—which give its a manifest 
form.  Similarly, the “wish-images” of the collective, for Benjamin, come to be expressed 
in cultural products in a way that is shaped not merely by the conditions of production, 
but also by those of subjectivity.  Cohen, therefore, writes of the wish-image as “doubly 
determined, not only by material forces but also by a nonmaterial collective agency that 
Benjamin names the collective unconscious” (42).  Benjamin posits a dreaming collective 
whose socio-cultural products are dream structures, embodying both repressed content 
and a deep-seated wish, and which, much like the dream, can be unravelled. 
 Cultural products are not merely “commodities” in the Marxist sense, but also 
“wish images” according to the Freudian model—they have a double aspect.  Within the 
form of these social artefacts are mingled “the repressed economic content” (Cohen, 34) 
of the social relations of production, as well as the utopian imaginings of the collective.  
As Benjamin writes in his essay “Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century”: 
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In the dream in which each epoch entertains images of its successor, 
the latter appears wedded to elements of primal history 
[Urgeschichte]—that is, to elements of a classless society. And the 
experiences of such a society—as stored in the unconscious of the 
collective—engender, through interpenetration with what is new, the 
utopia that has left its trace in a thousand configurations of life, from 
enduring edifices to passing fashions (2008,  98). 
That cultural products contain a utopian kernel is essential to their revolutionary potential 
in Benjamin's schema: “Suggesting that these products came into contact with deep-
seated collective desires, Benjamin proposed that they could be put to socially 
transformative ends” (Cohen, 21).  Social things, everyday objects, may weave the 
mystifying veil of the phantasmagoria, but they also harbour that element of desire, of 
human imagination, which longs to give birth to the new from within the old.  Thus, the 
wish symbols of the collective act as “dialectical images,” which are able to, in the words 
of Marx in a 1843 letter to Ruge, “awaken the world from the dream of itself” (quoted in 
Cohen, 22)—that is, from the strange slumber induced by the phantasmagoria of a world 
of fetishistic inversion in which commodities and cultural artefacts parade themselves to 
the onlooker in their mysterious fashion.   
 Seizing the utopian dimension harboured in the apparition of cultural products, 
means realizing their dialectical potential.  As Susan Buck-Morss writes, “by tracing 
these images back to their source, one wakes up from the dream with the historical 
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knowledge necessary to interpret it as nightmare—or realize it as wish” (1986, 133).  The 
“source” here is not only an understanding of the social relations of production—the 
latent economic content—but also the desire of the collectivity for a different world that 
expresses itself in traces: “These images are wish images” writes Benjamin, “in them the 
collective seeks both to overcome and to transfigure the immaturity of the social product 
and the inadequacies in the social organization of production” (2008, 98).  The dialectical 
reversal of the phantasmagorical apparition reveals utopia—the realm of freedom and 
human cultivation: “If adults [….] have been regimented and transformed into machines, 
one has only to reverse the image to recover the child's dream of utopia, where things are 
humanized rather than humans reified” (Buck-Morss 1986, 138).  The cultural products 
and artefacts of bourgeois society harbour within them the key to their interpretation, a 
vision of human agency and power which threatens the social order with its undoing.  As 
such, they point toward the ruins: 
They are residues of a dream world. The realization of dream 
elements, in the course of waking up, is the paradigm of dialectical 
thinking. Thus, dialectical thinking is the organ of historical 
awakening. Every epoch, in fact, not only dreams the one to follow 
but, in dreaming, precipitates its awakening […] With the 
destabilizing of the market economy, we begin to recognize the 
monuments of the bourgeoisie as ruins even before they have 
crumbled (Benjamin 2008, 109; my emphasis). 
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V. 
The flâneur emerges alongside a specific architectural and spatial configuration: the 
arcades.  The arcades are structures of consumer capitalism which display commodities 
and direct flows of people and goods in a particular way; their organization slows down 
movements, encourages lingering, elicits a consumerist gaze.  Within these structures, 
new needs are born of the desire to possess these objects bought at a price; while those 
without means are invited to share in the consumer dream through practices of looking.  
As such, the arcades are a terrain of idleness and reverie, of passive consumption.  The 
flâneur, the idler who roams this environment for hours on end, embodies the new sense 
that corresponds to this spatio-optical regime, which is, above all, a spectacle: “the 
mobilized gaze” (Friedberg 1991, 420).  This mobile gaze is detached and represents a 
larger perceptual pattern of distraction which critics argue has become the generalized 
perceptual regime in late capitalist, or 'postmodern', societies: “If the flaneur has 
disappeared as a specific figure, it is because the perceptive attitude which he embodied 
saturates modern existence, specifically, the society of mass consumption,” writes Buck-
Morss (1986, 104).  Yet, Benjamin treats the flâneur's ways of looking with ambivalence.  
Indeed, much like Freud who argued in the Interpretation of Dreams that this quality of 
free-floating attention is necessary to untangle the reverie and penetrate unconscious life, 
Benjamin sees the flâneur's gaze as one which, indeed, skims the surface of things 
without attachment, but in doing so, is able to make startling connections and 
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juxtapositions.  Thus, at certain moments, detached looking gives way to what Benjamin 
calls the practice of  “illustrative seeing” (1999, 418) or “stereoscopic” vision (458) 
which pierces the two-dimensional appearance of the cultural object to see it in its full 
socio-historical depth.     
 “Illustrative seeing” can be described as surrealistic practice of juxtaposing 
temporal images—it is based upon the “principle of montage” (Benjamin 1999, 461).  
“The spatial, surface montage of present perception […] can be transformed from illusion 
to knowledge once the “principle of montage” is re-functioned temporally, that is, once 
the axis of montage is turned “into history,”” writes Buck-Morss (1986, 109).  The 
residues, the debris of the past, provide this temporal juxtaposition—they stand in 
contrast to the present, both as its ruins, but also as a fleeting vision of what it might have 
been.  This double exposure of past and present works dialectically.  As such, 
stereoscopic vision is another concept for describing this imagistic historical dialectic.  
Interestingly, “a stereoscope,” Buck-Morss tells us, is “that instrument which creates a 
three-dimensional image, works from not one image, but two” (109).  This way of seeing 
gives weight and depth the cultural object, by piercing the phantasmagoric veil, and 
situating it within its socio-historical framework to reveal the “multiple nonmaterial 
imperatives [...] libidinal, symbolic, and ideological” that determine it (Cohen, 44).  
 For Benjamin, it was amidst the streets and scenes of Paris that one encountered 
dialectical images, those saturated dream residues of other times and places: “We know 
that, in the course of flânerie, far-off times and places interpenetrate the landscape and 
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the present moment” (1999, 419).  As he strolls, the street becomes a vehicle through 
which the flâneur is transported through the realms of the real and the imagined, into the 
heart of what Benjamin conceptualized as the unconscious of the dreaming collectivity:  
The street conducts the flâneur into a vanished time.  For him, every 
street is precipitous. It leads downward—if not to the mythical 
Mothers, then into a past that can be all the more spellbinding 
because it is not his own, not private (416).   
It is in negotiating the spaces, the architecture, the objects of the city that the flâneur is 
conducted into intimate regions of the shared imaginary, of social ideas, meanings, and 
values that are embodied in things.  Indeed, Benjamin emphasizes the sensuous qualities, 
or the “perceptibility,” of history (461).  Traces of the past are perceptible in residues and 
debris, and therefore discoverable in and through encounters with cultural objects, 
particularly the outmoded.  He refers to his own project as one of “literary montage […]  
I needn't say anything. Merely show the rags, the refuse—these I will not describe but 
put on display” (860; my emphasis).  The flâneur's work is to read in the rags and the 
refuse the signs and secrets that these forms contain.    
 The qualities of the gaze, of the flâneur's ways of seeing and perceptual habits, are 
at once symptomatic of the capitalist modernity which gave rise to them, but also 
potentially interpretive, when we think about cultural products and commodities as dream 
structures.  Slavoj Žižek, for instance, argues that we should conceptualize both 
commodities and dreams as symptom formations.  Understanding how and why they take 
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on their peculiar appearance—unlocking “the 'secret' of this form” (1994, 296)—is 
crucial.  And, as Buck-Morss suggests, this involves tracing their socio-historical roots: 
these “dream-symbols,” she writes, “nee[d] interpretation, and this require[s] a historical 
knowledge or origins” (1986, 109).  Benjamin writes in The Arcades Project of this need 
“to educate the image-making medium within us, raising it to a stereoscopic and 
dimensional seeing into the depths of historical shadows” (1999, 857).  The knowledge 
of social reality, though not immediately visible in things, is still perceptible to the 
trained eye that practices illustrative seeing.  It is in seeking to “penetrate the fetish,” as 
Harvey put it (2003, 54), through his practices of looking, that the flâneur could be said 
to be a historical materialist.  
 
VI. 
It is, above all, the flâneur's chance, undetermined encounters with the “trace” that have a 
revelatory effect.  Traces refer to the remnants of the former ways of life of previous 
inhabitants; they are the subtle residues of antecedent forms of social relations.  They 
adhere to the notion of the city as palimpsest: composed of overlapping layers of the past, 
partially erased, but leaving imprints, impressions.  Traces are ultimately the ruins of a 
collective and impersonal past; ruins that render that past sensible.  Benjamin describes 
the trace as the “appearance of a nearness, however far removed the thing that left it 
behind may be” (1999, 447).  It is this encounter that constitutes, not a rupture with the 
present, but rather an opening of the present onto the past, as well as, possibly, onto the 
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future—what he terms the “colportage of space,” an experience of simultaneity of time 
and place (418).  As Eiland and McLaughlin note in their introduction to The Arcades 
Project, “it was not the great men and celebrated events of traditional historiography but 
rather the 'refuse' and 'detritus' of history, the half-concea1ed, variegated traces of the 
daily life of 'the collective', that was to be the object of study” in Benjamin's uncompleted 
work (1999, ix).  Buck-Morss also notes that “it is clear that he chose the Paris arcades as 
the central image precisely because these early forms of industrial luxury were in decay 
in his own time” (1986, 100).  The debris of history are, for Benjamin, concealed in 
outmoded, obsolete, and discarded objects.  In re-encountering these objects from a 
historical distance they are denuded of the magical qualities of commodities: 
disenchanted, they fail to exercise the same power over us.  Benjamin is, in other words, 
teaching us how to read the ruins, to project ourselves into the past in order to understand 
the social and historical relations of the present. 
 Ruins hold the key to “the moment of awakening,” by which Benjamin (1999) 
meant the moment of critical insight, or that which Buck-Morss identifies as the 
development of “revolutionary cognition” (1986, 109).  It is in their afterlives—that is, 
their circulation outside of the realms of value and exchange, beyond the vicissitudes of 
the commodity—that things return with an unsettling difference.  The debris of history 
haunt the present as spectres, evoking the experience that, in the words of Shakespeare's 
Hamlet, “time is out of joint” (1993, 69).  Ruins create a tension between the past and the 
present, out of which the dialectical image is sparked: “The past can be seized only as an 
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image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again” 
(Benjamin 2007, 55).  This counter image ruptures the continuity of history, providing 
the critical distance—ironically by means of an immersion in the very materiality of the 
world—required for the disenchantment of history.  Naomi Stead, writing on ruins, 
argues that:  
It is only through an examination of these melancholy traces, the 
detritus left after the ‘catastrophes’ of history, that the allegorist or 
historian can critically approach the present. In his conception, the 
act of destruction places everything in new juxtapositions, shatters 
old relationships, and opens history up for examination. It is through 
the shock of destruction that the subject emerges from the 'dream' of 
tradition and into life in the present (2000, 11). 
 The ruin becomes the allegory of history.  It is an aesthetic form, which, beyond 
the categories of beautiful and sublime, embeds itself within social history, just as it 
represents, in an abstract way, that same history; it is a decontextualized fragment which 
opens up a contemplative window onto the past.  As Benjamin writes, “Allegories are, in 
the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things” (2003, 178).   An allegorical 
mode of thought or an allegorical sensibility performs a work similar to that of ruins.  
Thus, Benjamin makes of allegory the conceptual tool of the historical materialist; as 
Stead writes: 
In the context of Benjamin’s philosophy of history the ruin provides 
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an emblem, not only of the melancholic worldview presented in 
Baroque tragic drama, but of allegory as a critical tool for historical 
materialism. Benjamin’s concept of the ruin is valuable because it 
delves beyond the aesthetic of the ruin as an object, and reads it as a 
process, a means of demythifying and stripping away a falsely 
affirmative vision of reality, and of history (11). 
In his melancholy philosophy of history, ruins, while gesturing toward a lost whole, 
inevitably signal a gap: the ruin is always a fragment, an indication of loss and 
incompleteness.  On some level, the ruin signals a reading of modernity as a failed 
project.  The ruin, as wreckage or refuse, gestures toward history as an unending 
catastrophe: we “discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of 
the total event,” writes Benjamin in a note categorized under “Refuse of History” (1999, 
461).  Encountering the ruins of capitalist modernity reveals that “the ideal of the shock-
engendered experience <Erlebnis> is the catastrophe” (Benjamin 1999, 515).  As such, it 
awakens us to the ongoing process of history, and becomes an invitation to revision 
ourselves as its agents.   
 
VII. 
We must be careful not to celebrate the figure of the flâneur uncritically.  Indeed, many 
critics have pointed out the problematic gendered and class dimensions of this figure.  
Priscilla Ferguson, for instance, argues that the both Flaubert and Balzac “associate Paris 
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with a woman and flaneur with male desire” (1997, 99).  In this reading, the woman, 
much like the city, is subjected to the male gaze of the flâneur which seeks to possess 
her: she is “indispensable to the urban drama” which he navigates, enticing and 
frustrating, fulfilling or resisting, the advances of her “lover” (85).  Socially acceptable 
for her are identifying with the commodity form or consuming it; as Ferguson writes: 
“No woman can disconnect herself from the city and its seductive spectacle. For she must 
either desire the objects spread before her or herself be the object of desire” (84).  The 
woman is not accorded the same liberties as the celebrated flâneur, as his position relies 
upon male privilege: while he roams freely as the detached observer, the same freedom 
of mobility is denied her.  A woman on her own in the public sphere is suspect; as 
Ferguson argues, “because a woman is defined by the (male) company she keeps, to be 
alone is to be without station,” or worse, it is to be deemed streetwalker or whore (84)—
at least, that is, until shopping emerges as a socially-sanctioned form of leisure activity, 
one which, nevertheless, takes place within the narrowly-circumscribed domain of the 
department store and is accorded only to women of the bourgeoisie.  
 For critics like Anne Freidberg, the flâneur can be read as a harbinger of what 
would become a new formation of 'postmodern' subjectivity (1991, 419).  “The most 
profound symptoms of the postmodern condition,” she writes, “[...] the disappearance of 
a sense of history, entrapment in a perpetual present, the loss of temporal referents—have 
been, I argue, caused at least in part by the implicit time travel of cinematic and televisual 
spectation” (Freidberg 1991, 420).  In a commodity culture which is, increasingly, a 
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culture of the spectacle, everyday life for the postmodern subject is marked by simulated 
experiences, detemporalization, and the consumption of images.  The gaze itself is a 
commodity, sold to us by the culture industry.  Here the flâneur serves as the paradigm: 
his “mobilized gaze” was the necessary precursor of the cinematic apparatus, which 
relies on, as much as it encodes, particular “perceptual patterns” (420-421).  Yet it is, in 
fact, the flâneuse—who emerges alongside the advent of les grands magasins—who, 
according to Freidberg, best embodies the subject positioning of spectator-consumer:  
As the department store supplanted the arcade, the mobilized gaze 
entered the service of consumption, and space opened for a female 
flâneur—a flâneuse—whose gendered gaze became a key element of 
consumer address. And such spatial and temporal motility led to a 
unique apparatical sequel: the cinema (420). 
This optical conjuncture reduces former ways of relating to and inhabiting space to ruins.  
Even Benjamin disclosed a certain ambivalence with regard to the enduring critical 
capacity of his protagonist, writing: “The department store as the last promenade for the 
flâneur. There his fantasies were materialized. The flânerie that began as art of the private 
individual ends today as necessity for the masses” (1999, 895).   
 Nevertheless, other theorists challenge such readings, which often assume a 
straightforward delineation between the public and private spheres, fail to adequately 
address the dimension of class, and ignore the critical insights that a more nuanced 
reading of flanerie might offer.  Elizabeth Wilson, for one, seeks to complicate the divide 
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between public and private by pointing to the proliferation of semi-privatized spaces, 
including restaurants, clubs, theatres, and shopping centres in the Victorian era, while 
also highlighting that the home was far from “a safe haven, least of all for working-class 
women—domestic servants—confined within it” (1992, 98).  She argues that the private 
sphere, even if feminized, ought to be conceived as “a masculine domain [...] organized 
for the convenience, rest and recreation of men, not women” for whom it was, rather, a 
space of domestic labour (98).  Women and their activities were, according to Wilson, far 
from invisible outside the home (101).  Working-class and poor women, in particular, 
were highly visible: “Having in many cases almost no ‘private sphere’ to be confined to, 
they thronged the streets” (104).  The concern for women in public, as much as for 
“public women,” demonstrates an anxiety over ways in which gendered institutions and 
relations of power were being remade by the processes of capitalist urbanization: “The 
very presence of unattended—unowned—women constituted a threat both to male power 
and to male frailty” (93).   
 While Wilson considers the possibility that the prostitute might be considered the 
female flâneuse (105), she ultimately concludes that prostitution reveals an essential 
quality of flanerie—far from a position of male privilege, it is an expression of the 
insecurity and dislocation wrought by urbanization: “the interpretation of the flâneur as 
masterful voyeur underplays the financial insecurity and emotional ambiguity of the role” 
(106).  For her, the urban landscape constitutes a petrifying spectacle which reduces the 
male figure to anonymity and impotence (109): 
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From this perspective, we might say that there could never be a 
female flâneur, for this reason: that the flâneur himself never really 
existed, being but an embodiment of the special blend of excitement, 
tedium and horror aroused by many in the new metropolis, and the 
disintegrative effect of this on the masculine identity. The flâneur 
[...] is a figure to be deconstructed, a shifting projection of angst 
rather than a solid embodiment of male bourgeois power (109). 
For Esther Leslie, these dislocations must be traced back to the transformation of social 
relations under capitalism, and read as the subordination of gender to the imperatives of 
the market (1997, 72).  The commodification of labour means that the flâneur is not 
merely a spectator of the urban spectacle, but actively on the lookout for a buyer for his 
wares (his journalistic writings): he is “producer and consumer, and as such subjected to 
the contradictions of the commodity society” (70).  As such, Leslie argues that we cannot 
isolate gender from a class reading—one which emphasizes the outcomes of the 
traumatic encounter with capitalist modernity for men and women alike—for the 
flâneur's “subjectivity is allied not with men, but with those who sell themselves” (70).  
Capitalism makes prostitutes of all its workers, and the flâneur, far from being exempt 
from its logic, was increasingly subject to precariousness: “Prostitution is, for Benjamin, 
not just a by-product of city culture, it is the way of life for all” (78). 
 The flâneur and the prostitute are, in a sense, two aspects of the same processes.  
The difference, as David McNally notes, is that while the female body is eroticized, “the 
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rise of capitalism saw a de-eroticization of the male body as the dominant male ethos 
shifted from luxury to industry” (2001, 205).  Prostitutes are the embodiment of the 
commodity, and thus the object of desire and of male identification: “So significant is the 
eroticization of commodities, says Benjamin, that people in capitalist society secretly 
want to be commodities, that is, to be objects of mass desire” (208).  As he goes on to 
suggest: “Men in bourgeois society don't merely “want” women, they secretly desire to 
be women, to be commodified objects of desire” (209).  Yet, as McNally suggests, this 
feminization in identification, but also in practice (through prostituted labour), initiates  
the breakdown of the defensive male ego—and its sustaining myth 
of the self-made man—as a precondition of revolutionary 
subjectivity. Male identifications with women as historical actors on 
a landscape of ruination are decisive to the temporal dislocations 
involved in revolutionary change (206). 
The prostitute reveals our identification and equivocation with the commodity—the work 
of fetishism that renders the subject thing-like.  Such a revelation is potentially 
revolutionary: “The recognition that in capitalist society we are all prostitutes shatters the 
mythical structure of reality, and this allows us to break through the naturalization of 
history and to enter onto the terrain of historical action” (McNally, 210). 
 
VIII. 
The gleaner is, sadly, perhaps a more applicable figure when thinking about ruins and 
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modalities of survival within the conditions of late capitalism.  The activities of the 
gleaner (gleaning or glanage) offer us a glimpse into the precariousness of existence 
fostered by the shift to the 'post-industrial' society seen in Western capitalist countries.  
During the last few decades, the transnationalization of capital has resulted in 
manufacturing jobs—once bastions of stable, unionized employment and a decent 
wage—being shifted overseas, leading to a major restructuring of Western economies.  In 
the place of a manufacture-based economy, we have witnessed the rise of the service 
sector, a heavily polarized industry in which the majority of jobs are low-paying, part-
time, non-unionized, and with few benefits, while the much lauded 'white-collar' or 
'smart' jobs are awarded to a handful of individuals.  Combined with neoliberal 
governance strategies—including massive privatization and deregulation of services and 
industries, alongside cutbacks to social programs and services—that have dominated 
capitalist regimes since the 1980s, many have found themselves un- or under-employed.  
Added to this, the basic means and services essential to social reproduction have 
increasingly been commodified.  Given these conditions, those at the socio-economic 
margins are forced to forge their existence through various strategies that have the 
principle of gleaning at their core.  Yet, gleaning is much more than a necessary survival 
tool of the poor, but is also an act of creative re-appropriation.  Gleaning is a 
transformative practice that takes the very ruins of the capitalist system, “the rags, the 
refuse” as Benjamin put it (1999, 860), and uses them to fashion the self in ways counter 
to their intended purpose.  Thus, gleaning speaks to the afterlives of things, that is, their 
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vicissitudes beyond the circuit of commodities.  It is here that human-object interactions 
take on another aspect, one that is not necessarily characterized by the alienation fostered 
by the fetishism of commodities, but one more in line with what Marx meant by praxis.   
 A recent publication entitled, Who's Hungry: Faces of Hunger, based on a 2012 
survey conducted in the Greater Toronto Area by the Daily Bread Food Bank, reported 
that the city saw over one million visits to the food bank in the last year.  Hunger, it tells 
us, disproportionally affects immigrants and the unemployed, but interestingly, it also 
suggests that 28% of those using food bank services have a university degree.  Such a 
statistic presents a very different portrait of the urban poor than we are accustomed to 
imagining: as educated, often under- rather un-employed, and increasingly unable to cope 
with the cost of housing, which, for the average food bank user, amounts to 71% of their 
income.  The deregulation of services and the lack of funding for social housing and 
other forms of support, combined with a global economic recession, are increasing the 
precariousness of existence for a large percentage of the population.  The resurgence of 
gleaning must be situated within this political economic context, as a response to, but 
also a critique of, the system.  The common response that individualizes the problem, as 
one of having “fallen on hard times,” is being demystified by the sheer scale of the crisis.  
What is, as C. Wright Mills puts it, so often seen as a “private trouble,” is beginning to be 
understood as a larger social or “public issue” issue, one has its roots in capitalism itself 
(2000, 8).  Precariousness is, in this sense, not an unfortunate side-effect, but rather, the 
intended outcome of a regime of accumulation that requires a flexible labour force and a 
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large reserve army of labour.  Poverty, as a socially constructed reality, is not accidental, 
but deeply imbricated with the very functioning of the system.  Those who turn to the 
practice of gleaning are doing so as an act of resistance: the refusal to be made 
vulnerable, subjected to systemic crisis,  restructuring, or the fluctuations of the market.  
 “We used to make stuff here,” says one the characters in the film Requiem for 
Detroit, standing in the ruins of an old automotive factory.  One is struck by the sense of 
powerlessness in his voice—and one intuitively grasps what Marx meant by commodity 
fetishism, that strange world in which the forces that rule production are outside of our 
hands, located in the columns of the business section or in the financial reports of major 
corporations.  The desire and the capacity to produce are, in this case, out of synch with 
the forces restructuring the auto industry and forcing its workers into unemployment.  
Indeed, those affected by the decline of the manufacturing industry in late capitalist 
societies are suffering from much more than just the loss of jobs: the disappearance of 
factory work means the dissipation of the very conditions in which their skills made any 
sense.  As work environments change, those 'skilled' labourers who once populated the 
assembly line find that they themselves have become outmoded; as specialized cogs in 
the Fordist wheel of production, in which their bodies were carefully trained to carry out 
one particular movement, their skills are suddenly out of date—no longer suitable to a 
regime of flexible accumulation being imposed by transnational capital.  Thus, we hear 
much talk, especially here in Ontario, where the conditions are very similar to those of 
the Eastern United States, of initiatives to re-train these workers.  Yet, what this situation 
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reveals is a deeper logic of capitalist production that, over the course of its history, has 
stripped human beings of a general 'know-how'—that is, of the knowledge and skills 
necessary for social reproduction.  The entrenchment of capitalism in Western societies 
has brought with it the deepening alienation of individuals from any sense of self-
sufficiency, as food and clothing production, the making of goods, even child-care, have 
been commodified.  The mediation of the market has distanced us not only from an 
integrated understanding of and capacity for fashioning the tools and products of labour, 
but from the ability to actively fashion the self in the process.  It is to these conditions 
that the modern day gleaner responds, out of necessity but also with a certain sense of 
empowerment, recuperating the skills of self-sufficiency and self-determination.  Thus, 
gleaning can be situated within a larger DIY (do-it-yourself) culture, made up not only of 
marginalized populations, but also of those fed up with a culture built around passive 
consumption.  
 
IX. 
Arjun Appadurai, in his introductory essay to the edited volume, The Social Life of 
Things, explores the vicissitudes of the cultural object in and beyond its commodity state.  
His aim, he suggests, is to “illuminate the concrete historical circulation of things. For 
that we have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their 
forms, their uses, their trajectories” (1986, 5).  He calls this work a necessary 
“methodological fetishism” (5) because it shifts the focus of analysis away from the site 
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of production, and back to the realm of circulation and exchange.  It is humans, indeed, 
who attribute to things their value and meanings, he acknowledges, but to dismiss or 
ignore this dimension on the ground that it is fetishism or false consciousness would be 
to overlook a rich field of study.  If “commodities, like persons, have social lives” (3), as 
Appadurai argues, this means that their life histories or biographies potentially tell us 
something about ourselves as a society, about the larger tensions, trends, and shifts that 
shape the cultural contexts in which they circulate (34-36).  The enigmatic quality of 
sociality is what is perhaps most interesting about the object, for it reveals the complex 
interrelation between people and things, the way that our lives are interwoven with the 
objects that we produce.  A social archaeology of things, of the kind proposed by 
Appadurai, can aid us not only in understanding commodities, but also their afterlives 
outside of the arenas of production and exchange: it can illuminate the ruins and the 
social practices that surround them.  Ruins, as those things made obsolete or outmoded 
by shifting socio-economic contexts and regimes of value, have their own trajectories, in 
part as gleaned objects: they, too, have social lives, cultural biographies, that we would 
do well to explore. 
 For Appadurai objects have a “commodity phase” (15)—“things,” he writes, “can 
move in and out of the commodity state” (13).  As a commodity, an object's exchange 
value is at the forefront; the commodity state is, in other words, one in which 
“exchangeability (past, present, or future) for some other thing is its socially relevant 
future” (13).  Exchangeability is based on the fact that commodities have intended “use 
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values for others, social use values” (8), and as such, are embedded in networks of desire 
and demand.  That things can enter a commodity state also means that they are able to 
exit that state, becoming “ex-commodities” (16)—a phase in their social life that is of 
particular interest to this study.  There are multiple trajectories by which things become 
ex-commodities.  The sudden diversion of objects from the commodity circuit is a 
function of capitalism's logic of forced and artificial obsolescence—fashion being here an 
exemplary case.  Overproduction necessitates the stimulation of new desires and tastes 
that make existing products outmoded.  Furthermore, capital flight or divestment can 
leave those structures destined for commodification in a state of suspended motion, 
subject to premature decay.  “The diversion of commodities from specified paths is 
always a sign of creativity or crisis, whether aesthetic or economic,” writes Appadurai 
26; my emphasis).  Examples of aesthetic diversion are those in which new value is 
created by “placing objects and things in unlikely contexts” (28), creating, for instance, 
'authentic' works of art out of ordinary objects through their displacement—think of 
Duchamp's 'Fountain'.  These sudden diversions are, I would argue, part of the 
temporalities of ruination and recuperation in late capitalism. 
 When things enter a state of ruination they are considered to no longer to have an 
exchange value, or even any use value; that is, the socially-prescribed uses and functions 
of the object or structure in question are no longer valid or viable.  Yet, clearly, they do 
have value for those who recuperate, reinvest, or reoccupy them in so many different 
ways.  Their vision for the ruin inevitably competes with the dominant social narratives 
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that attempts to determine it as void and worthless.  Thus Appadurai's suggestion, that 
putting an object to a use or function that strays from its intended purpose is a matter of 
political contestation, is quite relevant: “the flow of commodities in any given situation is 
a shifting compromise between socially regulated paths and competitively inspired 
diversions” (17).  The act of gleaning must be viewed in this light—as creative diversion 
and revaluation.  Gleaning is an intervention in the trajectory of the ruin: it is about 
salvaging things, often destined for total decay or destruction, for economic, aesthetic, or 
survival purposes.  Economically, this may mean collecting scrap metal from abandoned 
buildings to sell on the black market or removing 'vintage' windows and doors for online 
auctions.  Aesthetically, it could be gathering found objects to create artistic installations 
or gleaning photographic images of ruins for publication.  When it comes to survival, it 
may involve any number of possibilities, such as dumpster diving to find a bite to eat, or 
going through trash bins for recyclable materials.  Usually gleaning entails practices 
considered to illegal, socially deviant, or 'eccentric' precisely because they go against the 
regulated and normative pathways that structure both the circulation and valuation of 
things in our society.  Particularly elicit, as we know, is the gleaning of those materials 
considered 'trash', at least in part because it is seen as a direct threat to a system that relies 
on wastefulness and the forcibly outmoded to maintain profits and address crises of 
overproduction. 
 The gleaner is positioned as a figure who understands the movements and 
trajectories of things in our society and can strategically intervene to divert them from 
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their normative pathways.  She relies on the oversights of the system, on the very logic of 
wastefulness and rapid obsolescence that makes capitalism a system of ruination.  She is, 
thus, a figures who succeeds in bridging the gap, at least in the realm of knowledge, 
between production and consumption that is one of the cornerstones of the experience of 
alienation: she understands where things come from and where they are heading to, and 
she is able to redirect them to her own ends and purposes.  In thinking not merely in 
terms of exchange value, of the commensurability of things, but of the many possible 
uses and functions that objects can be made to serve, she resists the cultural texts 
inscribed in things in order to read them otherwise.  Thus gleaning is less about the 
production and distribution of wealth, than about the recollection and redistribution of 
the materials necessary for social reproduction.  It is a creative fashioning of the self, as 
an aesthetic, economic, ethical, and political being, through a practice akin to bricolage.  
Although she serves as merely an individual instance, for she is not part of a collective 
and organized movement, the gleaner nevertheless offers creative strategies for the re-
appropriation of objects beyond their commodification.  In practising a different form of 
relation to things and to people, she gives some indication of the possibilities for 
remaking of the self and social relationships, if not outside, at least at the margins, of the 
relations of capital.  In her everyday practices of survival, the gleaner reveals the 
contradictions of the system that undermine it from within, making life at the margins a 
source of hope; in the discarded and outmoded she “recognize[s] the monuments of the 
bourgeoisie as ruins even before they have crumbled” (Benjamin 2008, 109). 
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X. 
For filmmaker Agnès Varda gleaning is a generative concept, unfolding in unexpected 
ways, and leading her on a series of adventures in which she is less the auteur than an 
enthusiastic participant.  Her film-essay The Gleaners and I [Les glaneurs et la glaneuse] 
(2001), takes us on a journey across France: from the fields of Avignon to the bustling 
streets of Paris, across vineyards and into artists' studios.  As she demonstrates along the 
way, gleaning—of food, images, objects—is a practice which conjoins the social and 
political, the ethical and aesthetic, in and through the acts of representation, recollection, 
and redistribution.  Gleaning opens up encounters with the refuse of capitalist society 
which are potentially transformative, as they happen outside of the sanctioned circuits of 
production and consumption.  Glanage is the reinvesting of the terrain of everyday life 
through praxis, the remapping of space and of social relations beyond market mediation.  
Gleaning is, for Varda, a paradigm of hope: more than the recuperation of discarded 
objects, it is about imagining anew the possibilities of human community.  Indeed, when 
carried out amidst the ruins, it becomes a creative means to overcome the melancholy 
imagination fixated on loss, to shift to the registers of life, love, and struggle.  While 
gleaning does not directly challenge the social relations of production by attempting to 
seize power or capital, it opens up a field of experimentation for the cultivation of human 
capacities and relationships at the margins of this system.  Furthermore, Varda's film, this 
time through its form more than its content, demonstrates that gleaning is also a model of 
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artistic practice: rather than being a detached observer, Varda engages directly with the 
subjects and material which interest her, participating in the lives and struggles of those 
she films.  
 Agnès Varda commences her film with the Larousse encyclopaedia's entry on 
gleaning: to glean is “to gather after the harvest,” she reads aloud.  Millet's painting Des 
glaneuses, set before the camera, presents poor peasant women collecting grain in simple 
dress.  Yet, as Varda demonstrates, gleaning is anything but an antiquated practice: it is 
alive and flourishing in the present day, taking on a contemporary guise in the context of 
the transformation of the social-economic system by the rise and maturation of 
capitalism.  Although the practice of gleaning what remains after the harvest persists on a 
small-scale, it is considered part of the “old way,” outdated by the increasing 
mechanization and industrialization of agriculture.  Varda nevertheless recognizes that 
the act of bending down, or reaching out, has far from disappeared: she sees it 
everywhere, in fields, urban markets, alleyways, and trash bins.  As such, she re-situates 
the practice of gleaning within the spaces of theory and aesthetics which so often 
undervalue the sites and subjects of everyday life.  In doing so, she casts light upon those 
persons usually invisible within both the spheres of artistic and political representation.  
In recuperating glanage from historical and conceptual ineptitude as a viable and 
potentially subversive activity, it becomes nourishment for the social and political 
imaginary.  
 As the film illustrates, modern gleaners are situated within relations of production 
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different from their ancestors: in the conditions of capitalism they depend upon the 
malfunctioning of machines or the vagaries of the market for their bounty, rather than 
upon the ancient French laws governing gleaning that make provisions for the 'weak' and 
'wretched'.  They forge their livelihood upon the surpluses of a society that are destined 
for destruction, collecting what has been discarded, whether intentionally (instances 
which, in the film, include potatoes dumped for failing to meet the market specifications 
of size, shape, or colour, and grapes left to rot in order to adhere to the strict laws that 
govern the appellation of wines by region) or by mechanical accident (a “field day”).  
Rather than seeking the charity of strangers, the generosity of landowners, or government 
assistance, gleaners make use of the excessive waste of a society of overconsumption and 
overproduction in which everything is, and ultimately must be, disposable.  They rely 
upon the logic of forced obsolescence built into the system, that rapidly reduces its 
products to ruins.  In advanced capitalist societies like France, the site of gleaning has 
shifted, in significant part, from rural landscapes to the heart of urban centres.  Social 
dislocation, enclosures, neoliberal policies, and a host of other economic and political 
factors have created a climate in which people of many backgrounds find themselves 
impoverished.  As a result, gleaners encompass within their ranks not only the rural poor 
and the urban unemployed, but a growing proportion of single mothers, immigrants, 
refugees, and those with mental illnesses, disabilities, or addictions.  And yet, those who 
glean are no longer bound together, as in the past, by the social ties of kinship.  As 
capitalism has devalued social relations outside of the nuclear family and promoted a 
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culture of self-interest and competitive individualism, those at the bottom are left more 
vulnerable, without the support networks that once existed among the poor.  Varda is 
struck by the portrait of isolation and displacement presented by many of the gleaners she 
meets, which seems so contrary to the beloved paintings of Millet and Breton which 
celebrate the communal, and almost joyous, aspects of gleaning.  Community, where is 
exists, has to be relearned: it is gradually forged anew, out of solidarity and compassion, 
and outside of the mediation of the market.  The gleaners whom she encounters have had 
to piece together a life at the margins of society through their own resourcefulness.  Their 
survival is a matter of an ongoing creative appropriation and negotiation of the ruins of 
the very system which has excluded them.  By collecting and sharing what has been 
thrown away, abandoned, overlooked—whether potatoes or household items—they resist 
institutionalized forms of injustice, exploitation, and atomization, defining alternative 
ways of being in the world and living with others.   
 The poetic, allegorical, and metaphorical interpretations of glanage open up for 
Varda a slew of the thematic possibilities.  To glean can mean to learn or to discover, in a 
piecemeal manner, and as such, is suggestive of the mediation, reception, or production 
of social knowledge.  As Varda suggests in the film, “gleaning is defined figuratively as a 
mental activity. To glean facts, acts and deeds, to glean information.”  Gleaning is, in this 
way, a modality of sensibility: a way of perceiving the world, of paying attention to 
certain sensuous details that beckon to us—to the traces and fragments that we are taught 
to overlook.  In contrast to Benjamin's model of illustrative seeing, which, while 
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insightful, still suggests a certain detachment and emphasis on the gaze, gleaning is a 
more tactile gesture of reaching out, grasping for, piecing together.  It is not only about 
learning to see things in their socio-historical depth, but also reclaiming the 'know-how', 
the ability to do, that capitalism has impoverished.  The principles of glanage can equally 
be applied to certain artistic practices, like bricolage, in which discarded cultural material 
is retrieved and employed in found-object art or installation pieces.  It is in this aesthetic 
mode that Varda herself is a glaneuse, immersed in a project of cinéglanage: the gleaning 
of images and soundbites, insights and objects, from her encounters: “Through Varda’s 
lens, the work of gleaning stands for documentary/ essayistic, anti-consumerist, 
democratic, empathetic filmmaking” (Chrostowska 2007, 120).  During a scene in which 
the camera films her—posing first with a bushel of wheat upon her shoulder, and then 
placing it aside in order to pick up her small, hand-held digital camera—she remarks: 
“There's another woman gleaning in this film, that's me.”  From the outset she implicates 
herself in her work, going as far as to tell us: “this is my project: to film with one hand 
my other hand.”  Hers is, in other words, as much a portrait of the self as it is a portrait of 
others.  Recognizing the position power that comes along with her role as a film-maker, 
she chooses to put herself on the line, exploring her own impressions, revealing her 
weaknesses, making herself a subject alongside the others she interviews.  Yet, as a self-
portrait, it is one which, as Emma Wilson argues in “Les Glaneurs et la glaneuse: Salvage 
and the Art of Forgetting,” continually shifts our attention from the individual to the 
social, from the personal to the collective.  Varda does not expose herself in a narcissistic 
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or exhibitionistic manner, but rather reveals the constitution of subjectivity in its 
relationality, its interconnectedness with others; she offers up the image of “an identity in 
transaction and becoming,” emerging from an open-ended series of encounters in the 
world, one that perilously “resist[s] melancholy and self-absorption,” those twin traps of 
a postmodern age (Wilson 2005, 109). 
 Varda's cinéglanage features her, not only behind the camera, but within the 
frame, bending down to touch the objects and reaching out to meet the subjects that it 
captures.  She emphasizes the hand as “the tool of the painter, the artist” (indieWIRE): it 
is the hand that gleans, not the detached eye which possesses.  Hers is film-making as a 
craft: a “handmade” labour of love.  As Chrostowska has noted, Varda, as a 
cinéglaneuse, figures as a “keen participant-observer (transcending the gender divide)” of 
cinema, in contrast to the flâneur who “stands for classical, narrative cinema” (2007, 
120).  Her work intimately engages with others and seeks to inspire encounters between 
people, both those in the film and also the audience.  As she states in an indieWIRE 
interview with Andrea Meyer: “it's not 'Audience'. For me it's 100, 300, 500 people. It's a 
way to meet her, meet him [...] I give enough of myself, so they have to come to me. And 
they have to come to the people that I make them meet [in the film].”  Varda demands 
that the audience not remain passive observers, but share in the series of exchanges, and 
this intention appears to have been realized, for what is most striking to Varda in the 
countless letters that she receives from enthusiastic filmgoers is the language they use to 
describe their reaction to the film: the pleasure each took in “meeting the gleaners in the 
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film.”  Varda's cinematic gleaning is characterized by a creative impulse uninhibited by 
the regulation, repression, and policing that other forms of gleaning are almost certain to 
run up against; as she tells us in the film: “On this type of gleaning, of images, 
impressions, there is no legislation.”  Her work accords space to feeling, the body, the 
senses—the lived dimensions of experience so often excluded from intellectual 
endeavours:  “You go to the right thing, to the right place, to the right image, with your 
own feelings” (indieWIRE).  While this strategy may prove to take shape in an endless 
series of digressions, it is precisely these sojourns into the unexpected, or passages 
through the things she loves, that forge new connections, returning the viewer-participant 
to the subject matter enriched.  
 Cinéglanage is characteristic of much of the revolutionizing project work of the 
last few decades, as outlined by Gratton and Sheringham in The Art of the Project: 
Projects and Experiments in Modern French Culture, in its attempt to break down the 
boundaries between art and life.  These theorists point out that project film-making is re-
situated in the terrain of the everyday and often deals, in a creative fashion, with issues of 
socio-political import.  It takes the form of an experimental and experiential fieldwork: 
an encounter with and reinvestment of material reality.  With the exception of a few 
guiding principles and parameters that serve as a broad framework, the work is 
unplanned—emphasizing the process above the end result.  The artist immerses herself in 
the conditions of everyday life, in which a series of unforeseen events, chance meetings, 
and surprises unfold.  The distinctions are blurred between aesthetic and ethical practice, 
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autobiography (self-portrait) and quasi-ethnographic inquiry (documentary), projection 
and representation: “The space of the project is always poised between the physical and 
the mental” (Gratton and Sheringham 2005, 15).  The result is a film that is more than a 
film, that takes on a life of its own; as Wilson suggests: “The film does not exist as fixed 
artefact or object, but works instead to set up a reverberating series of exchanges and 
encounters, to generate its own (after)life” (2005, 107).  Indeed, Varda's follow up film, 
Deux ans après, no ordinary sequel, speaks to the reverberations of the original film, one 
that clearly had a profoundly transformative effect upon the lives of those who saw it and 
those who took part in it—at least as judged by the countless letters, stories, testimonials, 
and gifts that Varda receives after the screenings.  The sequel, a gift on her part to her 
viewership, directly involves the audience as well: while she revisits several of the 
gleaners with whom we are acquainted, she also meets some those who wrote to her, 
whose letters touched her.  She joins them for an exchange of words, thoughts, and 
sentiments; she tends to the sparks that her work as ignited.  Thus Varda's art is 
performative, but in a genuine sense: it produces human intersections, personal 
encounters, and collaborative projects based on inclusivity and reciprocity.  
 “And for forgetful me, it's what I've gleaned that tells where I've been,” states 
Varda, as she displays souvenirs from her recent travels in Japan.  For the worldly and 
sentimental glaneuse, what she carries with her reminds her of her adventures, journeys, 
projects.  To carry something away suggests that one has left an experience changed.  
Thus, more profoundly, gleaning can be understood as a modality of memory, a way of 
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recalling the past, in and through the gleaned object.  The gleaned object circulates within 
webs of personal and collective histories, by which it is imprinted with memories, 
souvenirs, failures, and hopes.  In an era in which the dominant discourses of 
neoliberalism have achieved a self-proclaimed victory over history, at a time when we 
are told there is no alternative, objects of our collective past return to remind us that all 
systems of production become outdated, all empires rise and fall, all social formations are 
overturned.  When discarded objects, charged as they are with symbolic and affective 
power, are welcomed into our perceptual field, they speak volumes, they tell stories.  
And, in doing so, they awaken history from a frozen dream, one in which the present is 
reified and the past out of reach.  It is this ability to restore a lost temporality by acting as 
a denaturalizing and historizing force that Benjamin implied when, in his essay 
“Surrealism”, he spoke of the “revolutionary energies that appear in the “outmoded”” 
(1986, 181).  In providing a temporal bridge, the gleaned object—as residue, refuse, or 
ruin—not only enables creative reconstructions and re-memberings of our shared past, 
but also invites us, in imagining a future of possibilities, to start creating them in the 
present.     
 
XI. 
We must, of course, be careful not to romanticize gleaning.  In an era of neoliberal 
capitalism, it is, indeed, a strategy of survival for the poorest of the poor.  Gleaning is 
most often undertaken when there are no other options.  By the same token, it is all too 
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easy to victimize and dis-empower the poor—to view their activities as purely those of 
desperation and helplessness.  Yet they too, like the proletariat, have the capacity for 
agency and even critical insight.  The point here is not that gleaning constitutes a political 
practice or a social movement or anything of the kind.  Rather, it is to show that everyday 
life, even for the most marginalized members of society, contains potential moments of 
revelation, however few.  Even when immersed in the most appalling conditions—
oppressed, impoverished, subsisting on scraps and garbage—people are still social 
agents, who reflect upon their condition, shape themselves, and actively engage with the 
world.  It is to suggest that 'consciousness' may be a process that happens even at the 
level of our involvement with the materiality of the world.  Experience, particularly when 
it eludes commodification, can plunge us back into the world.  For Benjamin, experience 
is something impoverished by capitalist modernity: as Flatley remarks in this regard, “A 
range of historical processes, such as urbanization, the commodity, new forms of 
technologized war, and factory work required people to shield themselves from the 
material world around them, to stop being emotionally open to that world and the people 
in it” (2008, 69).  Gleaning, if a compulsion, still compels people into contact with the 
world—in this case, with the refuse of the system, with the recent past of capitalism in 
the form of outdated and outmoded objects, and with other gleaners.  
 The creative dimensions of gleaning, such as those picked up by Varda in her 
film, affirm that human activity, if it is not praxis, is still a form of poiesis.  Stephen K. 
Levine defines poiesis, which is drawn from the ancient Greek word meaning 'to make', 
170 
 
as “the capacity to respond to and shape the world” (2005, 10).  He explains how, in 
Aristotle's conceptualization, poiesis gives rise to a form knowledge different from that 
produced by theoria or observation, and praxis or action (32).  Poiesis is linked to 
imaginative and creative aspects of human nature which, as Michelle LeBaron argues, are 
essentially “world-building and self-building” (2011, 11).  Human beings shape their 
environments as much as they are shaped by them, in a manner that some see as akin to 
artistic formation or aesthetic practice.  Praxis, as informed and committed political 
action which seeks, as Marx put it in Theses on Feurbach, is not to interpret the world 
but to change it, is inseparable from poiesis—the capacity to imaginatively engage with, 
be attentive to, and respond to the world.  This basic capacity is one that is damaged by 
capitalism, which in naturalizing itself, obscures the fact that the world is one of human 
making.  The revitalization of the imaginary is crucial to recuperating our role as social 
and historical agents.  Demystifying capitalism and exposing history as the result of 
human activities, reflexive or otherwise, is a first step.  This chapter has sought to show 
that gleaning potentially involves such moments of demystification—a small victory, but 
powerful enough in its own way—through revealing the shaping power of human activity 
to transform the discarded into things that sustain, nourish, and sometimes feed the 
imagination. 
 This is perhaps why Benjamin used gleaning as the metaphor for the work of both 
the historian and poet. “Ragpicker and poet: both are concerned with refuse,” he writes 
(2006, 108).  Like the gleaner, the historian ignores the official valuations of things—
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history, as we know, is that of the victors—and searches through the detritus of history.  
As he writes: 
Like a poor and burdened man cleverly picking through the rubbish 
of the previous day, the materialist historian selects from amongst all 
that is disregarded and from the residues of history. At the library he 
is unconcerned with what has been accredited as precious and 
valuable, but rather is drawn towards historical refuse. Waste 
materials are to enter into significant connections and fragments are 
used to gain a new perspective on history (2007c, 252). 
The figure of the gleaner, like that of the flâneur, reveals something about everyday life 
in late capitalism: as market imperatives penetrate previously uncommodified realms, 
existence becomes more and more precarious for all. 
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4. 
Beyond the Ruins of Representation 
 
 
I. 
The challenge of representing the ruins raises important problems for the artist and 
intellectual, film-maker and storyteller.  Ruins, as the wreckage of history, are as 
troubling as they are tragic.  Modern and contemporary ruins—including those of war, 
atomic bombings, dispossession, and genocide—where they exist, are often the 
reminders of unspeakable atrocities and immense human suffering.  In many cases, what 
is lost—human lives, hopes, dignity—leaves no trace.  In this context, when considering 
an aesthetic practice that can work from and respond to these ruins, we are faced with 
questions that touch upon the relation not only of form to content, but also of aesthetics 
to ethics.  Representation is intricately bound up with cultural practices of memory and 
mourning, of repetition and working through.  It is a social and political act, situated as it 
is within networks of symbols, ideologies, and cultural meanings.  Ruins, in particular, 
bring us to the heart of the debate surrounding the capacity, and even the necessity, of 
symbols to represent suffering and disaster.  They point to the very dialectic of absence 
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and presence, raising the question of what is missing—of what resists or exceeds 
representation.  At its limits, the production of ruins in the conditions of 'postmodernity', 
the logic of ruination at the heart of contemporary capitalism, points toward a deep 
cultural problematic of the possibility of representation itself being in a state of ruin.  
Entering into this debate will require that we consider a diverse array of texts, both 
literary and visual.  This chapter will therefore traverse a great terrain, taking us from an 
analysis of key Frankfurt School writings, contemporary critical theory, and architectural 
practice, to a consideration of the film Hiroshima Mon Amour, the artistic practice of Ori 
Gersht, and the photographs that form the series and book The Ruins of Detroit by Yves 
Marchand and Romain Meffre. 
 Ruins are embedded in what Julia Hell and Andrea Schönle call “a transhistorical 
iconography of decay and catastrophe, a vast visual archive of ruination” (2008, 1).  This 
is to say that, at least in the Western world, ruins are embedded within a viewing context 
that has a rich history.  As the subject of centuries of art, poetry, and photography—
mediums which privilege the visual, or at least the depiction of imagery—ruins are 
conveyed to us in particular ways, that is, through common and familiar tropes (some of 
which were discussed in previous chapters) which represent a symbolic stock-house that 
the artist draws upon to communicate his or her message, whether the latter be about 
history, the human condition, acts of god, and so forth.  This “visual archive” informs the 
very optics of ruination, or how ruins are framed and mediated for viewing, packaged for 
spectatorship.  Such a framing constitutes no less than a visual language which has 
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served to naturalize, or occasionally challenge, certain ideas about ruins and ruination, as 
well as to condition certain responses to catastrophe and horror.  Thus, the beholding of 
the ruin is, or can be, akin to the reading of a text invested with cultural meanings, 
references, and indicators, and our very senses are conditioned to understand and 
interpret that information in certain ways through the narratives provided us.  Yet the 
contradiction here is that in the contemporary world, dominated by news flashes and the 
ceaseless, rapid cycling of images of disaster, meaning is more often negated than 
proffered.  Ruins in a spectacle society become so many empty images—
decontextualized, fragmentary, and senseless—which dominate the sensory environment.  
This reinforces the beholder's passive position as a consumer of images of disaster: the 
spectator undergoes a visual bombardment that can ultimately lead to the anaesthetization 
of the senses and feelings of detachment, anxiety, malaise, or helplessness.  The response 
elicited by the form of such images is not active or intellectual, but rather emotive, or 
even defensive, as the subject tries to shield herself from shock, leading to a state of 
apathy and withdrawal that has profound political consequences.  
 Ruins, in other words, have a certain hold over or power to shape, for better or for 
worse, our social, political, cultural, and historical imaginary.  The representation of the 
ruins of our age profoundly impacts how we ascribe meaning to our world and how we 
understand its conditions of possibility, including the possibilities of collective action and 
of re-imagining the uses of space and the structuring of social relations.  As such, Hell 
and Schönle argue that “ruin gazing” deeply informs the ways in which we perceive 
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history and position ourselves in relation to both the past and the rapid transformations of 
everyday life in the contemporary world:   
Ruin gazing [...] involves reflections about history: about the nature 
of the event, the meaning of the past for the present, the nature of 
history itself as eternal cycle, progress, apocalypse, or murderous 
dialectic process. And as Benjamin—who transformed what Arendt 
called the “shock of experience” into an enduring and enduringly 
beautiful image—knew, the aestheticization of ruins is unavoidable 
(2008, 1). 
It is this very “aestheticization of ruins” that we are concerned to problematize, as it is 
the aesthetic representation of ruin that we are addressing when we use such terms as the 
“visual archive” or “optics” of ruins.  Aesthetics, as we will see, are bound up with 
politics—politics referring here more broadly to the contestation that surrounds cultural 
meanings and social practices, the struggle to define the possibilities of the present and 
the future in relation to the past, and the very battle over the political imaginary.  I argue 
that the representation of ruins in popular culture, specifically the media, is contributing 
to a widespread condition of subjectivity that I call the melancholy imagination—here 
used to signify a damaged state in which praxis, or our ability to actively shape ourselves 
and our world, is paralyzed.  While melancholy has its vicissitudes, and melancholizing 
is an activity that can be productive (as we shall see in depth in the next chapter), here it 
is taken to refer to a condition akin to a depressive state.  Politicizing ruins and 
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representation—or politicizing aesthetics, as Walter Benjamin saw it—is perhaps a 
necessary response to the aestheticization of ruins for those seeking to challenge the 
dominant frameworks of interpreting historical events and catastrophes in order to seize 
upon the possibilities of the present.  Seeking alternative forms of representing the ruins, 
which take into account the very ruin of representation, is an absolute exigency if we are 
to move beyond the depressive imagination—that condition of Left melancholy which 
Benjamin so lamented—and toward a meaningful project of social change.   
 
II. 
In 1949, Theodor Adorno saw the final absorption of culture into totalitarian society as 
an achieved reality, expressing itself in the horrors of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust.  For Adorno, as for many other critical theorists of the time, the forms of 
thought and rationality that produced the death camps were the same as those behind all 
cultural expressions: “The more total society becomes,” he wrote in his essay, “Cultural 
Criticism and Society,” “the greater the reification of the mind and the more paradoxical 
its effort to escape reification on its own” (1983, 34).  In such conditions, he perceived 
the near total cooptation of cultural production and critical thought, which reproduce, 
almost necessarily and without being conscious of it, ideology and forms of domination.  
For Adorno, the critical capacity of art, as a negation of the reification of subjectivity, 
had been lost; horror and beauty were two sides of the same coin.  Thus he pronounced 
his famous condemnation: “Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the 
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dialectic of culture and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (34).  
Later, in Negative Dialectics, he would slightly nuance his conclusion, acknowledging 
the primal right of suffering to self-expression, but the overall indictment nevertheless 
remained: “Perennial suffering,” he reflected, “has as much right to express itself as the 
martyr has to scream; this is why it may have been wrong to say that poetry could not be 
written after Auschwitz” (1990, 362).  Adorno's powerful critique of culture still 
resonates today.  His writings have clearly problematized the possibilities and the 
limitations of art for writers, artists, and architects alike living in the aftermath of the 
great catastrophes of the twentieth century, who have refused to read in the devastation of 
war and genocide the wholesale failure of aesthetic or artistic practice.  They have 
opened up a debate around larger questions regarding the place and the role of art within 
a society that has orchestrated atomic bombs and death camps, just as it has symphonies 
and literary masterpieces.   
 In her preface to the first edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism, dated the 
summer of 1950, Hannah Arendt, one of Adorno's colleagues, surveys the devastating 
debris that surround her, and makes a plea.  It is a plea that the ruins should not be just 
swept aside, cleaned up, built over, and forgotten—and the parallels here with 
psychoanalysis cannot be overlooked.  She writes: “We can no longer afford to take that 
which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply 
think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion” (1958, ix).  If we 
imagine we can sweep the past under the rug we are terrifyingly wrong, for it will return.  
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Slipping into forgetfulness, or into some idealized version of the past or future, is self-
deception: “This is the reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape from 
the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated 
oblivion of a better future, are vain” (ix).  Much like Sigmund Freud who theorized the 
unconscious as the buried ruins of psychic life containing active elements (the repressed) 
which inevitably generate personal disturbances, Arendt's larger social and cultural 
interpretation argued that scattered among the rubble of recent events were the fragments 
of that “subterranean stream of Western history” (ix), which would invariably 
resurface—just as they had surfaced in recent history—to produce fresh catastrophes.  
Her words echo Freud's on the unconscious; he writes: “All of the essentials are 
preserved, even things that seem completely forgotten are present somehow and 
somewhere, and have merely been buried and made inaccessible to the subject. Indeed, it 
may, as we know, be doubted whether any psychical structure can really be the victim of 
total destruction” (1973b, 276).  Thus, the metaphor of the historian/psychoanalyst as 
archaeologist, which both Freud and Arendt heavily draw upon, as a figure who must 
salvage these pieces of the past in the interests of remembrance: 
[The analyst's] work of construction, or if it is preferred, of 
reconstruction resembles to a great extent an archaeologist's 
excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and 
buried […] The two processes are in fact identical, except that the 
analyst works under better conditions and has more material at his 
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command to assist him, since what he is dealing with is not 
something destroyed but something that is still alive (Freud 1973d, 
275).  
For Arendt, representing the past must perform this work of uncovering ruins: “The main 
task of the historian as storyteller in Arendt's eyes is to descend into the rubble of 
history,” write Wessel and Rensmann, for it is there, as they go on to say, that “she hopes 
to bring to light the subterranean and presumably long buried histories” (2012, 200).  In 
much the same way psychoanalysis seeks to find an expressive outlet for the unconscious 
in the 'talking cure', or the method of free association, through which what has been 
repressed is gradually interpreted, “worked through,” and placed in relation to the past, so 
too must the ruins of history be excavated, represented, and, hopefully, understood to 
break the cycle of repetition.   
 Arendt, like Adorno, recognized the project of representation, or aesthetic 
practice, as state of ruin, yet she saw it as one which must ultimately be redeemed.  The 
Holocaust marked a radical rupture with all notions of history as linear, progressive, 
meaningful: as an event, it falls outside of existing frameworks of comprehension.  As 
Wessel and Rensmann point out, “Auschwitz, Arendt insists, irrevocably destroyed all 
contexts of meaning, including those that had given history its sense and continuity” 
(200).  What language could be used to describe the horrors of the death camps?  What 
words or concepts could make sense of the senseless?  What aesthetic form could 
transmit a knowledge of atrocity?  Arendt was aware of the limits, even the dangers of 
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representation, when it comes to the question of human suffering and loss—and to the 
related problematics of memory and forgetfulness.  Yet, in questioning the very notion of 
comprehension, she points as much to the necessity as to the limits of representation: 
The conviction that everything that happens on earth must be 
comprehensible to man can lead to interpreting history by 
commonplaces: Comprehension does not mean denying the 
outrageous, deducing the unprecedented from precedents, or 
explaining phenomena by such analogies and generalities that the 
impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt. It 
means, rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden which 
our century has placed on us—neither denying its existence nor 
submitting meekly to its weight. Comprehension, in short, means the 
unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality—
whatever it may be (viii). 
The danger, here signalled to by Arendt, is one first identified by Freud: the possibility of 
forgetting, and thus repeating the past—what he called by the name of “repetition 
compulsion,” that “compulsion to repeat, which now replaces the impulsion to 
remember” (1973a, 151).  As he writes: “the patient remembers nothing of what is 
forgotten and repressed, but that he expresses it in action. He reproduces it not in his 
memory but in his behaviour; he repeats it, without of course knowing that he is 
repeating it” (160).  For Arendt, denial and ignorance are the handmaids of forgetfulness; 
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thus, the event that produces the ruins must be understood in its uniqueness, its 
specificity, at the same time as the underlying general trends and tendencies are also 
recognized.  It must be intellectually confronted in such a way that its lived and felt 
dimensions are not negated.  The work of the storyteller, the artist, the historian is 
essential in this regard.  For understanding does not come immediately, from experience 
alone, but through reflection; it requires a labour, the work of tracing ”the disparate 
origins [...] the threads, historical events, and discontinuities in this historical genealogy” 
(Wessel & Rensmann 2012, 201).   
 Arendt is concerned with transforming the “shock of experience” into a 
meaningful form, which requires mediation, without, however, mitigating its affective 
properties—its ability to move us.  For horror to be understood it must be felt, even as it 
is mediated.  As Freud writes of the practice of transference in analysis, through which 
our unconscious conflicts are presently enacted in relation to the analyst, and the patient's 
illness is treated “as an actual force, active at the moment, and not as an event in his past 
life” (1973a, 162): “no one can be slain in absentia or in effigie” (1973d, 115).  The 
“therapeutic task […] consists chiefly in translating [the repressed material which thereby 
comes to light] back again into the terms of the past” (1973a, 162).  Raw experience must 
be translated into memory and the kind of understanding that brings with it the possibility 
of acting and choosing differently.  History, in other words, like the events of our 
personal (pre)history, requires a creative and active reconstruction in order to open up a 
transformative space; the ruins must be pieced together—a task full of dangers and 
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pitfalls—so that they can stand at once as an interpretation of the past and an overture to 
the future. 
 It is thus that Arendt and Adorno, faced with unimaginable horrors that struck 
upon their personal lives, as well as the lives of those that surrounded them, opened up a 
great debate, not only upon the nature of evil, but upon the aestheticization of ruins:  
Should the catastrophes of history be represented, and if so, then how?  What are the 
limits of representation?  How can loss be presented?  What aesthetic form does one give 
to disaster, horror, suffering?  What is the relation of aesthetic concepts, particularly that 
of beauty, to the ruins of our age?  Should horror be made beautiful, and if so, to what 
end?  What are the ethical demands of representation?  The responsibility of the artist?  If 
we take for granted ongoing cultural production, even in the face of absolute catastrophe, 
how can it be carried out in a meaningful and engaged manner?  How do we rescue 
representation from a state of ruin?  I would like to suggest that there is an absolute 
exigency to respond creatively to the state of ruins which confronts us.  Re-learning to 
respond, as we shall see, challenges the state of anaesthetization and political 
melancholia fostered by the mainstream media, everyday experiences of 
disempowerment, and the historical and political losses we have suffered.  Thus, I am in 
agreement with Michael Sorkin, whom, after considering the challenges and the 
possibilities of representation in a short piece, entitled “Between Beauty and Horror,” 
concluded: “The difficult question is not whether to make art but how...” (1993, 74).  
Such a difficult task demands of those who work today, in the midst of all sorts of 
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cultural, social, economic, and political ruins, the aesthetic labour of giving them form.  
For it is only in inhabiting, sifting through, and recomposing the ruins that we encounter 
the enigma of loss and the problematic nature of the past as past, that we confront 
melancholy and recover our relation to time as the agents of historical change.   
 In the cultural condition that some have termed postmodernity, in which the 
depressive melancholy imagination, cut off from both the past and the future, frozen in its 
depths of reification, envisions no possibilities outside the eternal instant, clear and 
present is the danger of what Nietzsche once called 'eternal return'.  The possibility of 
breaking out of the cycles of devastation that define our social and political world, as 
well out of the attitude of “self-satisfied contemplation,” identified by Adorno (1983, 34), 
requires that we reconsider aesthetics as a political tool.  Adorno and Arendt knew as 
well as any art historian that representation—the question of aesthetics and culture—
deserves to be taken seriously.  If not, it becomes deadly.  Art, as I hope to demonstrate, 
can play a role in restoring us to perceptibility—enlivening and re-educating our senses.  
Art serves as a model of praxis, which Marx defined as a revolutionary human activity, 
based in critical thought and practical action, which transforms both the self and the 
historical-material world.  Art, as a sensual engagement with the world, has the potential 
to be an active and transformative activity, one which teaches us to see the world in new 
ways.  Representation is a social process that can be reinvested, and it is starting from the 
ruins that this will be achieved.  
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III. 
In a society—supposedly liberal, democratic, and free—that shares an uncanny 
resemblance with the total society feared by Adorno and the totalitarian regime decried 
by Arendt in the early Cold War years following upon the Second World War, aesthetics 
is a matter of the utmost urgency.  In the Western world, images, which circulate like 
currency or commodities, are more than ever the vehicles through which public opinion 
is manipulated, war carried out, and political sensibility numbed.  These writers that we 
associate with the Frankfurt School identified in fascism the harbinger of a frightening, 
and soon-to-be-generalized, tendency toward subtle forms of social control, and the 
achievement of what Walter Benjamin (2007a) would term the aestheticization of 
politics.  Arendt, for instance, pointed to the power that a politico-aesthetics has to 
conjure up the symbols, narratives, and perceptions that appeal to the imaginary—that 
deep dimension of human experience—and seal it off from social reality: 
Before they seize power and establish a world according to their 
doctrines, totalitarian movements conjure up a lying world of 
consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind 
than reality itself; in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted 
masses can feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks 
which real life and real experiences deal to human beings and their 
expectations. The force possessed by totalitarian propaganda—
before the movements have the power to drop iron curtains to 
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prevent anyone's disturbing, by the slightest reality, the gruesome 
quiet of an entirely imaginary world—lies in its ability to shut the 
masses off from the real world (1958, 353). 
Arendt recognized the importance that the imaginary must be accorded in politics—had, 
in fact, been accorded by fascism and to disastrous ends.  Aesthetics and power were, for 
her, interwoven: in compensating for the “shocks” of material reality, fascism was able to 
make a home for the masses in an imaginary world.  Yet, while fascism no doubt 
achieved the alienation of the senses and the reification of the imaginary that enabled the 
emergence and survival of brutal and repressive totalitarian regimes, the capacity for 
perceptual and affective manipulation is one that has ultimately been perfected today in 
our hypermediatized advanced capitalist society. 
 In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Walter Benjamin, 
another associate of the Frankfurt school, argued that the imbrication of technological 
innovations with modes of sensibility and sense perception had enabled a “total function 
of art” (2007a, 224): its capacity to “prescribe” meaning, to elicit predetermined 
responses, and to distract on mass.  He argued, for instance, that the total identification of 
the spectator with the camera's lens—resulting in the absorption of subjectivity—leaves 
no room for critical distance.  For Benjamin, this total function of art was symptomatic of 
what he termed the aestheticization of politics, and its consequences were disastrous.  
Aesthetics, he saw, had been an intrinsic part of the war machinery that wreaked havoc 
across Europe and its colonies over the course of the first half of the twentieth century: 
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“All efforts to render politics aesthetic,” he wrote, “culminate in one thing: war” (241).  
For Benjamin, it is in the Futurists' manifesto that this maxim finds its clearest 
expression: war, aestheticized, promises the gratification of the senses, the exaltation of 
body in metallic prostheses, the beautiful realization of the technological capacity for 
creation and destruction.  He reads in this the ultimate form of alienation: “[Humanity's] 
self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an 
aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is 
rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art” (242).  As such, 
developing a new conceptual language of aesthetics, one that counters the impulses of 
fascism, becomes, for Benjamin, absolutely essential to “the formulation of revolutionary 
demands in the politics of art,” an issue to which we will later return (218).   
 From her contemporary perspective at the turn of the twenty-first century, Susan 
Buck-Morss, reading Benjamin, Adorno, and Arendt, recognizes the diagnostic value of 
their work for the social and political malaise of our times: she identifies in their writings 
a larger critique of modernity, one that “outlives fascism” (1992, 4).  Buck-Morss is 
particularly interested in the intersection of aesthetics and subjectivity, in the political 
implications of our interactions with the highly manipulated terrain of everyday life.  The 
empty parade of spectres that haunt the nightly news, that populate our television and 
computer screens, are an important part of the “phantasmagoria” of modern life—the 
spectacle which charms, distracts, intoxicates, and ultimately serves as a veil obscuring 
the real conditions of social life.  Images participate in the conjuring up of a 
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dreamworld—or a state of mystification—described by Buck-Morss as “an appearance of 
reality that tricks the senses through technical manipulation” (22).  This sophisticated 
capacity to act upon the collective imaginary through the manipulation of the senses she 
refers to as “technoaesthetics” (22).  The contemporary landscape is, for her, one of total 
aesthetic environments which, by way of overstimulating the senses, end up deadening 
them—an outcome that has a devastating implications for political subjectivity.  She 
writes of these techoaesthetic-scapes: 
The perceptions they provide are “real” enough—their impact upon 
the senses and nerves is still “natural” from a neurophysical point of 
view.  But their social function is in each case compensatory.  The 
goal is manipulation of the synaesthetic system by control of 
environmental stimuli. It has the effect of anaesthetizing the 
organism, not through numbing, but through flooding the senses 
(22). 
The problematizing of aesthetics, in all its political import, must return to the question of 
the senses as the “sensual condition of modernity,” as Buck-Morss argues: “Benjamin is 
saying that sensory alienation lies at the source of the aestheticization of politics, which 
fascism does not create, but merely “manages”” (4).  We need to rethink the very concept 
of aesthetics which, according to Buck-Morss, has seen the reversal of its original 
meaning: aesthetics, which in ancient Greece referred to the body, to the sensorium with 
its perceptual capacities, has become an anaesthetics, the cultural forms that bombard 
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and overwhelm that same capacity for experience: “Its goal is to numb the organism, to 
deaden the senses, to repress memory” (18).  This alienation of the senses, and, I would 
add, of the imaginary itself, is at the root of the depressive political melancholia that is 
the ruin of our time.  Indeed, the ruin of representation is, on the subjective level, the 
incapacity to represent to ourselves alternative models of social, political, and cultural 
life, and take action toward achieving them, for, as Marx noted, “what distinguishes the 
worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before 
he constructs it in wax” (1990, 284).  
 Susan Buck-Morss offers a way of thinking through the devastation wrought upon 
the imaginary by the alienation of the senses.  The anaestheticization she refers to is the 
sensual bombardment that is part of the very fabric of everyday life in the contemporary 
world.  It is not just life in the city—the daily onslaught of noise, crowds, traffic—but, 
moreover, the hourly parade of spectres that haunt the news, the images that populate 
billboards and television screens, that constitute the assault.  The volume and pace of 
stimulation outstrips the capacity for reflection.  Representation, rather than offering a 
frame of mediation, is experienced as direct and unmediated.  As such, the “battlefield 
experience,” summed up in the word shock, initially circumscribed to the traumas of war, 
now describes the general conditions of existence in all domains, encompassing work, 
leisure, and intimate relations:  
Perceptions that once occasioned conscious reflection are now the 
source of shock-impulses that consciousness must parry. In 
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industrial production no less than modern warfare, in street crowds 
and erotic encounters, in amusement parks and gambling casinos, 
shock is the very essence of modern experience (1992, 16). 
To explain the significance of shock, Buck-Morss returns to the “Freudian insight” that 
consciousness will shield itself from trauma by making itself impervious to the intrusive 
stimuli: under stress, consciousness acts “as a buffer, blocking the openness of the 
synaesthetic system, thereby isolating present consciousness from past memory. Without 
the depth of memory, experience is impoverished” (16).  Sensory bombardment results in 
the incapacity to register sensual impressions, which means that perceptions fail to 
resonate with the depth of experience, fail to connect us to the memories of the past and 
to the possibilities of the future.  Thus understood, shock is intrinsic to the alienation of 
the senses, which in turn has a “cognitive” impact: “exploitation,” in this sense of 
perceptual manipulation and injury, “paralyzes the imagination” (17).  
 Freud, one of the first to develop an analysis and concept of cultural trauma, 
likened it to the neuroses he witnessed in many survivors of train collisions (1967, 84).  
He described the initial experience of trauma by emphasizing its quantitative element—it 
is experienced as the overwhelming incursion of stimuli that disrupts the psychic 
economy and puts the pleasure principle out of service (92).  Trauma is an unassimilable 
shock which breaks through the psyche's defence mechanisms, resulting in a deep 
narcissistic wound which splits the ego (98).  The effects of the shock, however, emerge 
only after a period of latency; that is, they are not experienced at the time of the event 
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itself, but develop only after the fact—the unconscious remainder of the event later 
becomes active as the return of the repressed.  Unable or unwilling to properly recall and 
remember the event, and to mourn the losses incurred therein, the subject becomes mired 
in fixation and repetition-compulsion, a delayed response to catastrophe that takes an 
unconscious, and therefore, unmediated, form (95).  Trauma—particularly the feature of 
narcissistic injury and its strange economy of remembrance and forgetting—thus appears 
to be bound with the emotional formation of melancholia.  The melancholic is unable to 
properly mourn a loss that remains unconscious; she does not know what has been lost in 
or of the self (Freud 2006, 314).  In melancholia, one's capacity for self-love, and love of 
others—the basis of human attachments and emotional bonds—is severely diminished, 
just as memory is impoverished.  Shock, whether it is instigated by an accident, an event 
of war, the loss of a loved one, or even damage done to an ideal, deals a traumatic blow 
to the capacity of the imaginary to connect to the past, and therefore empties out the 
present and future possibilities. 
 And what is the paralysis of the imagination pointed to by Buck-Morss if not a 
depressive form of melancholy?  Melancholy is more than just a passing mood or a 
romantic and fleeting sentiment.  As a constellation of subjectivity, a configuration of the 
imaginary, it represents, in the words of Wendy Brown “a persistent condition, a state, 
indeed, a structure of desire, rather than a transient response to death or loss” (1999, 20).  
Melancholia is characterized by a state of inaction, of impossibility: it is the inability to 
remember, to reflect, or to formulate thought and action that most clearly signal the 
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atrophy of the depressed imagination.  When applied to the domain of politics, to the 
political imaginary, one could argue that melancholy of this kind results in the 
impossibility of political praxis.  As Brown, in her discussion of  Benjamin's concept of 
“left melancholy,” argues, it amounts to “a failure to understand history in terms other 
than 'empty time' or 'progress'” and resultant incapacity “to seiz[e] possibilities for radical 
change in the present” (20).  Praxis, understood as the capacity to actively shape and 
respond to the historical conditions of possibility in the moment of their presentation, 
depends on the realization that history is of our own making—that we are not ruled by 
the world of things; paralysis, is just the opposite: a fetishized form of perception which 
renders the subject thing-like and blocks the dialectical imagination.  If we locate the 
source of this melancholy in the sensory alienation described by Susan Buck-Morss 
which works through shock, then we will perhaps agree with the latter's conclusion that 
the act of recuperating praxis depends upon that “of restoring 'perceptibility'” or 
revitalizing the capacity for experience (1992, 18). 
 Within the context of the aestheticization of politics, representation itself is 
embedded within a logic of ruination.  Representation, as repetition and sensory 
bombardment, attacks our very aesthetic capacities of perceiving, interpreting, and 
making aesthetic judgements.  When the categories of phantasmagoria, reification, and 
shock are introduced into the conceptual language of aesthetics, representation is 
suddenly seen to be bound up with the production of ruins—the fragmentation of 
experience, the dissociation of history, the disintegration of memory, and, perhaps, above 
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all, the ruin of our capacity to imagine the world differently and to act accordingly.  We 
begin to understand the intimate bonds that link subjectivity and aesthetics, 
representation and political life.  Part of this process is the very way in which the ruins of 
history themselves are represented.  While the aestheticization of catastrophe has become 
a normalized and somewhat banal part of everyday life in the contemporary age, the 
reportage of disasters, especially of war, is nonetheless at the centre of a great debate 
with political, philosophical, and ethical dimensions that deserve our attention.     
 
IV. 
Susan Sontag (2004) addresses the controversy surrounding the photographic image of 
ruins, particularly those of war, in her essay, Regarding the Pain of Others.  The images 
of war or catastrophe, disseminated in newspapers and on TV, invite us to do just that, to 
become “voyeurs, whether or not we mean to be” of the suffering of others (34).  For 
Sontag, this begs the question of the moral force of images, a subject of ongoing 
controversy, not only within the academy and the literary world, but also within the 
related professions.  When speaking about the aestheticization of suffering, it is the 
impact of images, the way in which they aid or impair our capacity to respond, that is at 
stake. “War was and still is the most irresistible—and picturesque—news,” she writes 
(39); yet, the contradiction is that we fail to acknowledge precisely this aesthetic aspect 
of its representation.  When it comes to the “news,” to the documentation of historical 
tragedy, we expect realism.  That the ruins of war, from the moment they are framed by a 
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camera and frozen in time, are situated on the aesthetic registers of the beautiful, the 
sublime, or the picturesque is something we tend not to acknowledge or discuss.  The 
photograph or the newsreel drive home the suffering of others, while, at the same time, 
objectifying it: “Photographs tend to transform, whatever their subject; and as an image 
something may be beautiful—or terrifying, or unbearable, or quite bearable—as it is not 
in real life” (76).  The aesthetic form is, in other words, one that gives rise to varying 
responses on the part of the beholder, and we need to concern ourselves with these 
reactions if we are to understand the aestheticization of politics and the politicization of 
aesthetics. 
 Sontag asks us to acknowledge that when it comes to the photograph, the 
newsreel, the documentary film, we assume, expect, even demand, a certain realism.  We 
imagine that, as Mathew Brady, a Civil War photographer put it, “The camera is the eye 
of history” (quoted in Sontag, 41).  This is the assumption that the camera lens 
documents, that is it records and registers, rather than represents, reality.  The photograph 
does not just tell us what war is like, it shows us how it really is; it says: “This is what 
war does. And that, that is what it does, too. War tears, rends. War rips open, eviscerates. 
War scorches. War dismembers. War ruins” (9).  At first glance it seems straightforward, 
if hard to endure.  The images—of suffering, mutilation, ruination—are falsely assumed 
to speak for themselves; and, as Sontag argues, in doing so, they are said to call out for 
moral indignation, to demand our empathy.  We forget that the photograph is, in fact, a 
representation—that it frames, even stages, it subject matter, according to aesthetic 
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principles as much as to political intentions.  The image is, above all, a product, a 
commodity, and one of a particular set of socio-historical conditions: the context (of its 
publication or reception), the captioning, the content, all matter.  War, as Sontag 
demonstrates, is never generic, and the same image could be used to evoke a set of 
different responses according to the context.  But beyond the level of political discourse 
or rhetoric, beyond the particularities of a conflict, we must return precisely to the 
general question of the aestheticization of historical catastrophe: is it justified, and if so, 
to what end? 
 “The ultra-familiar, ultra-celebrated image—of an agony, of ruin—is an 
unavoidable feature of our camera-mediated knowledge of war,” writes Sontag (21).  The 
ruin has a second life, an afterlife, as image in the spectacle society of contemporary 
capitalism—transmitted, diffused, and reproduced millions of times per day.  The 
technological innovations that gave birth to film have transformed the context as well as 
the content of our understanding of the ruins of history.  For millions of viewers, seeing 
bombs explode or towers crumble is a nightly affair; disaster is packaged for mass 
consumption.  Realism, “the simple duty to record” (42) the gritty facts, facts that some 
might prefer to ignore, cannot be accepted as a justification in itself for turning ruination 
into a spectacle.  As Sontag notes, realism of this kind—the kind that puts burning bodies 
on the screen—is designed both to shock and to sell; it is as much about making profits as 
it is about raising awareness: “to ask that images be jarring, clamorous, eye-opening 
seems like elementary realism as well as good business sense” (21).  The idea here is that 
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we are in need of “shock therapy” (14): to be confronted with the raw, obscene details of 
suffering is to be awakened, necessarily if somewhat brutally, from our apathy, called 
upon to feel something.  But given that we are exposed to hundreds, if not thousands, of 
such images in our media culture, the task of holding the attention of the viewer requires 
constant upping-the-anti.  Sontag offers an insightful analysis of the impact of image 
bombardment on our capacity to respond: 
An image is drained of its force by the way it is used, where and 
how often it is seen. Images shown on television are by definition 
images of which, sooner or later, one tires. What looks like 
callousness has its origin in the instability of attention that television 
is organized to arouse and to satiate by its surfeit of images. Image-
glut keeps attention light, mobile, relatively indifferent to content. 
Image-flow precludes a privileged image. The whole point of 
television is that one can switch channels, that it is normal to switch 
channels, to become restless, bored. Consumers droop. They need to 
be stimulated, jump-started, again and again. Content is no more 
than one of these stimulants. A more reflective engagement with 
content would require a certain intensity of awareness—just what is 
weakened by the expectations brought to images disseminated by the 
media, whose leaching out of content contributes most to the 
deadening of feeling (82; my emphasis).  
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The outcome is anything but the “restoring of perceptibility” that Buck-Morss called for.  
As such, it is not surprising that Sontag, like many others, is skeptical of this reasoning.  
Shock is perhaps less a remedy than a tranquillizer—a point which Freud would readily 
affirm.     
 Yet, to imagine the news taking a form other than realism is troubling.  To tinker 
with reality is to put into question its authenticity.  To aestheticize horror in any way, by 
giving it form or beauty, is to commit a gross moral abomination, that of 'whitewashing' 
atrocity or 'romanticizing' suffering.  Thus, in the representation of ruins, realism is 
assumed to be that which constitutes the difference between art and life, between the 
painting and the photograph.  The photograph, as a document of authenticity, as a trace of 
reality, is not meant to be artistic: “Transforming is what art does, but photography that 
bears witness to the calamitous and the reprehensible is much criticized if it seems 
'aesthetic'; that is, too much like art” (Sontag, 60).  As Sontag points out, the horrors 
wrought by war and other catastrophes are the long-standing themes of religious 
paintings and icons, of works of literature and epic poetry, even of modern art, and thus 
have always, to some extent, been the subject of aestheticization.  It is only when they 
become the themes of photography—for photography is presumed to present the real 
thing, to freeze an objective moment in time—that the question of ethics in its relation to 
aesthetics is introduced: 
That a gory battlescape could be beautiful—in the sublime or 
awesome or tragic register of the beautiful—is a commonplace about 
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images of war made by artists. The idea does not sit well when 
applied to images taken by cameras: to find beauty in war 
photographs seems heartless. But the landscape of devastation is still 
a landscape. There is beauty in ruins (60). 
Beauty, in contemporary culture is, according to Sontag, a “disgraced notion” (60).  At 
best, we are mistrustful of beauty as naïve; whereas, where it concerns more seriously the 
representation of catastrophes, we condemn it as “frivolous, sacrilegious,” or even  
traitorous (60).  
 Why does Sontag raise the question of beauty?  In acknowledging a beauty in 
certain representations of ruins, Sontag directs us to the traditional register of aesthetics.  
She wants reiterate the difference between reality and representation, one that is being 
blurred by new technologies, social media, and 'reality TV'.  A photograph is, for her, a 
thing apart from reality.  It is not the event—something we tend to forget when 
representation takes the form not of 'high art' but of 'news'—real events, actuality.  For 
instance, in speaking of 9/11, she suggests that while the “site itself, the mass graveyard 
that had received the name "Ground Zero," was of course anything but beautiful,” the 
photographs taken of the event “were beautiful, many of them” (60).  There is a crucial 
gap here between art and life.  Ruins, in the romantic or classical view, gesture toward 
something outside of the picture frame—something beyond.  Ruins, in romantic paintings 
or epic poetic descriptions, were, above all, symbols—reflections on the human 
condition, on the passing of all the things, the folly of human endeavours.  Art has a 
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function which, according to this classical interpretation, is to impose form upon chaos, 
to provide a meaning to what seems senseless, to offer metaphors for different aspects of 
existence.  Thus, Aristotle, one of the earliest theorists of aesthetics, viewed tragedy as 
catharsis—the purging or purification of fear and pity.  While Kant, a key enlightenment 
thinker, argued that the beauty of art gives rise to “the free play of the imagination” in the 
act of contemplation (1987, 190).  Whether in providing an eduction of the senses, in 
evoking an emotional response, or in offering the aesthetic distance needed to see 
something from another perspective, art leads to some form of understanding, 
interpretation, or transformation.  In this sense, the medium itself—the artistic form—
plays a crucial role: that of transfiguration.  What is raw, painful, unassimilable becomes, 
if not comprehensible, at least bearable.  Art, understood in the sense of the power to 
symbolize loss and give meaning to sorrowful events, is part of what makes life liveable.    
 If we accept, with Aristotle and Kant, the potential role and functions of art, we 
are still left with the problematic of conceptually distinguishing art from representation, 
particularly given a context in which the boundaries of art are continually expanding, and 
in which what is and can be counted as art are in constant negotiation.  Of special 
relevance to this analysis are the questions: How do we differentiate the images—of 
ruins, catastrophe, disaster—that we see on television from those that adorn the walls of 
galleries?  Are there just grounds for such a distinction?  I would like to suggest that it is 
not only possible, but essential, to articulate these differences.  The goal is not to 
reinforce the separation of high art and popular culture, but rather to consider the ways in 
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which different aesthetic frames, viewing contexts, and the element of beauty, serve to 
condition the potential impact of representation upon the beholder.  A consideration of 
the photographic work, “The Ruins of Detroit,” of contemporary photographers Yves 
Marchand and Romain Meffre, will help to clarify the potential, as well as the limits, of a 
conventional, if contemporary, artistic approach to the ruins.  
 
V. 
Looking at the images that form the series, “The Ruins of Detroit,” by Yves Marchand 
and Romain Meffre (2012), one is immediately struck by their melancholy beauty and 
faded grandeur.  Massive and architecturally stunning buildings—train stations, banks, 
theatres, hotels, production plants—built at the height of prosperity in the early- to mid-
twentieth century, have been utterly transformed by the processes of decay.  These ruins 
are wondrous and strange; in them, there is a blurring of the lines between nature and 
culture, life and death: a theatre resembles a stalactite cave, collapsed mansions become 
part of the natural landscape, an abandoned plant has the air of a mausoleum.  There is an 
apocalyptic element to many these scenes: one has the impression that they were 
suddenly abandoned: drawers are flung open, papers scattered, chairs overturned.  The 
ghostly inhabitants of the recent past—dancers in the ballroom, business men in suits, 
factory workers punching in—though missing are still palpable: they have left behind the 
traces of themselves and their former lives.  Thus, the images seem to have frozen a 
moment in time; they are, as the artists put it in their official statement, “small pieces of 
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history in suspension.”  The photographs, which travelled the world in an exhibition and 
are now brought together in a book, went viral over the internet, attracting critical 
acclaim for the young French photographers, and reminding us that beauty—for the 
images are indeed breathtaking—still has the power to captivate our imagination.   
 The language that Marchand and Meffre use to describe their work is very much 
in line with the romantic conceptualization of ruins as symbols of transience.  They 
elevate Detroit, “capital of the XXth Century,” to the same level as the other great 
political and economic power centres of history.  As they write on their website for the 
project: “Its splendid decaying monuments are, no less than the Pyramids of Egypt, the 
Coliseum of Rome, or the Acropolis in Athens, remnants of the passing of a great 
Empire.”  The ruins of Detroit, whose rise and decline came to pass over the course of 
less than a century, are the remnants of a great vision, the industrial dream of Henry 
Ford, whose very fulfilment sowed the seeds of its own decay—when the automobile 
become the vehicle through which the middle classes fled the city for the suburbs, 
reinforcing already existing patterns racial segregation and prompting urban decay.  We 
are led to view the ruins of a political-economic order under which many of us lived and 
worked, and which we still remember and even mourn, as we would those of an ancient 
and immemorial regime.  The images, in other words, serve to estrange us from what is 
familiar: they teach us to see in the decrepit remnants of industrialization the monuments 
of a vision whose time is now past.  What was once merely an eyesore awaiting 
demolition becomes a melancholic spectre of the sorrowful fate of empire—bitter-sweet 
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and tragic, but meaningful.  
 The ruins, as they are presented to us in this photographic work, are mediated by 
the photographic frame.  They are representations of ruins; they function as narratives.  
Many of the scenes have obviously been staged, as they are in a state of carefully placed 
disorder.  Moreover, the living human presence—of squatters, homeless, graffiti artists, 
teenagers—who presently use the ruins as spaces for a range of everyday activities and 
functions, has been completely erased.  The artists have done what was necessary to 
achieve the most striking impact.  The images are works of art: constructions.  They 
reflect upon the moment they seek to document; they interpret the spaces captured by the 
camera lens.  Realism, in the sense discussed above of recording reality as it is, is 
revealed as subjective.  Marchand and Meffre are clearly not concerned with 'pure' 
documentation, if one can speak of such a thing, but with the epic qualities of history, 
and how these are embedded in spaces which can be made to speak their stories.  Yet, 
their status as works of art does not detract from their visual authority; rather it is quite 
the opposite: their very power to move us is a function of their beauty.  The ruins of 
Detroit come to us as visions of another place and time, almost otherworldly.  The quality 
of light, mood, colour, and composition are each indispensable to producing what is, 
perhaps, a sense of the sublime: we stand before these images of time at a standstill with 
awe and wonder.  The imagination is transported at once into the possible past and the 
possible future. 
 What is most interesting in these photographs is, for me, their capacity to 
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stimulate the imagination.  The ruins of Marchand and Meffre invite the beholder into the 
picture frame to imagine what is beyond the frame—to reflect upon the lives of the lost 
inhabitants, the causes of the decline.  They insist not only upon memory, but upon the 
possibilities of reclaiming or reimagining these spaces.  Beauty serves as a crucial 
mediating factor in this regard: it gives us the distance necessary to look upon what is 
familiar in a totally different way, opening up a space for new ideas.  This is the opposite 
of the visual and sensory bombardment discussed above as characteristic of the news 
media's coverage of ruins.  Beauty encourages the engagement and response of the 
faculties toward synthesis and understanding, rather than alienating them through 
repeated shocks.  Furthermore, the viewing context is structured: we are given a 
statement, titles, narrative, and contextual information which offer indications as to how 
these visual texts might be interpreted.  They are the layers that make of the image a 
palimpsest.  We can contemplate the images at our own pace, even come back to them 
repeatedly.  These photographs, through the vehicle of aesthetic mediation and framing, 
which draws upon the principles of the beautiful and sublime, aid us in recovering our 
sense of history, as change and possibility, by estranging us from the present—a 
naturalized social and political order which so often feels eternal and unmalleable.   
 Yet, we must also pose the critical question: in looking at these images, what 
possibilities are we invited to imagine, and are they embedded in the real social and 
historical conditions of possibility?  Like all representations, “The Ruins of Detroit,” 
reveal and conceal, illuminate and mystify.  What is invisible are the ways in which the 
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spaces of ruins have already been reinvested and put to different uses and practices—a 
home, a garden, a canvas, a skateboard park, etc.  As such, the artistic practice of 
Marchand and Meffre falls short of a genuine social engagement, in the fashion of Agnes 
Varda.  The emphasis on contemplating the beauty of the ruins can also detract us from 
the larger questions concerning the economic and political logic behind the devastation of 
Detroit, and from the movements to creatively resist this trend, for instance, by initiating 
a cooperative system of production, or reclaiming the factories as social housing or 
community centres.  Thus, beauty can function as another form of fetishism, of the 
aestheticization of politics, if it obscures the real social relations and implications that lie 
behind its subject, in this case, the production of ruination.  Marchand and Meffre's work 
reveals this complicated and contradictory tendency, in which beauty serves as a 
mediator, offering us the space required to contemplate that which is before us, but can 
reinforce the tendency toward the “self-satisfied contemplation,” which so concerned 
Adorno.  Thus, I would like to turn to a consideration of alternative forms of artistic 
engagement with the ruins, in particular, the film Hiroshima Mon Amour and the works 
of visual artist Ori Gersht, which rethink the relation of form to content in a more 
fundamental way by dealing with the themes of memory, violence, and catastrophe.  
 
VI. 
A fascinating aesthetic approach to catastrophe and its remains comes in the form of the 
artistic practice of the London-based Israeli artist, Ori Gersht.  Gersht's work, though it 
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deals with themes including the Holocaust and Hiroshima, the Israel-Palestine conflict, 
and the aftermath of war and occupation, does not stop at representing catastrophe 
through alluring images, although the tension between beauty and violence is, indeed, 
one that is explored in his work.  Instead, he is concerned with the larger ethical and 
social questions surrounding the remembrance and the representation of horror.  His 
interest is in trying to hold onto the memories of atrocity in the face of forgetting, so that 
as a society we might not repeat the past.  While his works often take the form of 
personal stories or abstract events of violence, they are deeply woven with the broader 
theme of the interconnectedness of history, time, memory, and landscape.  His art 
performs the function of shaking us out of complacency, by confronting us with violence 
that cannot be safely situated in the past, but erupts out of the fabric of everyday life.  
While his work is photo and video-based (he trained as a photographer), many of his 
pieces are reminiscent of old master paintings or have certain characteristics of 
installation work, drawing the viewer into a participatory interaction with the piece.   
 As curator of the Museum of Fine Arts Boston, Al Miner, suggests in a 
conversation with Gersht on the occasion of the survey exhibition Ori Gersht: History 
Repeating in 2012, Gersht uses the camera as a tool to enact or perform memory: it is a 
metaphor for the complexities of memory and our propensity to forget.  Gersht points to 
the fact that the camera, in a sense, fixes history by capturing what is in front of it and 
freezing the moment, yet this is inevitably a subjective process, full of omissions and 
even errors.  As such, he pushes the technology that he uses to its limits, in an attempt to 
205 
 
add layers of meaning to an image—to capture what is not always visible to immediate 
perception.  Playing with this tension between the visible and the invisible is just one 
such way that he addresses larger concerns about the perceptibility of history and 
violence.  In the conversation with Miner, Gersht suggests that he seeks out the point 
when the image begins to decompose yet still holds together.  Working at the frontiers of 
photography, he turns his images into ruins.  In his Ghost Series (2003), for instance, he 
photographs ancient olive trees in former Palestinian villages in Israel.  In overexposing 
the negatives, the images become faded, bleached, blurred, and ghostly.  Written over, 
they are metaphors for landscape and history, a palimpsest of violence, dispossession, 
and occupation.  As such, they gesture toward what cannot be captured by the camera: 
absence, the absence of the former Palestinian inhabitants that once tended those trees.  
In another series, Chasing Good Fortune (2010), manipulated with analogue and digital 
technologies to a poetic effect, Gersht photographs cherry blossoms in Japan.  The beauty 
of the images is, at some point, interrupted by the revelation that many of them were 
taken in Hiroshima, where the trees are growing in irradiated soil.  Once a symbol good 
fortune, then later, for kamikaze pilots who fell from the sky during the Second World 
War, the blossoms become traces of devastation and imperial decay.  The photographs 
are thus a form of memorialization, but one that is entirely different from traditional 
expressions.  
 As suggested, Gersht's work explores the tension between beauty and violence. 
Beauty can be immersive, Gersht explains, lulling us into a state of tranquillity.  It is this 
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passive state that his pieces disrupt, for instance when a bullet unexpectedly penetrates a 
pomegranate in a scene reminiscent of a Chardin painting (Pomegranate, 2006), or when 
the roaring sound of a falling tree breaks the silence of a wooded grove (The Forest, 
2005).  Viewers are seduced into witnessing an act of violence.  In the video installation 
Big Bang (2006) the sumptuous beauty of the still life of flowers arranged in a vase 
invites viewers to peacefully contemplate it.  When it suddenly explodes with a sharp 
noise, sending shards of glass flying, the unexpectedness of the event shatters their 
everyday perception, radically rupturing the continuity of their experience of time and 
place.  The piece, in other words, enacts the experience of terror itself: unpredictable, 
unknowable, outside of any framework of comprehension.  Like the traumatic event it 
arrives too soon; preparedness is not possible.  The content is not the retelling of horror; 
instead the work is structured in such a way as to plunge the beholder into the event of 
catastrophe which unmakes and remakes both subjectivity and the world.  It is a sudden 
awareness or awakening, the understanding of which can only come after the fact, if at 
all.  It is clear that the indirect approach of these works differs from more traditional 
representations of violence which are more explicit in their content and depiction of 
horror.  Yet, what lies behind them is ultimately Gersht's concern with our ethical being, 
for questions of violence and aesthetics are, as he recognizes, bound up with ethics.  His 
search to find new ways of approaching such events as the Holocaust through personal 
stories—for instance in Will You Dance For Me? (2011) or Evaders (2009)—is an 
expression of his desire that our capacity to ethically and emotionally respond to others 
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should be revitalized, not dulled, by representation.          
 In 1959, the film Hiroshima Mon Amour, a collaborative project of Marguerite 
Duras, who wrote the screenplay, and Alain Resnais, the film's director, was released.  
While the film is about Hiroshima, the catastrophic event of the atomic bomb dropped on 
that city at the close of World War II, it is also not about Hiroshima.  The film, that is, 
finds an indirect path of approaching its subject matter—a fictional encounter is used as a 
way into suffering.  The film is an exploration of what it is to remember and to mourn, to 
love and to suffer.  The storyline is of an affair between a Japanese man, who lost his 
family in Hiroshima, and a French woman, who lost her German lover at the close of the 
war in Nevers, France.  It is the woman's recounting, and to some extent emotionally 
reliving, of the events that followed the loss of her lover—her experience of madness, of 
public humiliation, of grief—that connect her with the man.  Thus, we only enter into the 
horror of Hiroshima peripherally, through the personal tragedies of the principal 
characters, in particular, that of the young woman who is trying to understand Hiroshima.  
Yet the fact that the events take place within the context of Hiroshima positions the film, 
and the problems with which it grapples, in a particular light.  As Duras writes: 
Nothing is “given” at Hiroshima. Every gesture, every word, takes 
on an aura of meaning that transcends its literal meaning. And this is 
one of the principle goals of the film: to have done with the 
description of horror by horror [...] (1961, 9; my emphasis). 
Duras did not want to reproduce the atrocity of Hiroshima, an event she describes as 
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“sacrilegious” (9); rather, Hiroshima's story is mediated, displaced in a metonymic 
fashion onto other stories, other acts, other narratives.  The beauty of the film is in its 
poetry—in the way that poetry never directly names, but rather multiples the associations 
and the possibilities of representation, to give depth and tone to its images. 
 As the film opens, we view the bodies of the man and the woman abstracted and 
twisted together in the act of love or the experience of pain—it remains unclear—
glimmering in a dust that recalls the atomic ashes.  Duras reminds us that our experiences 
are embodied—emotive as much as analytic—and lived in relation to others.  She is 
exploring “the relation between history and the body,” the difference between the living 
and the dead (Caruth 1996, 26).  One of the lovers, the unnamed woman, recites the 
horrors of Hiroshima in this initial scene in the bed, to the accompaniment of a montage 
of film and archival images of these horrors.  Interestingly, Duras writes:   
This beginning, this official parade of already well-known horrors 
from Hiroshima, recalled in a hotel bed, this sacrilegious 
recollection, is voluntary. One can talk about Hiroshima anywhere, 
even in a hotel bed, during a chance, an adulterous love affair [...] 
What is really sacrilegious, if anything, is Hiroshima itself (1961, 9). 
Duras suggests that it is, in one sense, easy to speak of Hiroshima.  Horror, banalized, or 
reduced to commonplaces as Arendt put it, can be spoken of anywhere.  Nevertheless, the 
event itself, the true horror of it, falls outside of any framework of understanding, even if 
the causes and consequences can be identified.  In the same way that Arendt and Adorno 
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argued of the Holocaust, Hiroshima disrupts all conventional notions of morality and any 
sense of order; it breaks with the continuity of history.  Indeed, Alain Resnais, when first 
asked to make a documentary about Hiroshima, declined.  As Caruth argues in 
Unclaimed Experience: “In his refusal to make a documentary on Hiroshima, Resnais 
paradoxically implies that it is direct archival footage that cannot maintain the very 
specificity of the event” (27).  He refuses the kind of representation that would be an 
erasure; instead, the film “explores the possibility of a faithful history in the very 
indirectness of this telling” (27).   Thus, as we will see, the characters talk and they do 
not talk, they try to talk and fail.  They are not able to get at Hiroshima through their idle 
chatter.  Abstractions mean nothing; rather, the only way they succeed in approaching the 
past is by finding a way to make it resonate with the depth of their memory and 
experiences—to connect to it in the present.   
 The film questions what sort of knowledge might be gained by means of 
representation.  The woman recounts to the man all of the things that she has seen of 
Hiroshima—the horrors, the suffering, the mutilation.  She has been to the museum, the 
hospital—seen the photographs, the reconstitutions, the artefacts, the explanations—and 
thus, she 'knows' Hiroshima.  The film shows us images of all that she names: piles of 
burnt stone, twisted metal, scarred bodies, video reconstructions of the event.  Everything 
is categorized, factual, serious, and sober.  The man repeatedly responds: “You have seen 
nothing of Hiroshima.”  As Caruth argues, “the problem with the woman's sight is not 
what she does not perceive but that she perceives, precisely, a what” (28).  The man is 
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thus suggesting that to view a representation of the event is not to understand the event, 
or better, that to understand the event, at least on this level, is not to grasp the horror of it.  
She knows nothing of Hiroshima: in other words, is it possible to know anything of 
horror?  What is one speaking of when one speaks of Hiroshima?  Does catastrophe 
translate into a knowledge that is transmittable through images, facts, remnants—through 
the ruins of Hiroshima?  And furthermore, what knowledge is possible to those who did 
not experience the events directly?  As Duras writes in the foreword to the screenplay: 
“Impossible to talk about Hiroshima. All one can do is talk about the impossibility of 
talking about Hiroshima. The knowledge of Hiroshima being stated a priori by an 
exemplary delusion of the mind” (9).  Caruth echoes this in suggesting that the film 
explores the idea of “a betrayal precisely in the act of telling, in the very transmission of 
an understanding that erases the specificity of a death (27).  Thus, it sets up an interesting 
dialectic between the impossibility but also the necessity of speaking about Hiroshima.  It 
points at once to the impulse toward and the limits of representation.   
 To speak of the ruins, to remember and represent them, from whence does this 
necessity to arise?  In the film the characters return almost compulsively to their 
wounds—to Hiroshima, to Nevers.  They struggle to remember, but memory does not 
come easily.  The curse their own forgetfulness and the forgetfulness of love; for them, to 
forget is the tragedy, the horror, of repeating loss.  Thus, the man and the woman both 
fight against what they feel to be their innate tendency toward oblivion, even as at times 
they seem to embrace it, and this struggle involves repetition of the past, and eventually, 
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the effort to represent it.  This tension, as Caruth has pointed out, could be located in the 
fact that memory itself is a form of forgetting—a necessary and inevitable forgetting.  
Indeed, only in madness, in refusing to acknowledge the difference between the living 
and the dead, is one “the faithful monument to a death” (31).  Returning to life means 
“the inevitable movement from the literal to the figurative sight or understanding,” from 
madness to symbolization (32).  Understanding comes at the expense of “the forgetting 
imposed by the sight and understanding of a larger history” (31).    
 In his 1914 paper, “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through,” Sigmund 
Freud introduced two concepts that would become critical to the cultural study of 
memory: repetition-compulsion and working through.  Freud offers us the important 
lesson that what we cannot remember we will inevitably repeat.  He writes:  
the patient remembers nothing of what is forgotten and repressed, 
but that he expresses it in action.  He reproduces it not in his 
memory but in his behaviour; he repeats it, without of course 
knowing that he is repeating it (1973a, 160). 
In the film, the woman repeats the emotions and actions that belonged to the time of her 
loss, even going as far as to address the man as her lost lover—a repetition belonging to 
the difficulty and painfulness of remembrance.  From a psychoanalytic perspective, one 
might say that love and transference are wedded, as the emotions of the past are 
awakened in those of the present—and thus superimposed.  Indeed, Freud, through his 
concept of transference, is putting forward the rather radical, if romantic, idea of “turning 
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love into a cure” (Kristeva 1983, 8).  As the woman narrates her story for the man, for he 
demands this of her, she is also working through it—and it is love, the emotional bond 
between the two, that is the medium in which this process unfolds.  She is remembering 
the past—her lost love, her public shaming, her subsequent madness—through the 
mediation of representation, rather than just at the level of the emotional economy 
through repetition.  She is placing the past in the past, at that same time as she regains it 
for herself in symbols, in a desiring language that is no substitute for her loss, but still 
resonates with affect.  Thus, part of the necessity of remembering is about the healing of 
wounds, the restoring of perceptibility, the reinsertion of one's affective life into 
historical time.      
 The horror of forgetting is an ethical impulse, intimately bound up with mourning 
and melancholia, with repetition and working through.  In his paper, “Mourning and 
Melancholia,” Freud (2006) argues that the process of mourning involves a gradual 
forgetting, in the sense of easing the ties and the attachments, the emotional investments, 
that connected us with the loved one.  Returning to life after a loss demands that the pain 
lessen in intensity and that we work through our loss.  Thus, to mourn is also in a sense to 
remember through the mediation of representation, to relegate the loved one to the world 
of symbols: to tell our story.  Freud sought to distinguish mourning from melancholia, 
which he defined as the disavowal of loss and the identification with the lost loved one.  
Melancholia, as he saw it, was a state without symbols or sense, a madness of suffering.  
While one might argue that it is also a form of remembrance, an unwillingness to let go 
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of the lost object, and thus an ethical position, Freud's writings show that such a 
faithfulness to the dead is a refusal to acknowledge the past as past.  Nevertheless, years 
later, in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” Freud (1973c) was less able to sustain 
the clear distinction between the two responses to loss.  Mourning is never totally 
completed, there is always an element of melancholia in our attachments.  Working 
through becomes a lifelong project of grappling with the senselessness of suffering and 
transforming it into something meaningful.  It is thus that we are returned full circle to 
that place between the impossibility and necessity of remembering in which the 
characters of the film are caught.  In acknowledging the forgetfulness of love and of 
history, which makes possible new beginnings, they also strive to remember, rather than 
repeat, the past.  At last they succeed in finding a melancholy symbol to mediate their 
losses, to recall the horror of them but from the distance of time: at the end of the 
screenplay the woman says to man: “Hi-ro-shi-ma. That's your name” and he responds, 
“That's my name. Yes. Your name is Nevers.”  
 Hiroshima Mon Amour is not a documentary film or a film about peace.  To make 
such a film would be, from the perspective of Duras and Resnais, problematically 
complicit with a “self-referential reversal” of its meaning: “the perception of Hiroshima 
itself, from the perspective of an international history, turns the very actuality of 
catastrophe into the anonymous narrative of peace” (Caruth, 29).  Thus, Hiroshima Mon 
Amour does not instruct us in the horrors of war.  It is not tell us what Hiroshima was 
like, does not reconstruct the events for us.  The film does not offer us the illusion of an 
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intellectual mastery or understanding of the event.  It is not realism.  What it is, on the 
contrary, is a film about representation, a reflection upon making a film about horror.  As 
such, it is self-reflexive: it acknowledges and reflects upon its status as representation and 
invites the viewer to do so also.  It does this in part through the relation of form to 
content: a film within a film.  The woman is in Hiroshima as an actress in an international 
film about peace.  In many of the scenes—of mangled bodies, protests against nuclear 
war—it is unclear to which of the two films what we are witnessing belongs.  Are these 
people the real inhabitants and victims of Hiroshima or actors?  Is their suffering real?  
Were the events captured by the camera's lens actually taking place in Hiroshima at the 
time of the filming, or were they staged?  In witnessing the production of the fictional 
peace film, we recall that what we are viewing is equally a construction.  We are 
reminded that representation is not the same as reality.  Yet, clearly, both Duras and 
Resnais felt there was a certain value in making a film, this particular film, about 
Hiroshima.  I would suggest that, for them, it is only by way of mediation—by the 
aesthetic frame that is present throughout—that the difficult themes of remembering and 
working through such a catastrophic event can be assumed.  In approaching this task in a 
conscious way, their work of art rethinks the very parameters of what remembrance can 
mean, just as it opens up to reconsideration the notion of collective memory and function 
of collective monuments.  It is to this issue of public memorialization that I would now 
like to turn.  
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VII. 
As a society, we are faced with the difficult question of how to collectively remember or 
memorialize many terrible and terrifying losses that have left behind only ruins.  As we 
have seen, there is an ethics and a politics of representing catastrophe, particularly when 
it comes to erecting monuments or other structures that are designed to commemorate a 
disaster.  What is to be commemorated, as much as what is left to be forgotten, reveal 
much about our ideological and political landscape.  While, with those historical events 
deemed worthy of remembrance, what exactly is remembered—the message they 
embody—is another thorny issue.  The knowledge gleaned from horror is, as we have 
seen, anything but straightforward.  Thus finding the appropriate public forms or artistic 
expressions for representing catastrophe becomes an important and often highly 
contested endeavour.  Indeed, the difficulties surrounding collective memory and 
mourning, even when rooted in the desire to learn from the past so as not to repeat it, 
rather than in an ideological agenda, are not easily resolved, as the past resists 
representation—what is gone, invisible, or eliminated stretches the very limits of the 
presentable.  Nevertheless, many artists and architects are rising to the challenge of 
rethinking their practice through the lens of cultural criticism.  Working against the grain 
of traditional memorial culture, which recounts history as something ultimately 
knowable, and most often from the perspective of the victor or through the dominant 
discourses of society, these practitioners have moved in the direction of “counter-
monuments” (Young 1992) and “negative monuments” (Merewether 1997).  In this vein, 
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many interesting responses to the practical and ethical dilemmas of remembrance are to 
be found in the various museums and monuments dedicated to antifascism and the 
Holocaust.   
 James E. Young (1992) discusses the complexity of memorial work in post-fascist 
Germany in his article, “The Counter-Monument: Memory against Itself in Germany 
Today.”  The intense debates over how to remember the Nazi past reflect the paradox of 
a state seeking to commemorate the victims of its own crimes, particularly given “the 
state-sponsored monument's traditional function as self-aggrandizing locus for national 
memory” (270).  Critics have remarked not only the monument's celebration of a 
triumphalist version of history, but also its problematic relationship with memory more 
broadly.  For one, there is their concern over the didactic function of monuments: what 
does a memorial commemorate and in whose name?  Another, is the fear that when 
memory is embedded in an object it is somehow evaded or mythologized (270).  Indeed, 
critics go so far as to express the concern that “conventional memorials seal memory off 
from awareness altogether” acting merely as compensation or consolation to the public 
(272).  In this context, a new wave of “counter-monuments,” which rethink the function 
of monuments and potentially revitalize public memorial culture, have emerged.  As 
Young writes: 
Ethically certain of their duty to remember, but aesthetically skeptical of 
the assumptions underpinning traditional memorial forms, a new 
generation of contemporary artists and monument makers in Germany is 
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probing the limits of both their artistic media and the very notion of the 
memorial […] these young artists explore both the necessity of memory 
and their incapacity to recall events they never experienced directly (271). 
Counter-monuments “challenge cherished memorial conventions” by undermining their 
own authority and permanence, for instance, in their self-destructing form, in their self-
reflexivity, or through intentional provocation (277).  Without providing any 
prescriptions, the artists creating such monuments respond creatively to larger social 
debates, exploring the complex interworking of memory and time and the relation of the 
present to the past. 
 One example that Young offers of a counter-monument is particularly interesting: 
Jochen and Esther Gerz's “Harburg Monument against Fascism.”  The monument, 
originally a 12 meter high obelisk plated with soft lead, invites viewers to inscribe their 
names upon the surface in a commitment to “remain vigilant” against fascism (274).  As 
names fill a section of the tower, it is lowered into the ground during public ceremonies, 
until it eventually disappears, “return[ing] the burden of memory” and the work of 
resisting fascism to those who have signed it (276).  Rather than performing the task 
commemoration, and thereby absolving the citizens of responsibility, the monument 
demands their direct participation: “In its egalitarian conception, the counter-monument 
would not just commemorate the antifascist impulse but enact it, breaking down the 
hierarchical relationship between art object and its audience” (279).  It is, as Young 
suggests, antifascist not only in its message, but in its very form, countering what the 
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Gerzs see as the “fascist tendencies in all monuments”:      
Their monument against fascism, therefore, would amount to a 
monument against itself: against the traditionally didactic function of 
monuments, against their tendency to displace the past they would 
have us contemplate—and finally, against the authoritative 
propensity in all art that reduces viewer to passive spectators (274). 
The Gerzs do not shirk from the ethical necessity of remembering, but they shift the locus 
of memory away from authoritative representatives back to the people, at the same time 
demystifying the traditional role of monuments.  Their piece does not offer an easy 
version of the past to its beholders, rather it confronts them and demands of them a 
response.  Eventually vanishing from the landscape, the monument also enacts the 
complexities of the desire to build anew but, at the same time, never to forget, to bury 
fascism but to mark the permanent disappearance of its victims: “The best monument, in 
Gerz's view, may be no monument at all, but only the memory of an absent monument” 
(279).  An absent monument, a seeming contradiction in terms, inscribes the conflicting 
and irresolute impulses that drive commemoration.  Indeed, putting absence at the heart 
of memorialization might, in fact, be the best possible response: “How better to 
remember forever a vanished people than by the perpetually unfinished, ever-vanishing 
monument?” (277). 
 In a similar manner, contemporary architects, rethinking the ways in which form 
expresses content, have created a series of 'negative monuments'.  The recognition of the 
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relation between subjectivity and space—one that is evocative of memory, feeling, and 
thought—has led them to take into consideration the relationality of space—that is, the 
visitor's interaction with the spatial form and the responses that interaction evokes—in 
the design of such monuments.  As such, “negative monuments,” as discussed in the first 
chapter, “seek to frame what is missing—a voice or the space of loss” (Merewether 1997, 
33).  Such monuments gesture to loss as something irrecuperable, to horror as an 
experience that exceeds intellectual categories.  Beyond producing commonplaces, 
'negative monuments' aim at maintaining the specificity of the event.  Thus, working with 
the ruins in contemporary architectural practice means pushing the possibilities of artistic 
expression in order to circumnavigate the dialectic between the necessity and the 
impossibility of representation. 
 Michael Sorkin (1993), in his short piece “Between beauty and horror,” discusses 
the various dilemmas and competing demands that arose in the conceptualization and 
realization of the US National Holocaust Memorial Museum.  The underlying dictates of 
the project, outlined by the Memorial Council, centred around “the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust and the moral obligation to remember it” (74).  As Sorkin points out, this is 
anything but a straightforward and simple task: “The central paradox of all Holocaust 
commemorations is the impossibility of representing the unrepresentable, of depicting a 
horror beyond imagination: both to specify and to generalize risk diminishing the 
unmeasurability of its evil” (74).  On the one hand, such an act of commemoration runs 
the risk of banalizing evil, and on the other, of reawakening the trauma.  Thus, the 
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architect must carefully consider the relation of the form to the content, must find ways to 
make representation stretch its very limits.  As Sorkin wrties: 
What is to be the relationship between the beauty and the horror, 
between container and contained, between the container and its 
context. Shunning abstraction, the risk is kitsch. Perhaps the only 
way to approach the unrepresentable is to represent the impossibility 
of representing it, turning representation inside out to confront this 
horrific sublime (74). 
 For Sorkin, architect James Freed and his associates succeed in finding an 
aesthetic form that reflects its content—the museum monument to the Holocaust is 
discontinuous, estranging, incoherent: “Perhaps fitting for a problem that admits of no 
solution, the building is iconographized divergently, juxtaposing one mode of meaning 
with another, collaging to produce a measuredly inconsistent whole” (74).  It does not 
aim at a false synthesis, at comprehension through commonplaces.  Instead, the architect 
seeks to make the horror of the Holocaust resonate with the beholder, while at the same 
time, offering a certain distance through poetic framing; he “alternates abstraction and 
figuration, passages of repose and contemplation with the insufficient horror of 
representation” (74).  It is in these metaphorical overtures that the very form leads the 
visitor outside of its limits, signalling to what is beyond the represented.  In leaving gaps, 
blanks, things unstated, the viewer-participant is called upon to bring something of 
herself to the work.  It is her imagination, her capacity for feeling and for empathy that 
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lifts her toward understanding: “In the most overtly artistic passages at the Holocaust 
Memorial, Freed looks to a sort of minimalism as a transport to the sublimity of the 
impossible” (74).  
 
VIII. 
  
I would like to return to Walter Benjamin's “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”  Here 
he presents us with the image of the “Angelus Novus,” the angel of history, who sees the 
past as “one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it 
in front of his feet” (2007b, 257).  What is strewn behind us is a century of the most 
unimaginable ruins.  Is it any wonder that, amidst such ruins, we are paralyzed by the 
very weight of history?  Is it so surprising that the imaginary is steeped in a depressive 
form of melancholia—unable to adequately mourn the past, and equally unable to turn 
toward the future?  Benjamin's melancholic image of history does not exclude the 
possibility, however remote, of change in the present.  The key to transformation lies in 
an understanding the historical conditions of possibility, a task which requires the critical 
work of interpreting the past and representing the ruins.  “The past,” he writes, “can be 
seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is 
never seen again” (255).  The imagination needs to be free to seize the moment of 
possibility when it arises, which requires working-through the losses of history, whatever 
they may be.  As a collective, we need to find ways of representing the ruins that do not 
banalize horror nor reduce catastrophe to commonplaces.   
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 As we have seen, artistic practice can find creative ways of reflecting upon or 
piecing together the ruins of our time.  In doing so, such works of art, whether literature, 
painting, film, or architecture, offer us a framework for the critical contemplation of the 
past—a perspective from which to view history as always in-the-making.  In a period in 
which we so often feel “stranded in the present,” to recall the concept of Fritzsche's 
(2004) book discussed in the first chapter, art can help us understand our collective 
history, mourn our losses, and acknowledge the structures of possibility that exist in the 
present.  Aesthetic practice can be responsive to the historical and material conditions in 
which we live, and can offer solutions to our many of greatest cultural challenges.  The 
complex challenges of remembering, mourning, and representing the past are not 
insurmountable obstacles, rather they require fresh approaches, just a handful of which 
have been discussed in this chapter.    
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5. 
A Melancholy Aesthetics 
 
 
I. 
This chapter seeks to explore larger philosophical questions surrounding the relationship 
between ethics and aesthetics in the hope of making relevant an 'aesthetics of the ruins' to 
the pressing issues that characterize the contemporary socio-political landscape.  Over the 
past several decades, the societies of both East and West alike have undoubtably suffered 
profound political, social, and economic traumas—related to the Cold War, civil wars, 
colonization, genocide, and dispossession.  The postwar era is one that is awash in debris 
which—like visible question marks or imperatives poised upon the landscape—demand 
some sort of active response, be it historicization or working-through.  I would like to 
argue that one of the possible avenues for art is to effect a re-engagement with socio-
political issues by intervening in these ruins.  An artistic practice in and from the ruins 
can raise important questions relating to historicity, in particular those surrounding how 
the past informs both the present and the possibilities for the future.  While there is 
undoubtedly a melancholy side to this work, dealing as it does with historical losses, 
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cultural traumas, and damages done to the political imaginary, I would like to suggest 
that it is, nonetheless, anti-depressive in character, and rather stimulative of agency.  An 
aesthetics of the ruins is an aesthetics of fragments, traces, shattered bits, which reclaims 
the dissociated and disavowed parts of the past, and for some, redeems them.  As for me, 
I prefer the more modest claim that such work is inspiring and hopeful, pointing 
insistently as it does to the gap between what has been achieved, for better or worse, and 
what is still possible.  Whether this is, in its own way, a radical task, I leave that to others 
to judge, but it is undoubtedly political.    
 This work is driven by a concern to revisit the state of socio-political malaise that 
has especially afflicted the core capitalist countries of the West, a malaise which 
characterizes what has been called the “postmodern condition” (Harvey 1990) or the 
“cultural logic of late capitalism” (Jameson 1991).  As both Harvey and Jameson have 
noted, while postmodernism or late capitalism, whose origins they situate in the early 
1970s, is a complex and contradictory process, certain predominant trends can, 
nevertheless, be discerned.  Among those discussed in previous chapters—the emergence 
of a global market, flexible ('postfordist') accumulation strategies, neoliberal 
restructuring, and austerity measures—are important transformations of the ideological 
and subjective terrain—the imaginary of capitalism.  The 'postmodern turn' has much to 
do with changes to our experience of time and space and how these find cultural 
expression.  Important for our purposes is the transformation in the sense of historicity.  
The postmodern 'moment' is obsessed with the now; it is characterized by its detachment 
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from the past, which only returns in the guise of commodities or spectres, 
decontextualized and thus emptied of any significance.  The loss of historicity naturalizes 
capitalism—it is no longer understood as a social and historical process, in which we are 
all implicated and which we could, thus, challenge and change.  As Jameson argues: “the 
breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities 
and intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis” (27).  The present 
becomes isolated, cut off, from the past and from the future.  We become, as Peter 
Fritzsche (2004) puts it, 'stranded in the present'.  Beyond these generalizations, there are 
real, concrete historical events which must also be acknowledged, particularly for those 
on the Left, as constituting deeply felt losses that have done much to impoverish the 
imaginary.  The decline of the Soviet Union, as we shall see, is one such blow to the 
political imagination, but one could also point to the devastatingly hostile climate toward 
labour in the last few decades, as well as the loss of spaces of Leftist organizing and 
practice and the memory of collective struggles.  How such losses are tied to the 
discrediting of the 'project of modernity'—with its ideal of emancipation and the 
betterment of the human condition through social, political, and technological progress—
will be seen below.     
 I would like take Zizek's definition of ideology as “generative matrix that 
regulates the relationship between visible and non-visible, between imaginable and non-
imaginable” (1994, 1) and apply it to the imaginary, a concept that is perhaps more 
accessible, or at least more applicable to the present study.  The political imaginary is, in 
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this sense, productive of forms of political agency and identity, and governs precisely this 
relation between the possible and the impossible.  That we live, as Jameson (1991) 
framed it, in an era when it is easier to imagine the end of the world—think of all of the 
apocalyptic films that have come out in recent years—than a more modest change in the 
mode of production, the end of capitalism, speaks to the limited nature of our framework 
of the possible.  Furthermore, the fact that we are headed toward an environmental 
catastrophe—one that threatens to unfold in the manner of many of those apocalyptic 
scenarios—yet remain prostrate before it, points to the insanity of such a position.  It is 
suggestive of a profound malaise of the imaginary that has impoverished our 
understanding of the political terrain, our sense of historicity, and our ability to act, even 
in times of crisis.  I would like to argue that this pauperization of the imaginary can be 
theorized in terms of melancholia in the Freudian tradition—which is to say that the 
starting point of this analysis must be an elaboration of loss and our relation to the past.   
 
II. 
For Freud (2006), writing in 1917 his contemplative study “Mourning and Melancholia,” 
melancholia is highly enigmatic.  While symptomatically and behaviourally speaking it 
presents a similar picture as that of mourning (depression, loss of interest in the outside 
world, inhibition, incapacity to find substitute love-objects), there are some puzzling 
differences.  Unlike mourning, where loss is consciously recognized, and the bonds that 
once bound the ego to its love-object are gradually loosened by the knowledge and 
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recognition of the absence of the beloved, melancholia disavows such loss.  Indeed, 
though the melancholic, much like the mourner, has perhaps has suffered a loss in the 
external world, some set-back in life, or damage to a cherished ideal, often this loss is not 
clearly identifiable.  It is rooted in the furthest reaches of the unconscious, and is thus 
inaccessible to the reality principle.  Thus, in melancholia, one does not know what has 
been lost in or of the self (2006, 314).  As Freud suggests: “In mourning, the world has 
become poor and empty, in melancholia it is the ego that has become so” (313). The 
internal impoverishment, the lack of self-esteem, and the heavy self-reproach that 
characterize what remains of the psychic life of the depressed, all point toward this 
fundamental loss of the ego, of a sense of self.  In melancholia, the lost object, highly 
invested with libidinal energies, has been incorporated or introjected into the structure of 
the ego itself.  Here it is preserved, entombed, protected against reality testing.  Any 
ambivalence in the attachment, including the reproaches that were destined for the object, 
are turned back upon the ego, expressing themselves in “the indubitably pleasurable self-
torment of melancholia” (318).   
 Interestingly, Freud traces the mechanism of incorporation back to the 
identification with the object which characterizes of our earliest attachments, the mimetic 
processes by which we become subjects.  We might “suppose that the character of the 
ego is a precipitate of abandoned object cathexes and that it contains the history of those 
object-choices,” writes Freud a bit later in 1923, in “The Ego and the Id” (2001, 29).  
Moving away from a strictly normative view of mourning, Freud points to the idea that 
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subjectivity itself is built upon a series of ruins—the remnants of our earliest love, our 
first relation with the other: it is a palimpsest.  Identification is followed by those “series 
of splittings […] birth, weaning, separation, frustration, castration” that are, for Julia 
Kristeva, the “indispensable condition for autonomy” (1989, 132).  Melancholia thus 
describes a crucial moment in process of individuation in each person's history, part of 
“the essential dramas that are internal to the becoming of each and every subject” 
(Kristeva, 132).  As Jonathan Flatley explains, Freud recognizes the way that loss is not 
only 'out there' in the world, but “also interior to subjectivity” (2008, 42).  Loss is part of 
our very constitution as related, dependent, emotionally attached beings.  
Intersubjectivity is at the heart of what it is to be human, as psychoanalysts like Jean 
Laplanche (1999) emphasize.  The loss of the object, of the other, is what founds desire; 
it is what constitutes the desiring subject, able to make attachments and take an interest in 
the world.  Loss, from this perspective, leaves a gap, making us incomplete and open, 
destined to seek out others, to love, to learn, to struggle, and to symbolize.  This 
trajectory of thought ultimately leads Freud, in his more poetic moments, to gesture 
toward the notion that perhaps all mourning is, in some sense, impossible.  “There is,” 
summarizes Flatley, “no nonmelancholic loss, no mourning that leaves the ego 
unchanged” (49).  In the pivotal role accorded to loss, the straightforward distinctions 
between mourning and melancholia, like those between self and other, collapse, undoing 
any normative formulations found in Freud's early theoretical explorations.   
 Nevertheless, melancholia has been, as suggesed above, used to describe an 
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ailment of agency or praxis, an inability to engage meaningfully with the world and to 
inscribe oneself within history.  Melancholia, when it is of a certain quality or intensity, 
can be debilitating.  The “preoccupation with this loss can become a problem […] 
inasmuch as it leaves us living in the past, unable to create new emotional ties” (Flatley, 
51).  Melancholia, in this sense, is akin to a depressive state, of the kind diagnosed by 
modern psychiatry, whose features, as outlined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders – IV (DSM-IV), include: “disorientation, a diminished ability to 
think and concentrate, an impoverished sense of the past and the future, fatigue, negative 
thoughts about the self” (Ross 2006, xx).  “The depressed person,” Julia Kristeva writes 
in more metaphorical terms, “is a radical, sullen atheist” (5); which is to say, she has lost 
all sense of meaning, all faith in the world.  As such, the world ceases to stimulate her 
interest and her passion, to awaken her desire.  Unresponsive, she engages in a 
symptomatic repetition of behaviour: she goes through the motions belonging to a past 
that no longer exists.  The depressed is an exemplary figure of one who has made 
mourning a permanent, backward-looking orientation, who is steadfastly devoted to the 
dead; as Judith Butler notes, he unconsciously clings to “what is lost, absent, or dead,” as  
though “one would rather will nothingness than not will at all” (1998, 187).  This 
reification of one's relation to the world signals closure, a kind of living death.  Such a 
depressive melancholia results from the failure to come to terms with loss; in fact, it is 
the foreclosure of loss, and as such, it means the refusal of desire, for the depressed 
person hangs onto an illusion of completeness, denies the separation which would lead 
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him into emotional engagment and toward symbolization, which is unfurled from the 
void.  In this context, 'working-through' is a process, less of surmounting loss, than of 
making loss bearable: “psychoanalysis is about learning to invoke, manage, and happily 
live with ghosts” (Flatley, 62).  Analysis is a ruin-work of collecting fragments, naming 
them, and putting them in their place (which is the past), and building anew (in the 
present).  It is not about forgetting, but rather, about changing our relationship to the past.   
 
III. 
Does the distinction between melancholia and depression characterize the difference 
between the affective, imaginary, aesthetic, and political terrain of modernity and 
postmodernity?  Is depression the prevalent mood—mood defined broadly as an 
“atmosphere in which intentions are formed, projects pursued, and particular affects can 
attach to particular objects” (Flately, 5)—of 'postmodern' society?  If so, what does that 
tell us?  I suggest that the use of the concept of depression, as a priveleged category with 
which to understand affective life, is symptomatic of the impoverished imaginary of our 
times.  It constitutes a radical rupture with the richness and depth of the concept of 
melancholia, which can capture a whole spectrum of states, experiences, and 
relationships to loss.  In lieu of any attempt to assess the state of thought, agency, 
imagination, and praxis through historical experience and intersubjectivity, the recourse 
to the psychiatric formulation of depression encourages an understanding of malaise 
detached from social and political realities.  The critique that psychiatry 'dementalizes' 
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the subject, nearly doing away with the very idea of subjectivity (which searches for 
meaning), to replace it with the functioning of the brain, as discussed by Ross (xxvi), 
captures some of what is at stake.  While the category of depressive disorder used by 
psychiatry may aptly describe the symptoms—loss of interest, hopelessness, problems 
with concentration and memory—this does little to address the underlying causes nor to 
position them in a broader contextual framework.  As such, the discourse of depression, 
in disavowing loss, fails to identify possible sites of transformation or resistance.  By 
contrast, the category of melancholia still carries a tremendous critical power, one 
recognized early on by major theorists like Walter Benjamin.  Thus I disagree with the 
very premises of Christine Ross' assertion that “the understanding of mental illness as a 
form of subversion, and any practice associated with this understanding—be it art or 
psychoanalysis—collapses in the depressive paradigm” (2006, xxvii).  First of all, 
melancholia, I will argue, should be viewed less as a “mental illness” than as an aesthetic 
and political approach to malaise—an interpretive framework which enables a tracing of 
its causes and consequences.  Melancholy, as contemporary theorists, including Flatley 
(2008) and McNally (2001) tell us, is a methodology—a key point to which we shall 
return below.  It is a form of critical practice.  Second, to claim that psychoanalysis 
“collapses” in the face of depression is a defeatist position that only reinforces the 
psychiatric paradigm, rather than thinking against it.  The critical power of melancholia, 
pointed to by Freud and Benjamin, and so integral to the modernist aesthetic, can be 
recuperated.  I would like to show in this chapter how an 'aesthetics of the ruins', even if 
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it exists only as a marginal practice, performs such a recuperation, and how it differs 
from the 'aesthetics of disengagement' theorized by Ross.    
 In her book, The Aesthetics of Disengagement: Contemporary Art and 
Depression, Christine Ross (2006) argues that much of contemporary art should be 
viewed as an enactment of the veritable pandemic of depression afflicting Western 
societies.  Ross argues that depression has become a central paradigm shaping social, 
artistic, and, most importantly, subjective formations: “depression is now one of the 
privileged categories through which the contemporary subject is being defined and 
designated, made and unmade, biologized and psychologized” (xvii).  Postmodern art 
must be viewed through this prism, as participating in and “acting out of states of 
depression encompassing boredom, stillness, communicational rupture, loss of pleasure, 
withdrawal, the withering of one's capacity to remember and project, to dream, desire, 
and fantasize” (xv).  Depression is less the content of the artwork than the form itself, 
which is characterized by “the slowing down, near immobility, opacity, and looped 
repetition of the image” (xv).  Key features of this 'aesthetics of disengagement' also 
include the performativity of such psychologically 'pathological' conditions as repetition, 
inihibition, immobility, self-absorption, and fixation, all of which, in turn, presuppose a 
spectatorial subject whose faculties and capacities are impoverished and devitalized (xv).  
For Ross, contemporary aesthetics bespeaks the depreciation of the relational, the 
disintegration of social bonds, and the loss of non-verbal, affective forms of 
communication with others, even if it does so in a non-reflexive and unintentional—that 
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is, symptomatic—manner (xix).  Performativity, in other words, does not equal 
interpretation or analysis: “[Contemporary art] participates in what it denounces so as to 
criticize it from within, inserting the viewer into the devaluation of connectedness 
without offering any critical distance from which to observe and act on this decline” 
(xxiii).  Thus, the beholder is plunged into depressive experience, but without the 
possibilities of insight—“immersed,” she is, nevertheless, “at a loss as to what causes 
such an alienated state” (xxiii).  It is artwork without emancipatory intention, intervention 
without analysis, which, Ross suggests, raises all kinds of questions as to what is critical 
and subversive in aesthetic practice (xxv).    
 Drawing on Alain Ehrenberg's periodization, Ross situates the ascendency of the 
depressive paradigm in the 1970s when social norms underwent a major transformation, 
and self-sufficiency, independence, and individualism emerged as the new ideals 
(xxiii)—a period which, it is worth noting, corresponds to that of 'postmodernism' or 'late 
capitalism', in which neoliberal ideology and governance dominate.  She argues that the 
loss of previous forms of social regulation, which emphasized discipline and conformity, 
resulted in a measure of freedom, but also a crisis of identity arising from the pressures 
for perpetual self-creation divorced from the social realm of interdependence and 
collectivity.  She reads into much contemporary art practice an enactment of this 
struggle: “Depression—the insufficiency of self—could well be, as recent sociology has 
suggested, the fatigue that results from the individual's compliance with neoliberal norms 
of independence based on the demand for the reiterated creation of self so strongly 
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formulated in Lum's [contemporary art] installation” (xxii).  Ross is well aware that 
depression is particular to the current socio-historical context, and to the particular 
demands made upon the individual in 'postmodern' society.  She quotes Elisabeth 
Roudinesco: “In democratic countries, everything is as though no rebellion is possible, as 
though the very idea of social, even intellectual, subversion had become illusionary […] 
Hence the sadness of the soul and the impotence of sexuality, hence the paradigm of 
depression” (xxiv).  Ross concludes that psychological resistance is no longer subversive: 
depression has no political content; instead, it signifies the end of politics.  It is a sad 
acceptance of the state of things in which change is no longer viable or imaginable.  She 
not only diagnoses, but reinforces, a “withering of melancholia,” when she argues that it 
is no longer an appropriate framework of intepretation for making sense of affective 
experience (xxvii).  
 Ross' study reveals the impoverishment of the paradigm of melancholy, the 
depletion of its ethical and political dimensions.  It has become depression—a clinical 
category of experience understood mainly in physiological terms—and therefore, with 
minimal historical, social, or political meaning.  Depression, when theorized beyond 
neurotransmitters and chemical uptake, is conceived not in terms of loss, but rather, as a 
failure to adapt to the conditions of life—in other words, to accept the terms of 
neoliberalism and perform.  Depressive symptoms, no longer read as clues that must be 
traced back to historical events or affective attachments in a person's life, are objectified, 
treated for the most part as indicators of pathology that become, as Ross writes, the target 
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of “pharmaceutical intervention” (153).  Thus, the depressed person is cut off from any 
possibility of connecting his present affective state to the past, and thus of understanding 
his malaise; he is made isolated and thinglike by the inability to produce meanings and 
symbols that might cultivate praxis.  Ross' analysis, much like the artwork that she charts, 
in remaining at the intersection of science and art as two mutually informing regimes of 
knowledge and power which actively participate in the constitution of the subjectivity, is 
circumscribed by the paradigms of the contemporary biological and medical discourses 
of which she makes use.  She fails to see how melancholia is still an appropriate 
framework—perhaps more necessary than ever—in a context when, indeed, rebellion 
seems so impossible, resistance so futile.  This leaves her blind to existing forms of 
melancholy artistic practice which counter the trend toward 'disengagement' and 
stimulate historical agency and praxis.  Fortunately, other theorists have seized upon the 
critical power of melancholia, less as a state of being, than as an activity, a modality of 
interpretation and critique.  This work, as we shall see, is intimately bound up with ruins, 
just as the alternative aesthetic practices, which will be explored below, originate in the 
ruins.  
 
IV. 
Jonathan Flatley's (2008) lyrical book, Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics 
of Modernism, raises the possibility of many different kinds of melancholia, or many 
possible relations to loss.  He is interested in mapping the ways in which melancholia can 
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be, and has been, productive—of knowledge, affective bonds, interest in others and the 
world—rather than merely debilitating.  While we often think of melancholia as inducing 
apathy and indifference to the social world, he points to quite the opposite: its political 
potential.  In its capacity to generate knowledge of our shared pasts, of the causes of our 
losses, it exposes points of possible resistance to multiple structures of oppression.  
Melancholia becomes a way to take stock of the ruins of our collective and personal 
lives, to trace the lines of damage back to specific processes, institutions, and practices.  
As such, it produces a form of awakening, a politicized consciousness that seeks to 
actively engage with and transform social reality.  In fact, melancholia provides us with a 
way of reading modernity as a series of losses which have, I argue, resulted in the 
depressive 'postmodern condition'; it is, in the aesthetic practices of modernism and 
psychoanalysis, “an allegory for the experience of modernity” (2).  Instead of 
pathologizing and individualizing certain affective formations, this reading allows us to 
trace our subjective states—and I will add, the state of the political imaginary, which in 
the postmodern moment is suffused with a sense of impossibility and defeat—back to the 
shared and “specific experiences of modernization—urbanization, industrialization, 
colonialization and imperialism, modern warfare, the invention of “race,” the advent of 
the modern commodity and mass culture, the emergence of modern discourses of gender 
and sexuality, and the pathologization of homosexuality” that have been part of capitalist 
modernity (3-4).  Thus Flatley reinserts the affective body, the imagining and desiring 
subject, back into politics and history: our affective lives can serve as important 
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indicators of the state of things, a potential starting point for the radical remapping of the 
political terrain in the contemporary historical moment and for addressing the ruins that 
litter the present.  The postmodern 'depressive disorder' can, in this way, be traced back 
to specific historical, social, and political events and losses whose impacts are still felt 
and endured in the present. 
 Flatley's contention is that, while melancholia in modernity is intricately bound up 
with loss, “dwelling on loss need not produce depression” (1).  He contrasts the state of 
withdrawal, the emotional detachment characteristic of one form of melancholy—one 
that is closer to the clinical category of depression—with other “non- or antidepressive 
melancholias” (1; my emphasis).  Within the very affective economy of melancholia 
itself there exists “a dialectic between emotional withdrawal and its apparent opposite, 
the most intense or exceptional devotion of affective energy” (1).  Melancholia thus has 
its vicissitudes and can undergo a transformation, particularly in and through aesthetic 
practices, by which we witness “the conversion of a depressive melancholia into a way to 
be interested in the world” (2).  This is precisely what he seeks to probe, a 
conceptualization of melancholia as an activity, a verb: to “melancholize, long since out 
of use, suggests that melancholy might not just be a mood state into which one falls, or 
which descends on one like bad weather. Instead, melancholizing is something one does 
[…] It is a practice that might, in fact, produce its own kind of knowledge” (2).  What 
kind of knowledge might 'melancholizing'—that reflective and contemplative activity 
which takes the past as its object—produce?  He argues that, for the great modern authors 
238 
 
at least (James, Du Bois, Platonov, Freud, Benjamin), it offers “the knowledge of the 
historical origins of their melancholias” (3).  This means an understanding that our 
emotional lives have histories; it is a revelation that affectivity is itself a site of power 
(3).  Melancholia is therefore a socio-historical product: “In this view melancholia is no 
longer a personal problem requiring cure or catharsis, but is evidence of the historicity of 
one’s subjectivity, indeed the very substance of that historicity” (3). 
 Melancholia is the affective constellation from which our relation to the past can 
be explored, debated, and contested.  It is a reflective activity in which one takes one's 
own affective life as an object of contemplation.  Melancholia is, in this sense, akin to an 
'aesthetic' emotion, much like the beautiful or the sublime, as Emily Brady and Arto 
Haapala (2003) argue in their piece “Melancholy as a Aesthetic Emotion.”  Melancholy, 
as a complex activity, differentiates it from the passivity, withdrawal, and disengagement 
that characterize depressive states.  The contemplative and reflective character of 
melancholy distances it from the more immediate emotions of sadness or despair: “in 
melancholy we refuse to give in to the urge to collapse into a heap and cry” (section 4, 
para. 4).  Melancholy's object is indirect rather than direct, mediated rather than 
unmediated, for it has to do with the ways in which “losses [...] have penetrated into the 
very structure of subjectivity” (Flatley, 6).  The causal relations between the present and 
the past, between subjectivity and history, must be traced, or better, reconstructed.  
Events whose reverberations are still felt in the present must be historically located.  The 
melancholic attitude is a starting point from which to ask: “What social structures, 
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discourses, institutions, processes have been at work in taking something valuable away 
from me?” (Flatley, 3).  Loss, rather than remaining something unnameable, vague and 
indefinite, becomes very concrete, linked to larger social and historical forces.  
Modernism was an attempt to perform such an alchemy of loss, to move from the 
depressed condition to a melancholy aesthetic practice—a gesture that can be recuperated 
in postmodern practice.  Flatley argues, for instance, that Baudelaire's poetry, much like 
psychoanalysis, affects such a transfiguration—his is “a splenetic modernism, for it is his 
task to transform ennui, that “monstre delicat” that renders the world incapable of 
sustaining emotional involvement, into spleen: a state in which one is exceedingly aware 
of, angry about, and interested in the losses one has suffered” (6; my emphasis).  Moving 
from the individual to the collective means recognizing the ways in which we share in 
these losses—the disappointments and deceptions, the violence done to us and to others.  
Aesthetic practices, when melancholy rather than depressive in character, can help us to 
reconnect with our sense of historicity, and thus, of historical agency.  
 
V. 
Before outlining the parameters of an 'aesthetics of the ruins', it is worth pausing for a 
moment to reflect upon the melancholy character of contemporary social and political 
life.  Following Harvey (1990), if we are to read in the transition between modernity and 
postmodernity as much continuity as discontinuity (capitalism being the major example), 
this justifies, to some extent, the continued applicability of modern concepts to the 
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postmodern context.  The processes of creative destruction, destabilization, and 
dispossession are only intensified in the current era, which suggests that if “difficult-to-
mourn losses [were] a central feature of life” in modern times, as Flatley argues (42), 
they continue to be so in our times.  If we are to read the contemporary malaise—the 
impoverishment of the imaginary—through the framework of loss, as I suggest we do, 
then we must return to the enigmatic question posed by the melancholic: what has been 
lost?  As we saw with Freud above, the character of loss, far from self-evident, is rather 
elusive.  If we are to apply the categories of subjective experience to the collective, a 
practice well-established by cultural theorists from the Frankfurt school onwards, then we 
must think in terms of collective traumas that have influenced subject formations.  A 
number of theorists have offered important insights in this regard.  I would like to take a 
look at some of them to broadly sketch the parameters of loss and its impact on the 
political imagination.    
 Eric Santner (1993) is one such theorist who provides a reading of cultural 
melancholia in light of recent social trauma.  He argues in his book, Stranded Objects: 
Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany, for an interpretation of “end-of-the-
century” melancholia as the seemingly impossible work of mourning for stable forms of 
identity and relation in the post-modern and post-war context: the “destabilization of 
certain fundamental cultural norms and notions [within the space of the postmodern], 
above all those dealing with self-identity and community, cannot be understood without 
reference to the ethical and intellectual imperatives of life after Auschwitz” (xiv).  From 
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this perspective, it is necessary to “think the 'postwar' under the double sign of the 
postmodern and the post-Holocaust” (9).  In other words, Western societies are suffering 
from the reverberating trauma of a set of interconnected losses which have not yet been 
properly worked-through: those of the “narcissisms and nostalgias central to the project 
of modernity” (7), along with a “past dismembered under the sign of Auschwitz” (8).  
For Santner, and others, the postmodern condition is defined as a “perpetual leave-taking 
from fantasies of plentitude, purity, centrality, totality, unity, and mastery” (8).  It 
involves the painful process of coming to terms with the shocking revelation that the 
possibility of completion and self-identity, which he reads as the fantasy behind specular 
identity formation, were always already lost: difference is irreducible, constantly 
disrupting and subverting any perceived totality.  He emphasizes the indispensable work 
of mourning as the “task of integrating damage, loss, disorientation, decenteredness into 
a transformed structure of identity [...] [which] involves the labor of recollecting the 
stranded objects of a cultural inheritance fragmented and poisoned by an unspeakable 
horror” (xiii).   
 The loss of our utopian imaginings, however we define them, has a profound 
impact on progressive political praxis at all levels.  Indeed, one might effectually 
interpret the disengagement of the postmodern subject as a deep-seated political 
depression, which finds its manifestations in hopelessness, feelings of ineffectuality and 
impotence, cynicism, despair, and disillusionment with the political in general.  Drawing 
on the work of Walter Benjamin, Wendy Brown (1999) has noted that the untenable 
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losses suffered by those on the Left in the last few decades—the disappointed promises 
of Leftist analysis and revolutionary commitment—have dealt a bitter blow to the sense 
of moral certitude and righteous action that animated progressive movements, resulting in 
a 'Left Melancholy'.  As she states: 
We are awash in the loss of a unified analysis and unified 
movement, in the loss of labor and class as inviolable predicates of 
political analysis and mobilization, in the loss of an inexorable and 
scientific forward movement of history, and in the loss of a viable 
alternative to the political economy of capitalism [...] we suffer with 
the sense of not only a lost movement but a lost historical moment 
(22). 
While some may disagree with her diagnosis (or that of Santner), the point is that loss is 
not necessary just political defeat, but damage done to an ideal.  The withering of 
alternatives, of solidarity, of critical analysis are often less evident manifestations of loss.  
The inability to properly mourn past losses has meant, according to Brown, that any 
possibilities for a different future are held hostage by the “mournful, conservative, 
backward-looking attachment to a feeling, analysis, or relationship that has been rendered 
thinglike and frozen in the heart of the putative leftist” (21-22).  Thus, the work of 
mourning must address not only failed struggles, but former modes of thinking and 
strategizing that may inappropriate to given socio-political conditions.  David McNally 
(2001) argues that regret is an integral part of the process of coming to terms with the 
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missed moment: “Benjamin knows that the revolution has thus far failed, and while he 
thinks against that failure in order to open the space of revolution, he acknowledges it, 
names it, and mourns its consequences. The very meaning of catastrophe for Benjamin is 
“to have missed the opportunity”” (163).  Far from a defeatist position, acknowledging 
the defeats of the past becomes a way of reinserting ourselves as agents in history. 
McNally's reading of Benjamin, to which we will return below, suggests that by passing 
through “a space of mourning [...] we might find a way to commune with the ghosts of 
the past, to reenter the world of shattered hopes and broken dreams which is history” 
(176). 
 
VI. 
I propose a theoretical excursis into a recent blow political imaginary—the demise of the 
Soviet Union—as an illustrative example of the deeper dimensions of loss, through an 
examination of Susan Buck-Morss' (2000) monumental study Dreamworld and 
Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West.  Assessing the contemporary 
socio-political landscape, post-USSR, Buck-Morss explains that what we have lost, and 
on both sides of the 'iron curtain', are the utopian ideals and dreams at the heart of 
modernity.  The projects of both capitalism and socialism in the twentieth century were, 
she argues, inspired by the deep-seated impulse, characteristic of the most compelling 
aspects of modernity, to improve human existence, social relations, and everyday life.  
Those dreams that connected the all-too-often harsh realities of privation, alienation, and 
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personal sacrifice demanded by these political regimes to a larger social project were 
tragically deceived—unrealized, and perhaps, ultimately unrealizable given the material 
conditions and productive relations that were actually in place on both sides of the 
political-economic divide.  Yet, in contrast to the proponents of postmodern thought who, 
embracing a stance of political cynicism, go so far as to celebrate the demise of all 
metanarratives and grandiose designs for the betterment of the human condition, Buck-
Morss is more cautious in her assessment: while the dream did not translate into reality, 
this is certainly not a reason to abandon the former even as we condemn the troubling 
legacy of the latter.  It is, she strongly affirms, important to recognize the intimate and 
tangled histories of dreamworlds and catastrophe, the ways in which the energies of 
social desires have been “used instrumentally by structures of power, mobilized as an 
instrument of force that turns against the very masses who were supposed to benefit”; 
wielded to nightmarish ends, she comments in the preface to the book, “the most 
inspiring mass-utopian projects—mass sovereignty, mass production, mass culture—
have left a history of disasters in their wake” (xi). 
 The project of modernity is grotesquely mutilated in history's ruins.  This loss 
must be recognized as such if we are to move beyond a position of depressive 
melancholy toward a critical assessment of the past and a re-evaluation of the 
possibilities of the present.  History has not lived up to its promises, but has unfolded, 
since 1789, in a series of violent ruptures: “the French Revolution […] produced, as the 
two catastrophic forms of modern political life, revolutionary terror and mass-
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conscripted, nationalist war” (32).  In the twentieth century, modernity's project became 
that of 'modernization', which in practice meant the “lived catastrophe” of 
industrialization (105): the transformation of workers into machines; the rationalization 
of time, movement, and bodily rhythms; the operationalization of culture; and the 
aestheticization of politics.  Production, once envisioned,  and explicitly so in the East, as 
eventually moving society beyond the realm of necessity and into that of freedom, was 
directed not towards meeting human needs, but towards militarization and commodity 
production divorced from real needs.  Recognizing that these collective dreamworlds 
were systematically distorted by global political powers into phantasmagorias which 
acted as tools for the control and manipulation of the 'masses', Buck-Morss nevertheless 
maintains that it is important to distinguish between the two.  While phantasmagorias 
anaesthetize the political subject, collective dreams have a critical function, if only that of 
negativity, or the promise that another world is possible: “Dreamworlds are not merely 
illusions. In insisting that what is is not all there is, they are assertions of the human spirit 
and invaluable politically. They make the momentous claim that the world we have 
known since childhood is not the only one imaginable” (238).  In the aftermath of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the breaking apart of the Soviet Union, what is lamentable is not 
so much the loss of 'actually existing socialism', a system marred by terror and 
subjugation, but of an alternative to capitalism—the very notion that different systems 
and variants of modernity can exist alongside one another (239).  It is the loss of 
dreamworlds as such—a foreclosure of the imagination, and one which has had radical 
246 
 
consequences.  
 The capacity to dream, to sustain a hope for the future, should not be conflated 
with the dream itself, nor with its manifestations—the forms and distortions to which the 
dream gives rise.  To consign our most deeply held ideals to the trash bin of history 
because a particular political-economic system or systems failed to sustain or support 
them is to throw out the baby with the bathwater.  Accordingly, Buck Morss writes: 
There is real tragedy in the shattering of the dreams of modernity—
of social utopia, historical progress, and material plenty for all. But 
to submit to melancholy at this point would be to confer on the past 
a wholeness that never did exist, confusing the loss of the dream 
with the loss of the dream's realization (68). 
Melancholy, as the state of impossible mourning for a loss we do not understand or often 
even recognize, a pining for a mythic lost whole, carries with it the dangers of falling into 
inaction or cynicism.  Moving beyond the static condition of melancholy toward an 
appropriate mourning for our real losses means identifying and coming to terms with 
them, and moving on.  It is neither a wholesale abandonment or denial of the past, nor an 
idealization of it, which obscures the contradictions, tensions, and dangers it embodied.  
The wreckage of history must be sifted through, gleaned for its lessons for future 
struggles and new creative attempts:    
Rather than taking a self-ironizing distance from history's failure, 
we—the "we" who may have nothing more nor less in common than 
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sharing this time—would do well to bring the ruins up close and 
work our way through the rubble in order to rescue the utopian 
hopes that modernity engendered, because we cannot afford to let 
them disappear (Buck Morss, 68). 
In this account, ruins—those fragments left behind by our utopias and dytopias—can be 
pieced together to tell stories, to weave together a memory of the crimes committed in the 
name of or against our ideals, while at the same time sifting out the highest aims that 
were buried within them.  With such knowledge of the experiences of history we can 
move forward, for “the utopian impulse that once animated mass production and mass 
consumption is capable of new configurations” (276). 
 Artistic practice has had an important relationship to nourishing and sustaining 
collective utopian ideals.  Buck-Morss' historical reading of the Russian avant-garde is 
interesting in this regard.  She describes how, in its early stages, the avant-garde acted as 
a critical and disruptive force, constantly throwing into question the direction of 
historical events and 'progress' as it was dictated by the Bolshevik party.  So long as it 
maintained its autonomy, the works of the avant-garde were able to serve as the screens 
upon which collective dreamworlds were projected and explored.  Its architectural and 
aesthetic designs, often “non-functional” or impractical, were largely unrealized in three-
dimensional form; yet, even on paper, they “interrupted existing time and space as a non-
functional, utopian presence in the present. By not closing the gap between dream and 
reality, the artworks of the avant-garde left both dream and reality free to criticize each 
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other” (64).  The space of negativity opened up by avant-garde practice—that 
juxtaposition of the real and the possible—put into dialogue the dimensions of imaginary 
and material reality, making visible the distance between the two.  In estranging people 
from their everyday experience of reality, and inviting them to partake in “ new cognitive 
and sensory experiences,” it encouraged an open-ended conceptualization and negotiation 
of different futures.  In contrast, the realm of politics dictated a tightly determined 
political project which, in turn, necessitated a carefully constructed imaginary; its 
“cosmology of history,” as advancing toward an already-known end, would increasingly 
“dictate to art” its perimeters (49).  As such, politics and aesthetics, in the case of Soviet 
Russia, assumed different temporalities: “The "time" of the cultural avant-garde is not the 
same as that of the vanguard party. These artists' practices interrupted the continuity of 
perceptions and estranged the familiar, severing historical tradition through the force of 
their fantasy” (49).  Aesthetics gradually became another instrument of politics.  
Similarly, she argues that abstract expressionism served much the same purpose in the 
US: carefully de-politicized, it could then be taken up as powerful weapon in the war of 
cultural imperialism and the spread of liberal ideology, “used as a marvellous exemplar 
of US commitment to liberty of expression, rugged individualism and creative freedom” 
(37).  
 The work of art is not unambiguous.  It must be read contextually, that is, within 
the framework of its social and historical conditions which are constantly shifting.  As 
emphasized by Buck-Morss: “The power of any cultural object to arrest the flow of 
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history, and to open up time for alternative visions, varies with history's changing course” 
(63).  When soldered to a mass political regime, art often becomes the aestheticization of 
politics, marshalled into the service of myth and propaganda.  Monuments provide a 
great example of how works of art can be used to valorize a particular project, legitimize 
historical events, and ascribe meaning to the past.  However, at other moments, art 
provides dialectical images of society which can interrupt the dominant narrative, disturb 
our sensibility, and “shock us out of moral complacency and political resignation” (63).  
Buck-Morss cites a beautiful example of Pierre-Maxime Schuhl's to illustrate this 
dialectical power of images: “Bomber planes,” he wrote in 1938, “make us remember 
what Leonardo Da Vinci expected of the flight of man; he was to have raised himself into 
the air “in order to look for snow on the mountain summits, and then return to scatter it 
over city streets shimmering with the heat of summer”” (133).  The contrast here is 
poignant: technological development, imagined to bring with it pleasure and fulfilment 
for humankind, arrives as a nightmare which enslaves it.  The traumatic gap becomes a 
gaping wound of mutilated bodies, razed cities, charred corpses.  The power of such an 
image as Schuhl's, be it visual or literary, lies in its capacity to insert itself in the 
historical trajectory in a way that opens up a dimension of critical thought and reflection.  
It acts upon the body, the senses, the imaginary—not in providing the blueprints for a 
future utopia, but rather in revealing at once the devastating ruins of history and the 
possibilities of human agency that nevertheless persist in the present.  Thus, a truly avant-
garde artistic practice is one engaged in “the historical task of surprising rather than 
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explaining the present” (69).  Avant-garde aesthetics is “a mode of being “in touch” with 
reality,” a modality of responsiveness, rather than “a means of blocking out reality,” such 
as that achieved by the aestheticization of politics; the latter, an “anaesthetics [...] 
destroys the human organism's power to respond politically even when self-preservation 
is at stake” (104). 
 
VII.  
I argue that aesthetics, in the radical sense suggested by Buck-Morss, is closely attuned to 
ethics, though this demands further theorization.  The power of images is one which we 
need to take seriously.  As suggested in chapter three, dialectical images in the 
Benjaminian framework within which Buck-Morss' work can be located, are made up of 
fragments that rise up from a shattered history, fragments that put into startling 
juxtaposition phantasmagoria and utopian social desire, dream and nightmare.  They are 
ruins that speak: while they do not offer up a program for the future, they do tell us that 
other worlds are imaginable.  'Dialectics at a standstill', was the phrase that Benjamin 
used to describe the way in which such images embody and thus reveal the contradictions 
that exist within the social order.  Uncanny, at once familiar and unfamiliar, dialectical 
images call into question the status quo, both by estranging us from the quotidian and 
uncovering the remains of an alternative set of social possibilities.  Buck-Morss 
recognized the way that dialectical images or avant-garde art could interrupt the 
trajectory of global capitalism, stating that “[t]he juxtaposition of these past fragments 
251 
 
with our present concerns might have the power to challenge the complacency of our 
times, when "history" is said by its victors to have successfully completed its course” 
(68-69).  But how might they intervene in other struggles (which may or may not be 
linked to capitalism)?  Can images have a mediating function in conflicts like that 
between Israel and Palestine?  What does cultural production concerned with the ruins 
and fragments of the past have to do with the political imaginary in postwar Lebanon?  In 
a context in which we are called upon to address, better yet, to redress, historical 
traumas, the ruins of the imaginary, the catastrophes that have been wrought on bodies 
over this past century, can the kind of artistic practice associated with the avant-garde 
have a meaningful impact?  What good is poetry, performance, or cinema when people 
are dispossessed and dying?  Is it any more than either a distraction from or an expression 
of human suffering?   
 The role of 'images' (again, not necessarily visual, but constructed with words, 
gestures, sounds, or other materials—novels, films, performance, poems, paintings) 
should not be overstated, yet, nor is it negligible: limited in scope, circumscribed to the 
context and the audience of its reception, the image of the kind we have been speaking 
nevertheless has an important impact on the imaginary.  Certainly the work of 
remembering and redressing historical wrongs must take place on numerous levels—
social, economic, and subjective—and may involve, depending on the context, such 
measures as the restoration of land, the right of return, truth and reconciliation, 
environmental rehabilitation, and perhaps, a transformation of social relations.  Yet the 
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dimension of the imaginary—that which invigorates social struggles, enables us to 
empathize with others, encourages us to reflect upon the past and even to rethink the 
dominant structures of the present—is one that is often overlooked.  Depressive 
detachment and cynicism, as suggested above, are the dangers of the contemporary socio-
political landscape, or inversely, sectarian war and identitarian, as we will see below.  An 
aesthetics that can respond to the troubles of our age, a cultural production that can 
connect to historical losses, even if it exists only on the margins, is worth exploring.  
While the work of Susan Buck-Morss has taken us a long way toward understanding the 
impact of aesthetics upon the political imaginary, particularly in the context of the 'mass 
societies' of East and West, I propose that a productive engagement with psychoanalytic 
thought and cultural analysis will allow us to further elaborate the possible role that 
'images' may play in relation to contemporary conflicts and crises.   
 In particular, an 'aesthetics of ruins', or 'from the ruins', has ethical and political 
dimensions.  It lingers upon the wreckage of history, demanding the work of mourning 
and remembering the past.  Revisiting the site of conflict, loss, or separation recalls our 
encounter with the 'other', otherness, non-identity, difference.  It means questioning the 
dominant narratives that have told history and creating a space for other readings and 
writings, for conversations between former adversaries, that challenge our inherited 
assumptions.  It is the work of criticism.  Facing the past also means assuming 
responsibility for it—at the most fundamental level this is the recognition that history is, 
to a large extent, the product of human agency and actions, but that it is, therefore, 
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possible to choose otherwise.  An 'aesthetics of the ruins' is far from a backward-looking, 
sentimental stance toward history which prefers wallowing in loss to 'letting go', but is, 
rather, concerned with the ways in which the past is, for better or worse, active in the 
present.  It is undeniably imbricated with the constellation of melancholia; yet, it does not 
foster a 'pathological' attachment to the past that leaves the bereaved paralyzed, 
emotionally petrified, and unresponsive.  In taking the form of images, words, 
representations—already a step toward symbolization and therefore beyond the 
asymbolia that characterizes the lugubriousness psychological condition of depression—
it allows a degree of 'working through' of loss.  Yet, perhaps paradoxically, it recognizes 
that the work of mourning nonetheless leaves a remainder, and as such, is never 
completed.  What is unassimilable in loss is also, as we shall see, that which challenges 
power, resists compulsion, which withstands the allure of hegemonic narratives and 
identitarianism.  An 'aesthetics of the ruins', whose basic features we will sketch out 
below, is potentially transfigurative of the subject, of the socio-political imaginary, in 
that it opens up encounters with the past and its disappointed hopes, with the 'other' and 
the histories of violence that have been an intimate part of the experience of modernity.  
 
VIII. 
An 'aesthetics of the ruins' is a melancholy, anti-depressive, aesthetic which returns again 
and again to the detritus of history to retrieve the fragments of forgotten hopes, traces of 
disappointments, half-ruins of loss.  It is bittersweet, at once elegiac and hopeful, serving 
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as it does as a potent reminder of violence and oppression—damages done and losses 
irrecuperable—but also of the unrealized possibilities of the past that persist in the 
present.  As a contemporary practice, though marginal, it stands in sharp relief to the 
'aesthetics of disengagement', outlined by Christine Ross, which enacts withdrawal, 
boredom, and rupture.  It is an aesthetics of engagement—a committed practice with 
emancipatory intent.  Melancholia becomes a way of interpreting the ruins in order to 
trace them back to their socio-political sources.  It maps the structures of power, the 
social relations of capitalism and imperialism, and the activities of war that have 
produced ruinous states.  It is an activity of reflection and recollection that opens up the 
space for critical readings of the past.  
 There are, as Flatley has suggested, plenty of “images of unachieved happinesses 
floating around in that pile of catastrophes we call history” (75)—images of past 
struggles, of expressions of community and solidarity, that we can seize upon and make 
our own.  It is ruins which cache these traces of forgotten desire: “The rubble of our 
historical being—the petrified objects, the smashed and broken things, the piles of 
corpses—still speak a mute language of broken hopes”; they give us “ intimations of 
what has been lost” (McNally, 176).  These ruin-images contain an explosive power, 
which theorists like Flatley and McNally locate in their capacity to blast us out of 
complacency and into action.  Revealing the interval between our highest ideals, fought 
for in bitter struggles, and the painful realities left by historical losses, ruin-images 
defamiliarize our everyday sense of being in the world in potentially liberating ways, 
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opening up historical narrative and meaning to new interpretations: “The trick is to find 
the fragments of desire and disappointment that might be joined together for 
emancipatory purposes” (McNally, 215).  An aesthetics of the ruins allows us to read 
“history thus far as a field littered with the debris of failed struggles for freedom” (193).  
The realization that such struggles were for naught, while mournful in character, is, 
nevertheless, enough to make us angry, enough to drive us to recuperate the traces of the 
critical forces and impulses that animated that history.  It revitalizes hope that the future 
may be different, that other ways of being and doing are possible. 
 A melancholy aesthetics of the ruins tempers unbridled enthusiasm—a kind of 
naive optimism which makes us deaf to the lessons of the past—by reminding us of the 
atrocities that have so often been commited in the very name of freedom.  It recalls the 
stage of history as one scattered with corpses, the maimed and wounded, with burnt out 
villages and military occupations.  It guards, in other words, the tension between the two 
positions—dream and nighmare—a dialectical tension which McNally calls the “dialectic 
of extremes” (220).  Such overwhelming disappointments quite understandably threaten 
to result in depressive melancholia, the paralyzation of ageny, and political cynicism—
the 'Left-wing melancholy' that Benjamin so abhorred.  As Flatley writes: 
the utopian promises of modernity put the modern subject in a 
precariously depressive position. This is because the promises of 
modernity are never fulfilled [...] Silvan Tomkins has suggested that 
this kind of a situation, one between “Heaven and Hell on earth,” 
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between great hope and catastrophic disappointment, is the 
paradigmatic “depressive script” (31-32).   
It is precisely because this tension persists between hope and disappointment that the 
cultivation of what Flatley calls “non- or antidepressive melancholias” is possible (1).   
And it is this tension that depression collapses, by failing to register the interval between 
present and future that describes the possible.  The 'project' of modernity, in the aspect of 
its emancipatory ideals which called for a transformation of society, is not irretrievably 
lost—these ideals might still evoke an awareness of oppression, might invigorate “a 
tradition of the oppressed,” in McNally's words (217).  It is from aesthetics as much as 
criticism that new, politically powerful, orientations to the losses and traumas of history 
might emerge to revitalize struggles for freedom and against injustice. 
 “[W]riting now consists in a new effort to “pile up fragments ceaselessly”” writes 
David McNally in his study on Benjamin in Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, 
Labor, and Liberation.  With regards to such a technique, he goes on to write: 
The task is to improvise, to experiment, to use montage effects; to 
juxtapose advertisements, dreams, images of childhood, fragments 
of history and fiction in order to create allegories of a society 
suffocating beneath the crushing weight of commodities and money. 
This requires a new mode of writing oriented to profane illumination 
of a disintegrating bourgeois order (180).  
Writing is an aesthetic activity as well as a critical one.  'Piling up' the ruins in 
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representation is like piling up the tinder for fire: in a sudden flash we are “touched by 
the shock, as is the little heap of magnesium powder by the flame of the match” 
(Benjamin quoted in McNally, 186).  McNally locates this inflammatory power of ruins 
in our emotional investment in things, in our immersion in the very materiality of the 
world; as objects that are often deprived of exchange value, ruins are nevertheless 
intensely charged with 'erotic' energies (183).  Such moments of illumination reveal a 
startling state of things: the objectification of human life, the enchantment of things, the 
alienation of labour, the sad myth of 'progress', countless moments of repression and 
violence.  The ultimate revelation is that “bourgeois soceity,” which seemed so stable, so 
solid—which everywhere celebrates its victory over history—is itself in ruins: 
“Bourgeois society is a society of mourning—for our forgotten pasts, for our unfulfilled 
wishes, for our deaths which have been foretold as the only real novelty we will 
experience” (204). 
 A critical aesthetics, a political aesthetics, should thus seek to expose the ruins.  
Its concern is with delineating the contours of another topology—of what lies beyond, in 
between, and underneath, of what exists only in fragments and traces.  It does not map 
out monuments, but excavates the buried and forgotten.  This involves not only 
alternative readings of space, but also of history, and reveals something of the way that 
these two are superimposed.  Space is overwritten with texts and symbols—street signs, 
plaques, names of places, statues of historical figures—saturated with meaning. Who 
should be remembered and how, whose history is counted, who belongs and who does 
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not, are all messages encoded in space.  Space as such is a highly political: a site of 
power and contestation.  Ruins challenge such dominant encodings of space; an 
aesthetics which salvages the ruin returns the repressed, the voices and narratives that 
have been pushed aside.  As such, it is not another attempt at totality, but rather a 
gathering up of the debris of memory, in the interests of radical, decolonizing, and 
liberatory historical, spatial, and aesthetic practice.  
 
IX.  
Interesting in this regard is a wave of recent scholarship addressing the 'ruins of empire'.  
This literature tells us, in presenting the traces of violence embodied in both people and 
places, that colonialism is anything but past: it is an ongoing legacy, the sordid 
inheritance of ruined lives and livelihoods.  Colonialism is active in the present; it is a 
shaping force that continuously structures lives and landscapes.  Those who work in this 
field call us to the ethical task of exposing the lines and lineages that have led from the 
imperial past to the present state of affairs—economic, political, emotional, subjective.  
The critique of capitalism as productive of ruins must not neglect imperialism, those 
processes of aggressive geographical expansion, domination, occupation, and humiliation 
that have been its inextricable counterpart.  Returning to the 'ruins of empire' teaches us 
to think about decolonization as much more than political independence: sovereignty 
does not erase the damages done, as these are passed down through the generations.  The 
legacy of the residential school system and the colonial treatment aboriginal peoples in 
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Canada—who are still oppressed and still struggling for rights, recognition, and 
reparation, still without political or economic independence—is just one such example.  
For them, the violence of dispossession, the loss of language, culture, and an entire way 
of life are facts of everyday existence, and alcoholism and substance abuse, as well as the 
break up of families and communities, are among the continuing consequences.  
Decolonization—for those fortunate enough to have achieved statehood, or to be no 
longer living directly under the repressive mechanisms of an occupying force—is not 
something already achieved, even in those countries that have had decades of 
independence, but is an ongoing process: of the mind and heart, of the spaces and 
practices of everyday life, of the body itself, as much as of political-economic systems.  
 In her article, “Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination,” Laura Ann 
Stoler (2008) argues that it is necessary to understand empire as a process of ruination 
that lives on long after imperial powers have officially withdrawn from a particular 
geographical region.  The “ruins of empire” is the term that she uses to signify, not the 
'monuments' of colonial power, often celebrated by the colonizers themselves as 'gifts' or 
'improvements' bestowed upon their wards, but rather, the devastating debris left in their 
wake.  It refers to: 
the enduring quality of imperial remains and what they render in 
impaired states. This is not a turn to ruins as memorialized and large-
scale monumental “leftovers” or relics […] but rather to what people 
are “left with”: to what remains, to the aftershocks of empire, to the 
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material and social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things” 
(194). 
Dwelling among the ruins is anything but nostalgic: it means to live with irretrievable 
losses, dispossession, and damage.  Imperialism has 'afterlives'; it lives on in sites, 
bodies, and practices permanently altered.  The structures it leaves behind continue to 
“impinge on the allocation of space, resources, and on the contours of material life” 
(195).  Ruination, as such, is not merely a state, but a practice, not merely a noun but a 
verb: it is “a political project that lays waste to certain peoples and places, relations, and 
things” (196).  As an imperial endeavour, it mobilizes great financial, political, and 
military resources toward the refashioning of the socio-political landscape:  
Large-scale ruin making takes resources and planning that may 
involve forced removal of populations and new zones of 
uninhabitable space, reassigning inhabitable space, and dictating 
how people are suppose to live in them. As such, these ruin-making 
endeavors are typically state projects [...] that are often strategic, 
nation-building, and politically charged (202). 
 To return to the imperial practice of ruination is to highlight the ways in which the 
past has a present, and vice versa.  In much the same vein as Flatley, Stoler suggests that 
retracing such lineages produces a knowledge of the genealogy of collective suffering 
and dispossession that is useful for social struggles. 
Our interest is in dissociated and dislocated histories of the present, 
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in those sites and circumstances of dispossession that imperial 
architects disavow as not of their making, in violences of 
disenfranchisement that are shorn of their status as imperial 
entailments and that go by other names (193). 
Recognizing the historicity of present helps us understand the structures and sensibilities, 
the embodied and felt traces of violence, that pertain to it.  It enables us to identify 
seemingly unrelated phenomena, such as ““urban decay,” “environmental degradation,” 
“industrial pollution,” or “racialized unemployment”,” as, in fact, “patterned imperial 
effects that produce subjects with more limited possibilities and who are hampered 
differently by what is left” (200).  Viewing the present as part of a longer historical 
trajectory still in-the-making reveals the future as indeterminate, open: as Stoler 
emphasizes, “these are unfinished histories, not of victimized pasts but consequential 
histories that open to differential futures” (195).  Recognizing that history matters is the 
first step toward naming its enduring effects, identifying its ruins.  These ruins can then 
undergo “reappropriations and strategic and active positioning within the politics of the 
present” (196).  Insisting upon the ruins counters a tendency toward forgetfulness, as well 
as any bent toward imperialist nostalgia (199). 
 This leads us to another important problematic: the invisibility of ruins.  How 
ruins are covered over, hidden from sight, is also part of a political project which 
disavows the past and attempts to undermine the collective memory of traumatic events.  
If present struggles are informed by history, then there is a danger in being unable to 
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locate political agency within a longer historical trajectory.  How can one seek the 
solution to an illness if one cannot name what ails one?  Difficulties arise from the 
inability to identify the processes and outcomes of ruination, or even to recognize it as 
such.  In particular, if a decolonizing project must address the remains of imperial 
practice, misunderstanding the roots of everyday problems and practices can lead to 
misdirected measures.  Israel is a case in point.  As Stoler argues:  
the most enduring ruins in Israel are neither recognized as ruins nor 
as the ruination of colonialism; they are not acknowledged to be 
there at all. These are the ruins of Palestinian villages razed, 
bulldozed, and buried by the state-endorsed Israeli Afforestation 
Project, an intensive planting campaign that has literally obliterated 
the very presence of Palestinian villages and farmsteads on 
Jerusalem’s periphery for over 50 years (201). 
In such cases, remembrance of the past and struggle in the present are bound up with 
ruins.  Eliminating all traces of the former Palestinian inhabitants—their villages, 
orchards, street signs, and houses—is an effort to efface history, and such efforts are, as 
we have seen above, well-funded, strategic, and highly systematized.  Resistance can take 
the form of insisting upon memory, of affirming the past, of reclaiming the ruins.  With 
this in mind, in the next section I would like to turn to some inspiring examples of what I 
call an 'aesthetics of the ruins'—a current in cultural production which, if marginal within 
popular culture, is nonetheless important in its attempt to return to the ruins in a gesture 
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of memory, resistance, and hope.  
 
X. 
In Lila Abu-Lughod's memoir of her father, “Return to Half-Ruins: Memory, 
Postmemory, and Living in Palestine,” ruins are intertwined with struggle in the present.  
Her narrative recounts a visit she made to her father after he made the decision to return 
to Palestine more than four decades after being forced to flee his home in 1948.  He had 
long lamented, from his place of exile in the United States, the demise of his country, as 
irretrievably lost, totally gone, until one day one of his former students, now a colleague, 
said to him: “'Ibrahim, Palestine is still there'” (83).  His return, in the last years of his 
life, became about discovering the ways in which Palestine, indeed, still exists: in “half-
ruins” and material traces, in oral histories and the knowledge passed down from one 
generation to another.  Abu-Lughod remembers her father telling the story of being 
happily surprised shortly after his arrival when, upon inquiring the directions to a street, 
its name in Arabic, that he had known as a child, the children knew of the place he 
speaking: “They immediately took him there, though he could see that the street sign said 
something altogether different. From this, he knew that Palestinian parents were still 
teaching their children the old names of things even as Palestine was being buried, 
erased, and rewritten by Israel” (84).  During her stay with her father such instances 
multiply.  He points out to her the remains of old Arabic houses, surviving field markers, 
and cacti hedges that delineated the olive groves and citrus orchards of his childhood: 
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another geography that persists in between, around, underneath, and on the outskirts.  
While she laments that it is a geography immediately visible only to those with an 
intimate lived knowledge of the place, he is, nevertheless, able to reveal it to her: 
Where I, who never knew anything else, could see only the deep 
gouges in green hillsides made for Israeli settlements with garish red 
tile roofs, or miles and miles of highways criss-crossing the rocky 
landscape and claiming it with modern green signs in Hebrew and 
English, or non-native evergreen forests to hide razed villages, my 
father saw beyond, between and behind them to the familiar 
landscapes of his youth (84). 
His is a living memory that contradicts the Hebrew texts that have been written over the 
spaces of his childhood.  Recognizing the power of such counter memories, he wrote 
prolifically about his experiences, both of his childhood and the Nakba, and he 
encouraged others to do so, in the form of poetry, prose, memoirs.  Gathering together 
such bits and pieces of individual and collective memory—insisting upon the ruins—
serves as a reminder that resistance is possible, a practice that Lila Abu-Lughod herself 
picks up on.  
 Abu-Lughod emphasizes that this return, while sweet in some respects, was 
anything but a return to Paradise for her father.  Clearly the occupation had deeply 
changed the material landscape and the political climate, and she sensed moments of fear 
and uncertainty on the part of her father, despite his cheerful optimism, during their 
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travels.  Dispossession meant that he had lived the greater parter of his life in exile, and 
that his children were not able to grow up in the places of their ancestors or with their 
language.  It meant enduring many humiliations when he returned to live out his last 
years.  He understood all to well that “exercising, in the end, his right to return” was only 
made possible by his American passport and his prominent status as a distinguished 
professor (99).  His relative freedom of mobility, a position of some privilege, was 
sharply contrasted with the restricted movements or wholesale denial of access for other 
Palestinians, a point driven home on the day of his funeral, years later, in his home town 
of Jaffa, in the occupied territories: “I came to understand,” she writes, “there were many 
people who couldn't be there: all those with West Bank and Gaza identity cards. None 
were permitted to cross the checkpoints into “Israel”” (98).  The inescapable irony of the 
situation is further expressed in the fact that someone in the party received word on that 
morning that the funeral procession would be monitored by US security forces: “my 
father protected, as a citizen, by the same government that he had always berated for 
supporting and arming the killers of his people” (97).  To return—to this place between 
Heaven and Hell—was to live with all the contradictions, to embody them.  As Edward 
Said wrote in a memorial to her father: “His life simultaneously expresses defeat and 
triumph, abjection and attainment, resignation and resolve. In short it was a version of 
Palestine, lived in all its complexity” (quoted in Abu-Lughod, 101).  
 Ultimately, Abu-Lughod interprets her father's return to Palestine as more than a 
nostalgic desire to connect with a lost past before his death; his life was, she writes, “a 
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genuine confrontation with the present” (101).  In confronting the ruins of his former 
home and the brutality of an occupying force, he was driven neither to inconsolable 
melancholy nor inflamed to hatred and bitterness; instead, he saw the situation as a 
challenge, a challenge to all Palestinian people.  The fragments were the material that he 
used to load his pen—his weapon of choice.  Writing from the ruins was a practice that 
produced for him a knowledge of the present and how it is connected to the past, of the 
histories that have shaped him and the lives of his loved ones and community.  He chose 
to remain active in his struggles, rather than accepting defeat, and returning to the rubble, 
tracing out the contours of the 'half-ruins' of his former home, was one of the sources of 
inspiration for this task.  Reflecting on her father's life,  Abu-Lughod concludes: 
the Palestinian catastrophe is not just something of the past. It 
continues into the present in every house demolished by an Israeli 
bulldozer, with every firing from an Apache helicopter, with every 
stillbirth at a military checkpoint, with every village divided from its 
fields by the “separation” wall, and with every Palestinian who still 
longs to return to a home this is no more (103). 
The Nakba is an ongoing disaster, a living legacy, not a closed historical fact.  Yet, this  
openness means that the past can still be reworked: “Rather than something laid down 
once and for all, the past is a site of struggle in the present” (McNally, 191).  The terrain 
of aesthetics is one such field of battle, upon which symbols, narratives, and memories 
are heaped and records made of the damages done.  
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 For Palestinians, May 15, 1948, the day of Israel's Declaration of Independence, 
has become a national day of mourning.  It is known as the Nakba, or catastrophe.  Yet, 
the Nakba, while it recalls a particular day, is not considered to be something finished.  It 
is, rather, a symbol for the ongoing state of displacement, dispossession, and dispersal of 
the Palestinian people.  The great Palestinian poet, Mahmoud Darwish described it, in his 
public statement on the 53rd Nakba anniversary, as “an extended present that promises to 
continue in the future.”  Nakba is a concept that connects past, present, and future.  It 
emphasizes the ongoing nature of the disaster—the catastrophic manner in which Israeli 
statehood was conceived, which sparked the War of Independence (or Palestinian War) 
and other subsequent conflicts, and ultimately led to atrocities, death, and the exodux of 
over 700 000 Palestinians.  May 15, 1948, understood in this light, is a double exposure, 
a dialectical image: jubilation and despair; statehood and exile; Heaven and Hell.  For 
Jews it meant the end of persecution, an arrival in the promised land; for Palestinians it 
marked their banishment, the beginning of decades of enforced wandering.  Jean-Luc 
Godard captures this something of this idea in his controversial film Notre Musique 
(2004).  Toward the end of a lecture on cinema, entitled “The Text and the Image,” that 
he gives to a group of film students in Sarajevo, he holds up two different, yet strikingly 
similar photographs—each a portrait of a suffering man, one entitled 'jew', the other, 
'muslim'.  “[I]n 1948,” he tells them, “the Israelites walked in the water . . . to reach the 
Holy Land. The Palestinians walked in the water to drown. Shot and reverse shot. The 
Jews become the stuff of fiction . . . the Palestinians, of documentary.”  Sympathetic to 
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the tragic histories of both the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, Godard overlays these two 
images, not to suggest that their suffering is the same, but to set up a dialectical tension 
between the two conditions in order to provoke meditation on the issue.  As Amir Eshel 
has suggested, the “formal collapsing together of divergent images,” an aesthetic strategy 
used by many artists working in and with the ruins, is not the equation of suffering, but 
rather an invitation to reflection and response (141).  
 The work of Toronto-based, Canadian Israeli artist, Nomi Drory, also attempts to 
deal with the dialectical tension of this founding moment of the Israeli state.  Dichotomy, 
a series of works done in paint, charcoal, Mylar, paper, and wood, is exemplary in this 
regard.  While formally the work explores the “independence and interdependence” of 
two structures—the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin and the Israeli West Bank Barrier—it 
is also a profound meditation on violence and the interrelatedness of suffering.  As the 
daughter of a man who was a Yugoslav Holocaust survivor (the sole in his family), and 
whose “first home in Israel was the abandoned house of a Palestinian Arab family,” she 
is aware of the ways in which histories intertwine, and often tragically: “In juxtaposing 
Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial with The Israeli West Bank Barrier, I have attempted to 
represent viscerally the tragic dichotomy inherent in the founding of Israel: the creation 
of a safe home for the historically victimized Jewish people and the displacement of the 
Palestinian people,” she writes in her statement on the work.  The visual juxtaposition 
highlights the “symbolic resonance” between the two architectural structures.  It reveals 
how the past remains active in the present, for “while the memorial commemorates an 
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event in the past, the barrier functions in the present. The two edifices are, nevertheless, 
inextricably bound.”  History is spatialized, whether commemorated in monuments or 
embedded in ruins; thus material structures resound with the memory of suffering and 
violence, captured in the title of many of the Dichotomy pieces: “Again and Never 
Again.”  Her choice of materials reflects her intention of bringing these two faces of 
reality—Israeli and Palestinian—into dialogue: “I chose to incorporate bookbinding 
paper into this work because, although it is fragile, it also has a contradictory restorative 
purpose—an implicit suggestion of the possibility of resolution.”  Her aesthetics of 
engagement is one that picks up the melancholy pieces of both past and present in the 
hope of performing a work of reparation.    
 In “Layered Time: Ruins as Shattered Past, Ruins as Hope in Israeli and German 
Landscapes and Literature,” Amir Eshel discusses several interesting examples of artistic 
interventions that work with the ruins to address ethical and political issues, particularly 
in Israel and Germany.  These two states are of special interest because of their shared 
past (marked by trauma and violence) and the way that this past influences important 
decisions about their futures.  He finds in these places “cultural and political discourses 
that are shaped to a large extent by debates surrounding questions of history and memory.  
At the center of many of these debates, we find the difficulty of deciding between 
alternative understandings of what the countries' pasts signify” (136).  To speak to the 
case of Israel, the question of Palestine is ever present, for the Jewish experience of exile 
and persecution is shadowed by that of the Palestinians.  The significance of ancient 
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Jewish ruins, a source of national mythology in whose authority much of the land claims 
lie, cannot, however, ignore the haunting presence of Palestinian “cenotaphs” (137).  The 
past is one of competing claims, and the ruins scattered across the landscape are their 
persistent material reminder.  Ruins, therefore, play an important role in this postwar, 
post-Holocaust landscape because they are sites where the past is negotiated and ethical 
questions raised.  Such contemporary ruins, Eshel writes, “display the layering of time in 
space, what Koselleck calls Zeitschichten […] historical time is rendered concrete 
through spatial metaphors” (137).  As symbolic containers of the past, they are able to 
hold layers of meaning, multiple narratives, diverse and competing histories.  They insist 
that there is always another side to history, that of the vanquished, the forgotten, the 
condemned.  Indeed, Eshel goes as far as to suggest that “ruins promote conflicting 
notions of the past” (137; my emphasis).  As such, they may serve as a meeting place, a 
point of potential encounter between adversaries, a bridge that encourages the thinking 
through of conflict.  Ruins are able to serve as dialectical images precisely because of 
their ability to embody contradiction, to point at once to the past and the future, to call 
simultaneously for remembering and remaking: “they allow us to project onto them our 
wishes, desires, and hopes for the future: to see them as a space that is still in becoming 
rather than a site that merely marks what was” (147). 
 Works of art can add another strata to the composite that is the ruin: “Creating art 
[…] does not undo the past but rather suggests adding to it a new layer—a possible new 
form of life, the return of a vibrant community” (138).  Eshel describes how the walls of 
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former Palestinian homes in the abandoned Arab quarter of Haifa are covered in art.  One 
example is a poem entitled “Le'vad,” or “Alone,” composed by the poet Nava Semel, the 
child of Holocaust survivors, which was posted, in both Hebrew and Arabic, on the walls 
of one of the houses.  This poem, written about Jewish suffering, when spatially 
dislocated to the context of Palestinian history, creates a juxtaposition of suffering, a 
comment on “the displacement and exile of those [Palestinian inhabitants] who used to 
live [there]” (139).  Another piece, “Untitled,” by Israeli artist Igal Shtayim, features 
images of a woman in the cemented up windows, recalling the life of the former 
inhabitants and raising the possibility of future inhabitance.  Yet another example, this 
time of  “the textual ruin,” is the novella, “Hirbet Hizah” by S. Yizhar, a fictional account 
which invites the reader to consider how the process of Israel's state formation was bound 
up with the production of Palestinian ruins (141).  Such artistic intervention, which 
recalls different histories of suffering, shows that ethical responsiveness to the other is 
possible, “that diverging memories can share a single space, and that those who 
experienced darkness can perceive the sufferings of those around them” (139).  They 
work through juxtaposition—of one suffering with another, of the ruinous state-of-things 
with past life, of present decay with the promise of the future—which startles, jars, or 
invokes reflection on the part of those who contemplate them.  These creative pieces 
make it possible to understand how the past persists in the “now”: it is through such 
artistic and “literary sites that the interdependencies between the occurrences of the past 
and the constitution of the present are made present” (141).   
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 The final example of the 'aesthetics of the ruins' as a melancholy methodology 
comes from Ken Seigneurie's (2011) work on Lebanon.  In his book, Standing By the 
Ruins: Elegiac Humanism in Wartime and Postwar Lebanon, he points toward the ruins 
topos as an aesthetics of loss that counters the dominant aesthetics which emphasizes 
self-sacrifice and redemptive violence in Lebanon.  An aesthetics of the ruins, though 
marginal within Lebanese popular culture, serves as an important form of resistance to 
the prevalent culture of war and identitarian politics.  The images that circulate in popular 
culture constitute what he calls an aesthetic of “mythic utopianism,” which mythologizes 
death, and necessitates suffering and sacrifice in the name of 'commitment'.  It draws 
upon the codes of “social realism and a much older mythic aesthetic” to insist that the 
past can only be redeemed through violent acts (8).  Here we are witnessing a form of the 
aestheticization of politics, in which parties demand “the gold standard of commitment—
blood,” in order to continue civil war and promote sectarianism (9).  Seigneurie likens 
this aesthetic 'economy' to a blood-thirsty machine: “In the mythic utopian aesthetic, 
flesh and blood are value-quantities in an imaginary moral economy” (9-10).  His interest 
is in exploring several works of Lebanese fiction and film which, taken together, 
constitute an alternative “aesthetic of resistance against a dominant war ethos” (1).  This 
'ruin aesthetic' counters what he calls the tendency toward 'memoricide': “the eradication 
of all memories of coexistence and common interests between Lebanese,” which only 
serves to fuel violence and the process of othering (4).  Through these works the 
wreckage of the past, stripped of its mythic qualities, is juxtaposed with images that 
273 
 
glorify war in order to reveal the real legacies of violence.   
 For Seigneurie, diverse as these expressions of a ruin aesthetics are, they share a 
humanist and elegiac quality.  They draw upon the 'standing-by-the-ruins' or 'stopping-
by-the ruins' topos, which has a rich history in Medieval Arab texts (26).  These works 
are “humanist” in the sense of upholding the “general conviction that humans are 
uncircumscribable beings possessed of mystery and therefore endowed with “dignity”” 
(23).  They are elegiac in their insistence upon loss as irrecuperable: “What has been lost 
is gone forever, and life is the less for it” (31).  Violence will not bring back what is 
gone.  As such, these works avoid the danger of readings of the past that insist upon 
“programmatic action” for the future (31).  Instead, they “invite us to tarry over ruins as 
open-ended signifiers” (12).  The very activity of lingering, the sentiment of longing, are 
significant in their capacity to interrupt the dominant discourses and ideologies which 
view history in a teleological manner, as a form of progress toward a fixed end: 
A character's contemplation of a bullet-riddled statue or a narrator's 
musing before a dusty balcony strewn with dead house plants leaves 
open the question of causality and briefly halts the forward-driving 
narrative. Ruins here are metonyms of a complex, dubious past—the 
statue was once revered, the plants alive—pointing to loss without 
presuming to explain it. Ruins here do not concretize a casus belli 
according to a moralized syllogism, but unfurl time's tight progress 
and suspend cause-effect reasoning to evoke the ambiguity and 
274 
 
pathos of that which is forever lost (12). 
While I would argue that there is a value to seeking an explanation, in naming the 
structures and that have resulted in loss, Seigneurie's point here is that ruins open up a 
space of reflection—they offer the reader or viewer the critical distance necessary to 
question “the logic of righteous retribution”  (34).  Rather than simply blaming the 
'other', they call upon us to think through moral complexity and find new solutions to 
dealing with animosity.  In the novels, films, and popular culture examples he discusses, 
memory is an ethical refusal to forget the past which opens up a transformative space, 
while the difficult and painful work of mourning is proposed as a way of learning to bear 
the past, and as such, to intervene in the cycles that have ensured that the future is always 
a repetition of the same. 
 What remains—the ruins—become the unassimilable fragments of the past that 
aid us in resisting compulsion.  Melancholizing becomes an activity that resists 
hegemonic forces—of ideological and political coercion—that insist upon the will to 
power as a response to animosity.  The melancholy nature of cultural productions evokes 
reflection upon the past; remembering counters those who would have us forget what has 
been lost—human lives.  The aesthetics of the ruins becomes a way to think against the 
grain.  Ruin fragments—the refuse, the leftovers of war and violence—insert themselves 
into the dominant discourses, imagery, and aesthetics, interrupting their narratives that 
lead straightforwardly from one version of the past to present sacrifices.  As such, they 
have the power to stimulate meaningful reflection on cycles of violence and revenge, 
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even if they cannot break them directly.  
 This chapter has developed the concept of an 'aesthetics of the ruins' to designate 
alternative cultural tendencies that reject the depressive paradigm of withdrawal, 
disengagement, inaction, and hopelessness.  Contra the postmodern evacuation of history, 
this aesthetics, in returning to the remains of past, enriches our historical imagination—of 
past, present, and future—allowing us to better understand the historicity of our affective, 
social, and political conditions.  The revitalization of our sense of the possible, as well as 
a keen sense of what has been lost, is one outcome of such a practice.  In acknowledging 
and working through loss, it becomes part of the subject, adding depth, richness, and 
complexity to her character.  A ruin aesthetics, as we have seen, is characterized as much 
by its content as its methodology.  Melancholy need not convey a depressive state; it is as 
much an activity of reflecting upon loss, an historical sensibility, and a framework for 
understanding ourselves both as historical subjects and agents as it is a psychological 
condition.  As Eshel argues: “Ruins [...] enable us to think about the historicity of our 
condition and even experience hope. The significant ruins of our time indicate both the 
persistence of the catastrophic and the fact that humans—weak and restricted as we 
might be—are still agents of our histories” (135).   
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
This dissertation has attempted to speak to the fashioning and refashioning of historical 
awareness and possibility in and through our encounters with and elaboration upon ruins.  
The concern with subjectivity—with how we imagine our conditions of possibility, how 
we grapple with loss and build anew—has been at the heart of this analysis.  Ruins are 
one index of how trauma and loss are experienced and assigned meaning.  They serve as 
one of the privileged tropes through which, over the course of modern Western history, 
broader understandings of temporality, history, and human agency have found 
expression.  The starting point for this thesis has been the premise that encountering the 
ruins of the catastrophe and disasters of the twentieth century—ranging from global and 
nuclear warfare to deindustrialization to the rise and fall of ‘actually existing 
socialism’—has undoubtedly had an impact upon the contemporary imagination.  The 
full extent of that impact, of the reverberations on the social and cultural imaginary in the 
aftermath of these significant events, is still to be determined.        
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What is clear is that the ways in which ruins are perceived and interpreted 
changes in different historical periods.  What ruins signify reveals much of the imaginary 
of the time, particularly the dominant readings of both history and agency.  While ruins 
in modernity signalled a dialectical tension between loss and hope, between decay and 
renewal, between past and future, we must ask whether they still have that same 
significance in the current conjuncture, whatever we label it.  “The losses of the past are 
irreversible; this is what constitutes the melancholy of history” Fritzsche writes in his 
study of the revolutionary period in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century France; 
yet, the people of the time actively sought out new ways to “connect their personal 
ordeals with larger social narratives,” including revolution and other historical dramas, in 
which they often participated (2004, 8).  This modern melancholy view of history—the 
nostalgia evoked by the impossibility of returning to the lost past—as so many theorists, 
including Walter Benjamin, Marshall Berman, David Harvey, and Peter Fritzsche have 
demonstrated, was nonetheless tempered by a creative impulse directed toward shaping 
that same history.  Modernity offered up the present as a site of possibility, unhinged 
from previous orderings of social, political, and economic life, even as it estranged 
people from former ways of being in and knowing the world.  While the loss of traditions 
no doubt came with feelings of dislocation and rootlessness, the other side of this was a 
new freedom to invent, to redefine values, and to reimagine social relations.  Modernity 
thus engendered committed practice in the spheres of art and politics.  The deep-seated 
losses of everyday life were worked through and assigned new meanings.  Ruins, in the 
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context of European modernity, “made it easier to consider the different ways in which 
historical conditions shaped the actions of men and women and thus to imagine 
(Western) people as historically active subjects” (Fritzsche, 125).  Ruins were taken up 
by the imaginary as metaphors for a history in which it was possible to remake identities, 
forge political bonds, and incite change.     
It was only in the twentieth century that a series of global atrocities came to 
overshadow the optimism, however tempered, that was part of the earlier modern period.  
Authors and poets saw Europe not as landscape of picturesque remnants, as in the 
Romantic period, nor even as the stage upon which the fragments of political turmoil 
were littered, as in the modern, revolutionary period, but instead as a wasteland.  The 
rubble of bombing blitzes, the haunting remains of mass graves, and glittering atomic 
ashes altered the conceptualization not only of the ruin, but also of historical possibility 
and human agency.  The work of mourning became complicated, and even seemingly 
impossible, in the aftermath of human-made horrors and catastrophes of a kind 
previously unimaginable.  Even Sigmund Freud who, in his early essays, drew a clear 
line between mourning and melancholia and believed that the analysis and working 
through of loss could be achieved, began to doubt whether the process of coming to terms 
with our losses had an end—whether, in fact, loss might be rooted in the very subjectivity 
of modern beings.  Modernity itself, vehicle for the Enlightenment project, was seen as 
responsible for these horrific events.  The anti-modern impulse was perhaps an inevitable 
response to the barbarism of fascism, death camps, and nuclear war: a healthy stock-
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taking of the dangers that accompany any rationalized schemas apparently dedicated to 
the advancement of ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’.  Important cultural theorists, such as 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1986), raised important questions as to the role 
and the state of culture and cultural production (with which ruins are bound) in the post-
war, post-Holocaust, post-atomic world.  These critiques have been indispensable to the 
re-thinking of representation and memorialization in the last few decades.  The question 
of how to remember and mourn is anything but straightforward, and raises philosophical 
issues surrounding the nature of presence and absence, the relation of form to content, 
and the kinds of memory available to those who never experienced the events directly.  
The pressing imperative that the past should not be repeated is one that has animated 
these discussions.   
Yet the postmodern movement, which has followed on the heels of these anti-
modern critiques of modernity and the Enlightenment, lacks the same critical power.  In 
fact, rather than establishing its raison d'être in reference to the past—in the ethical 
concern to remember the past and to remain vigilant against barbarism, that is, in self-
reflexivity—it is, as Frederic Jameson (1991) has pointed out, entirely self-referential.  
We might suggest that it has constituted itself in a narcissistic, specular manner.  Any 
reference to the past—and indeed, past forms and styles do return as spectacles and 
commodities—is illusionary, for these forms are emptied of their content.  They are not 
the surviving traces of the past that disrupt the present and call into question the status 
quo, not remnants of disappointed hopes that speak to the unfinished possibilities of 
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historical action, but pastiche, parodies of the “stereotypical past” (Jameson, 21).  In 
postmodernism, there is an impoverishment not of a sense of historical continuity—
something that was already lost in modernism—but of historical rupture and 
discontinuity, of history itself as in-the-making, as shaped by human agency, and 
therefore as open to transformative events such as revolution.  In these ways it mirrors—
and perhaps is even symptomatic of—the self-referentiality of that other system, 
neoliberal capitalism, which claims its victory over the social, political, and economic 
spheres.  Both are self-affirming and supposedly triumphant.  Both occupy the space of 
the now—that eternal moment—which suspends historical time as the time of agency and 
praxis.  Capitalism, which has long been engaged in the process of remaking the world in 
its image, has perhaps only recently achieved the apotheosis of this refashioning process: 
even cultural forms, once the site of negativity and challenge, impassively mirror its 
features.  
What becomes of ruins in this brave new world?  Once the debris of the past still 
active in the present, evoking both loss and its counterpoint in possibility, ruins are now 
quickly cycled back into the circuits of commodification and consumption, and thereby 
stripped of their critical power: they are refurbished, gentrified, demolished, or otherwise 
erased.  Ruins are hardly allowed to remain, especially untouched—that is, without the 
superimposition of some kind of message or political intention—upon the landscape.  
Indeed, even when it concerns the ruins of supposedly ‘natural’ events, like hurricanes or 
flooding, the ‘slate’ is quickly wiped clean.  As Naomi Klein (2007) discusses, 
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catastrophe becomes an opportunity for selling off public assets, privatizing space, and 
re-engineering social relations.  Profitability, in these cases, extends into the furthest 
reaches of disaster, making of ruins the latest frontier of accumulation and dispossession.  
Among those others that are still perceptible, that have left visible traces upon the 
landscape—the ruins, for instance, of the former Soviet Union or deindustrialization in 
Detroit—they often seem to signify the loss of the future, of any hopes for an alternative 
project that might enliven the present.  In these conditions, is it any wonder that 
depression has become pandemic in Western countries, or that political activities often 
seem shadowed by cynicism or ‘left melancholy’?   
“Not the ruin, but the ruin of the ruin is the hallmark of modernity,” Fritzsche 
suggests (102).  This is a provocative statement, and one that has been and will continue 
to be debated by scholars.  As he goes on to explain:  
Nineteenth-century Europeans were increasingly conscious of the 
ways in which history enhanced the subject and enabled action. They 
fashioned their newly mobilized identities out of loss and 
displacement […] The culture of remembrance became a political 
force. In this view, then, it was the perpetual present, the ruin of the 
ruin, the permanence and preemption of empire, that constituted the 
real destructive potential of modernity (128). 
This “ruin of the ruin” never fully materialized in the period with which Fritzsche deals 
in his book.  While the ruin of the ruin was threatened, it was never really an achieved 
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reality.  But this begs the question, is the ruin of the ruin, in fact, the spectre that haunts 
our age?  Have we departed from modernity’s culture of remembrance that was so 
politically-charged to enter an era of forgetfulness?  Is the ‘empire of capital’, to borrow 
the title of Ellen Meiksins Wood’s (2005) book, the real destructive threat—the eternal 
return of the same?  The answer is of course complicated.  While perhaps more closely 
achieved in the contemporary moment than at the height of modernity, this ruin of the 
ruin remains, nevertheless, only a partial victory.  Indeed, while capitalism consumes the 
past, people continue to remember.       
 Ruins, or at least the memories of ruins, the memories of loss, cannot be entirely 
effaced.  They find expression in works of fiction, memoirs, films, paintings, and 
installations.  Again and again, women and men return to the ruins of their former 
countries, to the ruins of occupation or of empire, to the ruins of their former residences 
and workplaces.  ‘Standing by the ruins’, as Ken Seigneurie (2011) has shown, becomes 
an act of resistance, a way to think against the dominant discourses of society.  
The forgetfulness of popular culture and of the spectacle is also in contrast to the 
marked interest displayed by contemporary scholarship in memory studies and in ruin 
studies.  Art is another arena in which, while there are indeed many pieces that centre 
upon enactments of depression and the impoverishment of memory, as demonstrated by 
Christine Ross (2006), there is an alternative current, if marginal, of aesthetic practices 
that are concerned with the ruins.  Furthermore, the very impulse to revisit, to theorize, 
even to mourn the ruins of modernity, as exemplified by Julia Hell and Andreas 
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Schönle’s (2008) edited collection, should perhaps be read as a signal that modernity is 
an unfinished business—and that is good news.  The ruins of modernity are our ruins.  
We have to grapple with them and decide what they mean for the future.   
Confronting the disappointments and the catastrophes of the past is not an inert, 
backward-looking gesture, but rather a way of recuperating the revolutionary impulses or 
unrealized possibilities that rest there, at the same time as we learn from our mistakes.  
“Rather than something laid down once and for all, the past is a site of struggle in the 
present” writes McNally (2001, 191).  We have to sift through the ruins of history, of our 
recent past, to find what is worth salvaging.  As Susan Buck-Morss argues “we […] 
would do well to bring the ruins up close and work our way through the rubble in order to 
rescue the utopian hopes that modernity engendered, because we cannot afford to let 
them disappear” (2000, 68).  Nor does moving beyond the melancholy imagination mean 
the disavowal or foreclosure of loss and the adoption of an attitude of false or naïve 
optimism.  Instead, it means that we use melancholy as a method, as Flatley (2008) has 
suggested, for tracing out the structures and institutions responsible for the production of 
mental, emotional, and physical ruins, in order to move beyond the paralyzation of 
agency and challenge the frameworks that are limiting our sense of the possible.   
There is still an openness to history; the future remains undetermined. 
Everywhere capitalism offers opportunities for encounters with its recent past in the form 
of the obsolete and the outmoded, those “melancholy traces” of history that can spark 
moments of insight (Stead 2001, 11).  Capitalism has not succeeded in stripping us of our 
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capacity to dream, to erect structures in our imagination even if they are not always 
realized on the ground.  And this is important because there are many challenges ahead.  
We are called upon to reimagine our cities, to find new solutions to conflicts, to work out 
alternatives to the institutions and structures that are causing so much damage to our lives 
and livelihoods.  While it was beyond the scope of this dissertation to document all of the 
dynamic and creative reappropriations of ruins, I have sought to introduce readers to 
enough interesting examples that demonstrate that ruins continue to be a site of 
contestation and struggle.  They remain a privileged topos in debates over remembering, 
renewal, resistance, and even the revitalization of our social, political, and economic 
landscapes.  
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